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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis presents three empirical essays on the interaction of housing and 
labour markets, which generates academically meaningful social outcomes. The 
first essay looks at whether one’s tenure choice affects unemployment as this 
question has potential implications for homeownership subsidy schemes adopted 
in many advanced countries. The contribution of this essay is mainly 
methodological in that it rigorously deals with the endogeneity of homeownership 
by taking an IV approach with instruments not adopted previously for studies in 
the UK in conjunction with panel data models. Using the local homeownership 
rate and parental homeownership status as an instrument, it shows that 
homeownership does not increase the probability of being unemployed.  
 
The second essay highlights the role of local housing market information as a 
determinant of housing tenure. As the distance a mover wants to move increases, 
the costs of collecting information on the destination housing market rise and the 
quality and amount of the information collected fall. Therefore, it is hypothesised 
that the longer the distance moved, the more likely movers are to choose private 
renting over owner-occupation since homeownership decisions require a large 
amount of information on the target properties and their neighbourhoods. 
Empirical tests that control for relevant characteristics correlated with distance 
moved and tenure decisions provide supporting evidence for this hypothesis.  
 
The last essay is the first UK study to confirm that commuting time has a negative 
influence on worker effort. The topic has important implications for transportation 
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policy, employer’s commuting welfare strategy and hiring decisions and 
individual worker’s location decisions. As commuting is physically and mentally 
tiring, it could influence worker effort negatively. The hypothesis turns out to be 
true when the absenteeism rate and unpaid overtime hours are used as proxy 
variables for work effort. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Overview of thesis 
This thesis explores the interaction between housing and labour markets from an 
economic perspective through three empirical essays. The two markets are 
distinguishable from each other in terms of elements and functioning and have 
been studied separately by two distinctive groups of economists with different 
academic interests and focuses. As a result, two branches of applied economics, 
namely urban economics (more specifically housing economics) and labour 
economics, have developed. Housing economics particularly tends to focus on 
institutional arrangements such as the provision of social housing or the specifics 
and role of housing finance whereas labour economists tend to look at labour 
markets in the aggregate and certainly in a non-spatial way.  
 
However, the spatial extent of both housing and labour markets is similar for most 
households as both work and other daily activities need to occur within a 
relatively small area for the efficiency of time and resource. The spatial proximity 
of the two markets increases the likelihood of socially and economically 
meaningful interaction between them. For example, the location of the job 
determines that of the residence and, at the same time, the location of residence 
tends to determine the spatial area of the search for jobs. The starting point of this 
thesis is the recognition of the fact that spatial dimension is exactly what housing 
and labour markets have in common and therefore it is difficult to understand 
housing markets without taking into account the spatial character of the labour 
market and vice versa.  
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There are a few academic advantages of studying the two markets jointly. The 
studies of the interaction between the two markets are usually initiated by one side 
and they soon attract the attention of the other. Through the process of 
competition and collaboration between the two sides, the expert knowledge and 
research specialities of one side are likely to be mixed with those of the other. For 
instance, the research focus of housing economists could inspire labour market 
researchers to pay more attention to spatial aspects of the labour market such as 
the locations of jobs and workers. Any critical errors which might threaten the 
validity of the studies can be more easily detected and corrected. Indeed, labour 
economists often test with macro-data Oswald’s (1996) hypothesis that one’s 
homeownership may affect one’s employment status but urban economists 
criticise this practice and employ micro-data as the hypothesis is concerned with 
behaviours and labour market outcomes of individual homeowners.  
 
Looking at one of the two markets can also help in finding missing pieces of the 
puzzle of the other market. Although there are many studies which do not confirm 
Oswald’s (1996) hypothesis, his speculation could have led to the discovery of a 
significant cause of unemployment from a completely unexpected angle. 
Moreover, larger scale and more complete pictures of the operation of urban areas 
can be captured through the study of the two most notable urban markets 
simultaneously. As they interact to generate joint social outcomes, an observation 
of only one market is not able to reveal a complete picture of how urban areas 
work and operate. For example, to study commuting behaviours, the functioning 
13 
 
of labour, housing and transportation markets need to be addressed together as 
Rouwendal and Nijkamp (2004) suggest. 
 
This thesis tries to explore three topics, all of which are related to unemployment, 
one of the most important economic issues in our society. Each chapter commonly 
focuses on activities or behaviour to find and retain jobs and studies the 
relationships between such activities and socio-economic outcomes in labour or 
housing markets. Chapter 2 focuses on individual’s homeownership decisions to 
ascertain if it causes unemployment. Given the greater cost of inter-city mobility 
faced by homeowners compared to private renters, it would be more difficult for 
homeowners to move labour markets and so, they may experience a greater 
probability of being unemployed. Chapter 3 looks at the relationship between 
migration distance and housing tenure decisions. Given the costs of information 
on more distant housing markets, an inter-city/labour market move would make a 
worker more likely to opt to rent rather than own in their destination housing 
markets. Chapter 4 is concerned with commuting which is an alternative 
mechanism to migration to find and keep a job. Within a city’s labour market 
given the costs of commuting, a longer journey to work is likely associated with 
less effort on the job. A more detailed discussion of each chapter is given below.  
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1.2. Outline of empirical chapters 
1.2.1. Homeownership and unemployment  
Chapter 2 investigates whether one’s homeownership causally affects one’s 
employment status. Homeownership is subsidised through various policies in 
many countries but if it causes unemployment, one of the most important 
economic problems many governments struggle to resolve, those policies may 
have to be revised or even abandoned. Therefore, it is important to understand any 
link between homeownership and unemployment for public policy’s sake. One 
well-known hypothesis on the relationship between homeownership and 
unemployment is speculated first by Oswald (1996) who shows that 
homeownership rates are positively correlated with unemployment rates across 
countries. This suggests that the effect from homeownership to unemployment 
might be causal since homeowners are generally less mobile than renters given the 
costs of buying and selling housing. Initially, most studies tested the hypothesis 
using macro-data and almost unanimously produced empirical results in support 
of Oswald’s proposition (e.g. Nickell, 1998; Pehkonen, 1999; Green and 
Hendershott, 2001). However, the criticism arises that they used macro-data to 
explain a micro-level outcome (note that individual homeowners’ low mobility is 
suggested as a cause of their unemployment). More recent studies employ micro-
data and generally produce evidence which contradicts the conclusions of the 
macro-level studies (e.g. Van Leuvensteijn and Koning, 2004; Munch et al., 2006, 
2008; Battu et al., 2008; Coulson and Fisher, 2009).  
 
Furthermore, those micro-level studies tend to deal with the endogeneity of 
homeownership much more rigorously than the macro-level studies by often 
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adopting the multi-spell approach (e.g. Van Leuvensteijn and Koning, 2004; 
Munch et al., 2006, 2008, Battu et al., 2008). The endogeneity of homeownership 
is problematic as it causes ordinary least squares (OLS) or maximum likelihood 
(ML) estimators to be biased for two reasons. Firstly, one’s homeownership status 
is correlated with one’s personal and family characteristics and these are 
simultaneously correlated with one’s unemployment. The omission of the 
variables representing those characteristics from OLS regressions would cause 
bias. Secondly, there is mutual causality between homeownership and 
unemployment. Oswald (1996) suggests that homeowners’ low mobility could 
lead to a higher likelihood of being unemployed at any given time but reversely, 
the unemployed are less likely to be homeowners as employment is an important 
source of income to finance home purchases. Therefore, the OLS or ML 
estimation would capture the correlation between homeownership and 
unemployment rather than the causality this chapter focuses.  
 
This chapter also explores the relationship between homeownership and 
unemployment using micro-data but it is methodologically distinguished from the 
previous micro-level studies in that it relies on an instrumental variable (IV) 
approach rather than the multi-spell approach. This chapter employs two 
instruments but no single UK dataset can provide both of them at the same time. 
Therefore, these two instruments are obtained from different datasets and an 
empirical analysis needs to be carried out for each instrument separately. The first 
instrument is the local homeownership rate which can be regarded as a 
comprehensive indicator of how accessible homeownership is in the local area. It 
is a frequently employed instrument for individual homeownership status (e.g. 
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Van Leuvensteijn and Koning, 2004; Dujardin and Goffette-Nagot, 2008) but has 
not yet been tried in the UK study of this topic. One of the special licensed 
versions of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) provides information on 
the survey respondent’s local district of residence and based on this locality 
information and housing tenure status, homeownership rates of 278 districts of 
Great Britain are calculated.  
 
The second instrument is parental homeownership status when individuals were 
young children. Parental homeownership status was once used as an instrument 
for the Danish study by Munch et al. (2008) and shown to be highly correlated 
with their offspring’s homeownership status. The high correlation is also found in 
the related literature, which is believed to be because of an inter-generational 
transfer of wealth and knowledge of real estate transactions (Munro, 1989; 
Hamnett et al., 1991; Deutsch, 1997; Haurin and Morrow-Jones, 2006; Hilber and 
Liu, 2008). However, parents’ homeownership status is unlikely to be correlated 
with their children’s unemployment status. This instrument is available from the 
British Cohort Study (BCS) 1970 which follows cohort members born in a certain 
week of 1970 throughout their lifetimes. Therefore, the information on the 
homeownership status of their parents can be traced back to when the cohort 
members were 5 years old. 
 
The model specification states that one’s unemployment status is a function of 
homeownership status along with other controls. The model is estimated first 
using the ML logit by pooling the entire sample over time from the BHPS. 
Contrary to Oswald’s hypothesis, the likelihood of being unemployed turns out to 
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be lower for homeowners than for private renters but it is likely to be a spurious 
correlation through individuals’ innate abilities which reduces the likelihood of 
unemployment but increases that of homeownership. To control for unobserved 
time-constant heterogeneity including innate ability and to remove the possibility 
of reverse causality, a fixed effects (FE) IV model is estimated with the instrument 
being the local homeownership rate. The result indicates no causal effect of 
homeownership on unemployment status. When the model is estimated by two-
stage least squares (2SLS) with parents’ homeownership status as an instrument 
using the BCS 1970, the same result is found – homeownership has no impact on 
unemployment status.  
 
1.2.2. Distance moved and housing tenure decision 
Chapter 3 focuses on the effect on movers’ tenure choices of information on 
destination housing markets, with the distance moved being a proxy variable for 
the costs of acquiring the market information. It is often observed that job-related 
movers move relatively long distances as they are likely to move between 
spatially separated labour markets. Such inter-market moves naturally lead to a 
change in home location and housing markets, too. In the new housing markets, 
the movers face uncertainty about the quality of the neighbourhood and the 
appropriate price level for housing of a given quality. This uncertainty is expected 
to cause the movers to opt to rent since renting implies lower subsequent moving 
costs and no house price risk that can be substantial for uninformed movers. Once 
renters gather more information on their housing markets over time, they can 
make more informed decisions regarding the location of more permanent housing. 
Yet, the degree of uncertainty is expected to increase with the distance moved as 
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the collection of information on the new housing market becomes increasingly 
difficult as movers intend to move longer distances. Hence, it can be hypothesised 
that the longer the distance moved, the higher the likelihood of choosing private 
renting over owner-occupation. 
 
The dataset for this study is the Survey of English Housing (SEH) as it contains 
the essential information such as the distances moved to current accommodation 
and housing tenure status of households. In addition, various socio-demographic 
and economic characteristics of household heads are available to be included as 
control variables. These variables are of great help for reducing omitted variable 
biases as they are thought to be correlated with distance moved and propensity to 
own. Furthermore, though it is a cross-sectional dataset, the SEH provides some 
information on the pre-move conditions of households including previous housing 
tenure which helps to control for unobservable preferences and ability to own.  
 
Including the main hypothesis introduced above, three hypotheses, all of which 
are consistent with the notion that the distance moved affects a tenure decision, 
are tested. The first hypothesis is whether the amount of information on 
destination housing markets held by movers decreases with the distance moved. 
The measures of how aware movers are of problems in the new neighbourhoods 
are assumed to reflect the amount of local housing market information held by the 
movers prior to their moves. Empirically, the degree of awareness is shown to 
decrease with the distance moved. Secondly, the main hypothesis that the 
likelihood of choosing homeownership over private renting declines with the 
distance moved is shown to have a support from the empirical analysis. The last 
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hypothesis is concerned with household’s subsequent moving decisions and states 
that the longer the distance moved, the more likely movers are to move again 
shortly after their initial moves. As renting households become familiar with their 
housing markets, they may consider moving to more permanent accommodation 
within the same market. This tendency is likely to be stronger for longer-distance 
movers as they are less likely to be satisfied with their new neighbourhood and 
accommodation due to lack of information on them. Therefore, they are expected 
to move out sooner than shorter-distance movers and this hypothesis is confirmed 
by the empirical analysis. 
 
1.2.3. Commuting time and worker effort 
Chapter 4 examines whether commuting time has a negative influence on worker 
effort. Though inevitable in the modern world, commuting is recognised as a 
physically and mentally tiring activity. Psychology and transportation studies also 
report commuting as a negative experience (Koslowsky et al., 1995; Evans and 
Wener, 2006; Hoehner et al., 2012). This finding naturally leads to the question of 
whether the length of commuting time affects worker effort negatively. Though 
there could be important implications for a study of this kind to workers, 
employers, and policy makers, economists have not paid very much attention to 
the question to date. Zenou (2002) uses the idea of commuting distance reducing 
worker effort levels only to set up his red-line hypothesis which seeks to explain 
Kain’s (1968) spatial mismatch hypothesis and it is not tested empirically. Ha 
(2005) tests the relationship using the UK data but cannot find evidence for it. To 
the best of the author’s knowledge, the paper by Ommeren and Gutiérrez-i-
Puigarnau (2011) is the first and only study that carries out more rigorous research 
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on this issue and concludes that commuting distance does increase the worker 
absenteeism rate using German data. Given this relative lack of information and 
evidence, this chapter contributes to the literature by adding evidence using UK 
micro-data. 
 
In the literature, effort is understood as effective labour supply and this allows the 
use of a neoclassical labour supply model as an analytical framework to predict 
the effect of commuting time on effort. The basic idea is that a worker facing 
reduced leisure time as a result of more time spent commuting is likely to shirk 
work to achieve the same utility level as an otherwise identical worker with zero 
commuting time. Through the review of the labour-supply literature, absenteeism 
and unpaid overtime work hours are chosen as proxy measures for effort. Though 
they are correlated with effort in different ways (absenteeism is negatively and 
unpaid overtime work is positively correlated), both variables bear a core 
characteristic of effort: effort is costly to employees but beneficial to employers. 
The adoption of two different measures is expected to strengthen the reliability of 
the empirical results. 
 
The dataset for empirical analysis is the UK Quarterly Labour Force Survey 
(QLFS) as it provides information on both absenteeism and unpaid overtime work 
hours and other relevant variables which contain a great deal of information 
relating to work and employment. The availability of abundant information on 
personal and family characteristics and work conditions helps to control all the 
necessary explanatory variables so that concern about omitted variable bias can be 
substantially lessened. The empirical results are supportive of the hypothesis: 
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absenteeism is positively correlated with commuting time and unpaid overtime 
work hours are negatively correlated. 
 
To check the robustness of the results, this chapter examines if the size of the 
effect is different between full-time and part-time workers. The prediction is that 
the relationship between commuting time and effort level would be stronger for 
part-time workers because the effective wage rate would fall more sharply for 
them since their hours of work are shorter for a given increase in commuting time. 
As predicted, part-time workers reduce their effort levels more substantially for a 
given increase in commuting time. Secondly, working women are expected to 
reduce effort at a greater degree than men as commuting time increases. They are 
likely to be more time-constrained than working men due to additional household 
work and so, they are expected to respond more sensitively to a given increase in 
commuting time. This prediction is also shown to hold true empirically. Even after 
finding evidence consistent with the hypothesis that commuting time affects 
worker effort negatively, one cannot be certain that the confirmed correlation is 
entirely causal. Theoretically, reverse causation running from effort to commuting 
could exist as less work-oriented workers might choose long commutes to live in 
suburban areas to enjoy a higher quality of life. However, less work-motivated 
workers are likely to try to find jobs near their homes and therefore the influence 
of the reverse causality is likely to be limited.  
 
The empirical findings of this chapter have important implications for policy-
makers, employers and workers. For policy-makers, this chapter suggests that 
increased labour productivity should be considered as one of the benefits of 
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improved transportation infrastructure in the cost and benefit analysis of 
investment in public transport. Employers would find it worth improving their 
workers’ commuting environment or shortening their commuting time by, for 
example, running free shuttles or subsidising the use of faster and more 
convenient transport, since all such measures can increase worker effort levels and 
productivity. For workers, an increase in their effort levels due to reduced 
commuting time could lead to pay rises and promotion through increased 
productivity. They may consider moving closer to their workplaces if the gain 
from improved productivity is predicted to be greater than the relocation costs. 
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CHAPTER 2. HOMEOWNERSHIP AND UNEMPLOYMENT 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Assessing the social benefits and social costs of homeownership accurately is 
important from a welfare economics point of view as the social net benefit (or cost) 
determines whether homeownership should be encouraged and subsidised. In 
reality, many advanced countries provide favourable tax treatment for 
homeowners (Hendershott and White, 2000) and this may be because the relative 
benefits of homeownership have been demonstrated and recognised, such as its 
positive impact on social capital, child-rearing, home maintenance, etc. However, 
the debate still continues around whether homeownership has an unfavourable 
impact on one’s labour market outcome. This chapter aims to provide rigorous and 
novel evidence on the causal effect of homeownership on unemployment using 
UK micro-data and complements earlier studies in that it is the first to combine a 
panel fixed effects model and an instrumental variable approach to assess the 
causal effect.  
 
The recent revival of the debate on the impact of homeownership on 
unemployment is sparked by Oswald (1996, 1999) as he suggests that persistently 
high unemployment rates have been associated with rising homeownership rates 
in most advanced economies since the 1960s. Early empirical studies test whether 
those two rates have a positive correlation at the country and regional level and 
confirm it almost unanimously (e.g. Nickell, 1998; Pehkonen, 1999; Green and 
Hendershott, 2001). However, these studies are criticised as they depend on overly 
simplistic econometric techniques and control for too few explanatory variables to 
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cope with the endogeneity of homeownership. A more fundamental problem of 
these studies arises from the fact that they suggest macro-level findings as 
evidence for Oswald’s hypothesis whereas it is concerned with individual 
homeowners’ behaviours and labour market outcomes. Therefore, it is 
questionable whether aggregate-level results are truly brought about by 
underlying individuals’ behaviours. 
 
Recent micro-level studies tend to look directly at the unemployment status of 
individual homeowners and conclude that they are not necessarily more likely to 
be unemployed than renters (e.g. Van Leuvensteijn and Koning, 2004; Munch et 
al., 2006, 2008; Battu et al., 2008; Coulson and Fisher, 2009). Munch et al. (2006) 
suggest that homeowners may face greater difficulties in moving home than 
renters but they are more willing to accept local jobs at a lower reservation wage 
to avoid unemployment. Indeed, homeowners may be prepared to accept the 
inherent disadvantage associated with homeownership (i.e. being less mobile than 
renters) and they try to find and keep jobs even if working conditions are 
unfavourable. 
 
Methodologically, micro-level studies are better placed to cope with the 
endogeneity of homeownership either through a multi-spell approach (e.g. Van 
Leuvensteijn and Koning, 2004; Munch et al., 2006, 2008; Battu et al., 2008) or 
through an instrumental variable approach (e.g. Coulson and Fisher, 2009). 
Endogeneity of homeownership status may be a problem for two reasons. Firstly, 
one’s homeownership status is correlated with numerous individual and household 
characteristics which affect preference and the ability to own. If some of these 
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characteristics are also correlated with unemployment status but not controlled for 
in the OLS estimation, the estimated coefficient of homeownership is biased and 
inconsistent (i.e. omitted variable bias). Secondly, one’s unemployment status 
may affect the likelihood of one’s homeownership (possibility of reverse 
causation). Labour income is a significant determinant of homeownership since a 
stable income stream is a key to making mortgage payments. As unemployment 
means zero labour income, one might expect that the unemployed have a lower 
probability of becoming homeowners than the employed. Therefore, both 
directions of causality could result in a positive correlation between probabilities 
of becoming a homeowner and being unemployed and the OLS estimation cannot 
tell us the direction of causality. 
 
The present analysis differs from previous micro-level studies in the UK in terms 
of methodology. Unlike previous UK studies, it employs an instrumental variable 
(IV) approach, using the local aggregate homeownership rate and the parents’ 
homeownership status when the children were young as instrumental variables 
(henceforth instruments). The local homeownership rate is frequently used as an 
instrument for an individual’s homeownership status (e.g. Van Leuvensteijn and 
Koning, 2004; Dujardin and Goffette-Nagot, 2008; Munch et al., 2008). It can be 
understood as a comprehensive indicator of how accessible homeownership is in a 
specific local area. The parents’ homeownership status is shown to be a strong 
predictor of their offspring’s homeownership status in the related literature and 
this is likely because wealth and knowledge of real estate transactions are 
transferred between generations (Munro, 1989; Hamnett et al., 1991; Deutsch, 
1997; Haurin and Morrow-Jones, 2006; Hilber and Liu, 2008). The identifying 
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assumption is that when various time-varying characteristics and individual fixed 
effects are controlled for, the parents’ past homeownership status is uncorrelated 
with the children’s current unemployment status. In practice, it is used as an 
instrument in Munch et al. (2008) to explore the causal effect of homeownership 
on unemployment in Denmark and shows a strong and positive correlation with 
their children’s homeownership status.  
 
No single UK micro-dataset can provide both instruments and hence the two 
variables need to be obtained from two different datasets. The empirical analysis 
will also be carried out separately for each instrument. The local homeownership 
rate is obtainable from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) as one of the 
special-licensed versions of the BHPS provides information on the respondents’ 
local districts of residence. Based on this information, the proportion of 
homeowners and private renters among the survey respondents are computed for 
278 districts of Great Britain. The parents’ homeownership status is derived from 
the British Cohort Study (BCS) 1970 which follows a group of people (cohort 
members) born in a certain week of 1970 throughout their lifetime. Therefore, the 
information on the homeownership status of the cohort members’ parents can be 
traced back to when the members were 5 years old. In addition to the instruments, 
both datasets also contain information on personal and household-level 
characteristics which help control for variables that are correlated with both 
unemployment and homeownership status. 
 
A model specification states that one’s unemployment status is a function of 
homeownership status along with other control variables. The empirical section 
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first estimates the relationship by maximum-likelihood logit estimation. The 
regression results indicate that the probability of being unemployed is smaller for 
homeowners than for private renters, contrary to Oswald’s hypothesis. However, 
this finding may only be due to spurious correlation through an individual’s innate 
ability which reduces the likelihood of unemployment but increases that of 
homeownership. To control for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity, 
including innate ability, a fixed effects (FE) model is estimated using the panel 
structure of the BHPS and the difference in the probability of unemployment 
between homeowners and private tenants disappears. This result implies that one’s 
homeownership is, indeed, correlated with unobservable characteristics and these 
are also correlated with unemployment status. However, an FE model cannot 
account for reverse causality and therefore an FE IV model is estimated with the 
instrument being the local homeownership rate. The result shows that there is no 
causal effect of homeownership status on unemployment status. When the model 
is estimated by 2SLS, using parents’ homeownership status as an instrument with 
the BCS 1970, homeownership is shown again to have no impact on 
unemployment status.  
 
Overall, this chapter contributes to the gathering of evidence on the causal 
relationship between homeownership and unemployment. Its key contribution is 
methodological in that it uses two different types of instruments which have not 
yet been used with UK data. Both of the instruments are correlated with an 
individual’s homeownership status but have different rationales as an instrument 
so that the robustness of the empirical results can be double-checked. Furthermore, 
taking advantage of the panel structure of the BHPS, this chapter runs an FE IV 
28 
 
model which can be more effective in identifying the causality of interest than an 
IV approach alone.  
 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 reviews previous papers 
related to this study and discusses their results to highlight a gap to be filled in the 
literature. Section 2.3 presents theoretical reasoning and discusses the main 
testable proposition. Section 2.4 discusses the econometric problems and solutions 
in detail and introduces the main datasets and explains their advantages for this 
study. Section 2.5 presents and discusses empirical findings. The last section 
draws conclusions. 
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2.2. Literature review 
The debate on the relationship between homeownership and unemployment 
originated from the puzzling phenomenon of high unemployment rates which 
have been persistent in Western economies since the 1960s. Labour economists 
led the research at an early stage and paid attention to the macro-level relationship 
between homeownership and unemployment. Oswald (1996) was the first to 
notice a positive correlation between homeownership and unemployment rates in 
most advanced countries and suggests that this correlation might be causal as 
homeowners are less mobile than private renters and hence they would be more 
vulnerable to negative demand shocks in the local labour market. 
 
Early empirical studies which test the so-called Oswald hypothesis typically use 
country- or regional-level data. Oswald (1996) estimates a bivariate model of 
homeownership and unemployment rates using the panel and cross-sectional data 
for OECD countries and their sub-regions and finds that a 10% rise in the 
homeownership rate is associated with a 1 to 2% increase in the unemployment 
rate. Nickell (1998) uses the same data but controls for many more variables in 
addition to the homeownership rate so that the possibility of omitted variable bias 
is substantially reduced. The empirical results are still consistent with those of 
Oswald (1996). Pehkonen (1999) pays sole attention to homeownership as a main 
cause of unemployment by examining the relationship between the two variables 
across 13 labour districts in Finland. With no other explanatory variable but the 
homeownership rate, he concludes that the unemployment rate rises by 1.4 to 2.5% 
for a 10% increase in the homeownership rate. Green and Hendershott (2001) 
employ a more sophisticated method using the 1970 and 1990 state-level 
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homeownership and unemployment rates of the US. Specifically, they use a 
difference-in-difference estimator to control for state fixed effects, which helps to 
reduce omitted variable bias. In addition, the detailed grouping of sample by age 
helps identify positive relationships between the two rates more clearly. 
Accordingly, for the middle-aged group (34 to 65), the homeownership and 
unemployment rates are most likely to be positively correlated. Barrios Garcia and 
Rodriguez Hernandez (2004) address the endogeneity of homeownership in a 
more explicit manner with Spanish regional data. To deal with the simultaneity of 
homeownership and unemployment, they rely on a simultaneous equations 
approach. In contrast to the previous macro-level studies, they report a negative 
relationship that, at the mean value, implies that a 10% increase in the 
homeownership rate is associated with a fall of 2.2% in the unemployment rate 
across regions in Spain. 
 
Despite the methodological improvement over time, a fundamental criticism of 
macro-level studies is that they test using macro-data whereas Oswald’s 
hypothesis describes individual homeowners’ behaviours and labour market 
outcomes. It should be questionable whether the macro-level findings are truly the 
result of the underlying behaviours of individual homeowners. In response to the 
unjustifiable methodology of macro-level studies, more recent papers tend to 
depend on micro-data and use more convincing methods to mitigate the 
endogeneity of homeownership. Van Leuvensteijn and Koning (2004) test the 
relationship between homeownership and the length of time spent unemployed 
using data from the Netherlands. To cope with the simultaneity between the two 
variables, they use simultaneous models of individual job status change and 
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probability of becoming a homeowner which is instrumented by the regional 
homeownership rate. For the omitted variable bias in the context of a duration 
model, they estimate non-parametric models adopting the mass-point 
methodology introduced by Heckman and Singer (1984). They conclude that 
residential tenure decisions are driven by job commitment rather than the reverse 
but that homeowners are less likely to be unemployed than renters. 
 
Munch et al. (2006) examine the same topic using Danish data. Based on search 
theory, they identify two conflicting factors which jointly determine the 
relationship between homeownership and unemployment: (1) constrained 
mobility of homeowners due to high property transaction costs and (2) their 
willingness to accept locally available jobs at a lower reservation wage to avoid 
moving costs. Therefore, the overall effects of homeownership may be 
theoretically ambiguous. Adopting a similar empirical approach to Van 
Leuvensteijn and Koning (2004), they find that homeowners are likely to find jobs 
in their local areas rather than in other regions and hence the net impact of 
homeownership on the period of unemployment is negative. The implication of 
their findings is that homeowners try to find jobs in other ways than moving to 
other regions. This may be an expected outcome as homeowners expect low 
residential mobility and hence they are ready to accept this inherent disadvantage 
when searching for jobs.  
 
Battu et al. (2008) look at the UK context using the BHPS, also employing a 
multi-spell approach. Their findings indicate the importance of the initial 
employment status: homeowners in employment are less likely to transit into jobs 
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in the distant labour markets while unemployed renters in public housing are 
associated with a lower probability of finding a job in non-local labour markets. 
Their results indicate no evidence that homeownership increases the period of 
unemployment. Furthermore, recent studies show that homeowners are not 
necessarily immobile when they move for job-related reasons (Hilber and 
Lyytikäinen, 2012). One defining characteristic of homeowners (relative to renters) 
is that they face very high relocation costs and one important component of 
relocation costs is the stamp duty. Hilber and Lyytikäinen (2012), using a 
Regression Discontinuity Design, find that an increase in the UK stamp duty land 
tax lowers homeowners’ propensities to move substantially but only when they 
move for housing-related reasons, not when they move for job-related reasons. 
 
The micro-data studies often use a multi-spell approach to deal with the 
endogeneity problem associated with homeownership. This approach looks at 
whether and the extent to which homeownership status affects unemployment 
spells. Its advantage is that it can identify causality without relying on instruments 
which are normally difficult to find. However, it is not the only solution to the 
endogeneity of homeownership and its shortcoming is that it is available only 
from panel data. Furthermore, the length of the unemployment spell is not the 
only indicator of unfavourable labour market outcomes. The comparison of the 
probability of being unemployed at a point in time for both homeowners and 
renters is simpler to test and easier to understand. Coulson and Fisher (2009) 
compare the probability of being unemployed by residential tenure in the US and 
rather than using a multi-spell approach, they depend on an IV approach with the 
state marginal tax rate, percentage of households living in multi-family properties 
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and sex of children in the households being a set of instruments. They do not find 
any evidence that homeowners are more likely to be unemployed.  
 
This chapter explores the UK case using an IV approach but does not employ 
those instruments adopted by Coulson and Fisher (2009) for the following reasons. 
Firstly, the state-level marginal tax rate is not available in the UK, a centralised 
country that does not have regional income taxes. Secondly, the sex combination 
of children is a potentially valid instrument as its determination is exogenous. 
However, its relevance is challenged empirically, at least in the UK, as it is found 
to be uncorrelated with the probability of parents being owner-occupiers in the 
UK BCS 1970 data. It may be driven by the fact that in the UK housing space is 
much scarcer than in the US and hence not mixing siblings of the opposite sex is 
more of a luxury in the UK. Lastly, the percentage of households in multi-family 
properties in the local housing market is highly relevant to one’s homeownership 
status in the UK, too, but it has a high correlation with one’s likelihood of being 
unemployed as well, according to the BHPS. This is thought to be because most 
multi-family properties are in public housing in the UK and its allocation is 
closely related to one’s employment status and income. Therefore, the public 
housing tends to be occupied by those who are more likely to be unemployed and 
an agglomeration of unemployed or less employable people may lower the 
employability of residents in the neighbourhoods through spill-over or peer effects. 
This chapter, instead, employs two different instruments: the aggregate 
homeownership rate and parental homeownership status, the validity and 
relevance of which will be discussed in the empirical strategy section below. 
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2.3. Theoretical background 
The early macro-level studies suggest a positive relationship between 
homeownership and unemployment rates without providing a concrete theoretical 
rationale but rather relying on a loose relationship between geographical mobility 
and job search efficiency. The micro-studies reviewed above rely on job search 
theory. Coulson and Fisher (2002) argue that the key insight of their model 
concerning employment outcomes by tenure type is that renters can enjoy a higher 
job-matching rate thanks to their higher residential mobility. In Coulson and 
Fisher (2002), the probability of unemployment for homeowners in the steady 
state is given as follows: 
 
l
h
u
pd
d
p

                            (1) 
 
Where 
h
up  is the probability of a homeowner being unemployed, lp  
is 
the probability of match between job seeker and employer in the local 
labour market and d is the probability of a worker being unemployed.  
 
The mechanism is simple: if the matching does not occur at all during a certain 
period, lp  
is zero and hence the unemployment rate (
h
up ) is 1. If lp  is 1 
(perfect matching), 
h
up  
becomes close to zero and homeowners are less likely to 
be unemployed. The corresponding equation for renters is given as: 
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Where 
r
up is the probability of a renter being unemployed and np is the 
probability of match between job seeker and employer in the national 
labour market. 
 
np is added to the denominator of eq. (1) reflecting the fact that renters can move 
for jobs elsewhere and hence their matching probability is the sum of probabilities 
in both local and national markets. As any probability should range from 0 to 1,
np  is equal to or greater than zero and hence
r
u
h
u pp  . That is, homeowners are 
more likely to be unemployed at any point in time.  
 
Munch et al. (2006), however, argue that homeowners may not necessarily be 
more likely to be unemployed despite their lower residential mobility. This is 
because they may be more willing to accept available jobs locally at a lower 
reservation wage than renters arguably because housing transaction costs are 
much higher for owner-occupiers than renters and so, they may be better off 
staying put and accepting a lower wage. The implication of their findings for the 
equations of Coulson and Fisher (2002) is that the matching rate in the local 
labour market is not necessarily the same for both tenure types but it can be higher 
for homeowners (i.e.
r
l
h
l pp  ). Therefore, the question of whose unemployment 
probability is higher depends on the relative size of
h
lp  
and n
r
l pp  , which can 
be figured out only empirically. 
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The discussion above suggests that any factors causing 
r
l
h
l pp   can boost the 
employability of homeowners. There could be various ways for homeowners to 
cope with their limited job opportunities and hence raise the matching rate in the 
local job market. Firstly, they may carry out a more rigorous search within their 
own local areas than renters to raise the matching rate. Rouwendal and Nijkamp 
(2010) argue that the higher housing expenses involved in homeownership may 
cause homeowners to search jobs more intensely and hence lower the probability 
of unemployment or shorten the length of unemployment spell. Secondly, 
homeowners may have better access to social networks through which they can 
find better job information for the local labour market, as Coulson and Fisher 
(2002) point out. Lastly, homeowners may try to lower the likelihood of dismissal 
while in employment (i.e.
hr dd  ) in expectation of limited re-employment 
opportunities when becoming unemployed. If all of the arguments above hold true, 
it may even be possible that homeowners are less unemployed, as found in Van 
Leuvensteijn and Koning (2004). To sum up, theory cannot give a conclusive 
answer as to the direction of the causal effect of homeownership on 
unemployment: the direction of the effect is ambiguous and therefore can only be 
determined empirically. 
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2.4. Empirical strategy and data  
2.4.1. Maximum likelihood logistic model 
A basic model specification is a simple binary response model where the 
dependent variable is a dummy variable taking 1 if a respondent is in 
unemployment and zero otherwise. The main explanatory variable is also a binary 
variable referring to the tenure choice between home-owning and private renting. 
Then, a mathematical specification is: 
 
 )Dx(exp1
 )Dx(exp
DexyPr
iii
iii
iiii





0
0),,|1(              (3) 
 
Where 𝑦𝑖  is a dummy for unemployment status, 𝑥𝑖  is a dummy for 
homeowner, 𝐷𝑖 is a vector of other controls and 𝜀𝑖 is an error term.  
 
To reduce omitted variable bias to the highest extent possible, in addition to the 
homeownership dummy, the specification also includes a long list of control 
variables that may be correlated with both homeownership and unemployment 
status. The list includes various personal and household characteristics such as age, 
sex, marital status, number of children and educational level. 
 
The division of the renter group into private and public tenants is important in this 
chapter as they are highly distinguished from each other in terms of several 
characteristics, especially, residential mobility. Using the Survey of English 
Housing, Hughes and McCormick (2000) find that the migration rate (the number 
of households per 1000 households that moved between regions of England) is the 
highest for private tenants with 4.66% while it is 0.57%, 0.67% and 1.92% 
38 
 
respectively for homeowners, local authority tenants and tenants of social landlord 
between 1993 and 1998. For all moves, the difference in the mobility is even 
greater. A move rate (the number of households per 1000 which moved any 
distance) is highest for private renters with 38.75% and lowest for homeowners as 
4.23%. Local authority and social tenants are in the middle of the mobility 
spectrum with rates of 10.94% and 18.36%, respectively. Since the difference in 
residential mobility is starkest between private renters and homeowners (social 
renters are more similar to homeowners in terms of their mobility), it seems 
appropriate to concentrate the analysis that follows on the response of these two 
groups to external shocks to the local labour market. 
 
2.4.2. Panel-data models 
Though it is feasible to control for a large number of household specific variables 
alongside homeownership, some important characteristics (such as innate ability) 
may not be observable. Hence, a logit model without fixed effects may lead to 
biased estimates. In contrast, a panel-data fixed effects model is effective in 
dealing with unobservable time-invariant characteristics of individuals or 
households. A specific unobservable variable which deserves attention in the 
context of homeownership and unemployment is the innate or natural ability of 
individuals. Since innate ability can affect the likelihood of homeownership 
positively and that of unemployment negatively, its omission in the logit 
regression results in a downward bias. Some proxy measures have been suggested 
in the literature, such as exam or IQ scores but none of them are perfect measures 
and, in any case, they are not available from the BHPS. Instead, using the panel 
structure of the BHPS, a fixed effects (FE) model is estimated as a partial solution 
39 
 
to unobserved individual characteristics including innate ability. The solution is 
only partial since fixed effects only control for time-invariant but not time-varying 
unobservable characteristics. Still, estimating an FE model is arguably a 
significant improvement over standard OLS or logit models. 
 
Other than the FE model, another well-known panel model is the random effects 
(RE) model which treats unobserved characteristics as random and leaves them in 
a composite error term. Its estimator is the most efficient as it takes advantage of 
both within- and between-variations but may be inconsistent if the orthogonality 
condition of 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑥𝑖𝑡, 𝑢𝑖) = 0 is not satisfied (where 𝑢𝑖  refers to unobserved 
individual characteristics). In this case, homeownership status and innate ability 
are likely to be correlated and therefore an RE model is not expected to deliver a 
consistent estimator. However, it is worth looking at its outcomes as it can be used 
to ascertain the degree of the bias caused by the time-constant unobservable 
characteristics through the comparison of the results from the corresponding FE 
model. 
 
As the dependent variable is a binary variable, it might seem preferable to use an 
FE logit model rather than an FE linear probability model (LPM). The latter is not 
ideal for dealing with a binary outcome variable as it allows for implausible 
estimated probabilities (greater than 1 or smaller than 0) for the outcome variable. 
Due to the complicated nature of the transformation process required for the FE 
logit model, those households that exhibit no variation in value of the dependent 
variable over time (i.e. those who were never unemployed or never employed) 
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have to be excluded from the estimation.1 Because of the persistency in the 
employment status over time, a substantial number of households are lost when 
estimating an FE logit model. This issue may suggest employing, despite its 
shortcomings, an FE linear probability model. Results are therefore also reported 
for an FE linear probability model in order to check whether the findings are 
sensitive to the choice of estimator. 
 
2.4.3. Identification strategy 
The panel-data fixed effects models are a partial solution to deal with omitted 
variable bias since they do not have the power to deal with unobserved time-
variant individual characteristics. One example of time-variant characteristics is 
an unobserved preference for mobility which may not be constant over time and 
can be affected by life-cycle status, employment status or working conditions. 
More importantly, bias from mutual causality between homeownership and 
employment status cannot be dealt with by panel fixed effects models. The 
income is, needless to say, one of the most significant determinants of 
homeownership. As a main source of stable income and a crucial condition for 
mortgage qualification, employment becomes one of the most influential 
determinants of homeownership. Therefore, a negative correlation between 
unemployment status and homeownership status is represented by not only the 
causality from the latter to the former but also the reverse. To identify only the 
causality this chapter focuses, an IV approach is needed. In this chapter, two types 
of instruments are considered: (1) aggregate homeownership rates at the levels of 
local authority district and county and (2) parental homeownership status. 
                                           
1 See Frees (2004) for detailed discussion on sample loss in the FE logit model.  
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2.4.3.1. Aggregate homeownership rate as an instrument 
The aggregate homeownership rate at a specified geographical level has been 
frequently used as an instrument when the causal effects of homeownership on 
various social phenomena need to be identified. The reason for its popularity as an 
instrument is that it can be regarded as a comprehensive indicator of how 
accessible homeownership is in a specific local area. The rate reflects the 
characteristics related to the propensity to own (e.g. income, wealth and mobility) 
of average households in that area. Also, it is closely related to conditions in the 
local housing market which affect individuals’ tenure decisions (e.g. availability 
of housing stock suitable for ownership). Munch et al. (2008) argue that the 
regional homeownership rate affects individual homeownership status through a 
supply effect. Therefore, it may be a better predictor of an individual’s tenure 
choice than any single individual determinant of homeownership. The special-
licensed version of BHPS data used in this chapter provides information on three 
levels of geographical units of survey sample – region, county and local authority 
district for each wave.2 Aggregate homeownership rates at county and district 
levels will be used as they are likely to be more strongly related with 
homeownership statuses of individuals than regional homeownership rates are. 
For each wave of the BHPS, the local homeownership rate would be computed as 
the ratio of owner-occupying households to total households for each of 57 
counties and 278 districts as in 1991 when the BHPS began.  
 
 
                                           
2 The title of the data is ‘British Household Panel Survey, Waves 1-18, 1991-2009: Conditional 
Access for Non-UK Users, Local Authority District Codes’. The details of the dataset are found on 
the website of ‘Economic and Social Data Service’ (www.esds.ac.uk). The dataset used for this 
chapter is an earlier version of this dataset and hence the local district codes are available from 
1991 to 2006. 
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2.4.3.2. Parental homeownership status as an instrument 
A second instrument to be employed is the parental homeownership status which 
has also been employed by Munch et al. (2008). In the literature, children whose 
parents were homeowners have a greater propensity to owner-occupy when they 
are grown-ups (Henretta, 1984; Boehm and Schlottman, 1999; Mulder and Smits, 
1999). The inter-generational correlation of homeownership seems to have two 
sources. Firstly, there may be a transmission of knowledge of home-buying from 
parents to children such as knowledge on housing market searching (e.g. Farley, 
1996; Hirad and Zorn, 2002), use of credit markets (e.g. Courchane, Surette and 
Zorn, 2004) and specific local characteristics of target markets such as 
neighbourhood quality (e.g. Hilber, 2005), which are demonstrated to play 
significant roles in the home-buying process. One source from which to acquire 
such knowledge, free from any third-party interest, are parents who have 
experience regarding housing transactions. Haurin and Morrow-Jones (2006) 
show that additional market knowledge from parents does matter for children’s 
homeownership decisions in the US based on their own survey data. 
 
Secondly, there may be an inter-generational transfer of wealth which not only 
makes a direct financial contribution but also eases the qualification test for 
mortgage acquisition. Munro (1989) and Hamnett et al. (1991) confirm the 
importance of intra-family transfer of wealth as the source of homeownership in 
the UK as cited in Deutsch (1997) who also shows the same result using Austrian 
data. Engelhardt and Mayer (1994) find that about 20% of first-time homebuyers 
obtain financial help from their family or kin worth an average of about 50% of 
the down payment. Charles and Hurst (2002) suggest that Afro-Americans have a 
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higher decline rate of mortgage applications than White because they have a lower 
level of financial assistance from family. Hilber and Liu (2008) demonstrate that 
the previously unexplained gap in homeownership propensity between Black and 
White households in the US, of about 6.5%, disappears entirely when a 
household’s own wealth, parental wealth and macro-location preference are 
jointly controlled for. In the UK, 38% of first-time home buyers under age 30 had 
assistance with the down-payment in 2006 (Tatch, 2007). 
 
In order to be valid as an instrument, parental homeownership cannot be 
correlated with the error term. In practical terms, this means that parental 
homeownership ought to be uncorrelated with unobserved individual 
characteristics of the offspring that may affect the offspring’s employment status. 
It has been reported in the literature that parental homeownership status exerts 
many positive effects on child outcomes such as lower level of school drop-outs, 
lower pregnancy rates among teenagers (Green and White, 1997; Aaronson, 2000), 
higher exam results and fewer behavioural problems (Haurin et al, 2001). The fact 
that better educational results are closely related to employment outcomes 
suggests that parental homeownership status cannot be regarded as completely 
irrelevant to employment outcomes of the children. Therefore, for parental 
homeownership status to be a valid instrument, one’s educational characteristics 
need to be included in the model. 
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2.4.4. Data 
2.4.4.1. British Household Panel Survey 
One of the two datasets for the empirical analysis is the British Household Panel 
Survey (BHPS). It is a panel survey which has been carried out annually. The data 
from 1991 to 2006 (16 waves) are used in this chapter. The survey follows over 
time an initial sample of about 10,000 individuals who are over 16 year old and 
these individuals belong to 5,500 representative households in Great Britain. The 
sample of households is occasionally boosted to compensate for households that 
exit the panel. The survey topics are various and the most relevant types of 
information for this chapter are basic demographic characteristics, labour market 
status and job characteristics, residential tenure, accommodation characteristics, 
education and qualifications. It is well-known that panel data have a number of 
benefits unavailable in either cross-sectional or time-series data alone. In 
particular, the panel structure of the data, by employing fixed effects, is often used 
to control for unobserved individual heterogeneity and this advantage is of great 
help to the present research topic. 
 
The total sample size is 209,714 individuals over 16 waves, out of which, 164,225 
are of working age (16 to 64 year old for men and 16 to 59 for women). When 
public renters are excluded, 132,087 observations remain and the respondents 
whose districts (and hence the local homeownership rates) are known are 119,179. 
After the households with any missing values for the variables entering the 
specification are excluded, the final sample size for the regressions is 113,839. 
Table 2.1 summarises the basic statistics for the variables from the BHPS. 
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Table 2.1. Summary statistics for the BHPS variables 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Respondent was unemployed 113839 0.034  0.181  0 1 
Respondent was homeowner 
(private renter exc.) 
113839 0.892  0.310  0 1 
Age 113839 38.133  12.704  16 64 
Age squared 113839 1615.491  991.633  256 4096 
Sex (Female exc.) 113839 0.493  0.500  0 1 
HH head (Non-head exc.) 113839 0.474  0.499  0 1 
Qualification  
(First or higher degree exc.)      
Other higher qualification 113839 0.264  0.441  0 1 
A level 113839 0.167  0.373  0 1 
GCSE 113839 0.229  0.420  0 1 
Other qualification 113839 0.057  0.232  0 1 
No qualification 113839 0.128  0.334  0 1 
Marital status (Married exc.) 
     
Separated 113839 0.020  0.139  0 1 
Divorced 113839 0.075  0.263  0 1 
Widowed 113839 0.012  0.111  0 1 
Never married 113839 0.318  0.466  0 1 
No. of dependent children  
in the HH 
113839 0.606  0.953  0 8 
No. of HH members 113839 3.101  1.295  1 14 
District homeownership rate 113839 0.702  0.144  0 1 
District unemployment rate 113839 0.038  0.035  0 1 
District employment rate 113839 0.581  0.103  0 1 
County homeownership rate 113839 0.695  0.081  0 1 
County unemployment rate 113839 0.039  0.019  0 0.143 
County employment rate 113839 0.578  0.062  0 0.889 
Region (Inner London exc.) 
     
Outer London 113839 0.024  0.154  0 1 
Rest of South East 113839 0.051  0.219  0 1 
South West 113839 0.169  0.375  0 1 
East Anglia 113839 0.078  0.268  0 1 
East Midlands 113839 0.035  0.184  0 1 
West Midlands conurbation 113839 0.071  0.256  0 1 
Rest of West Midlands 113839 0.027  0.162  0 1 
Greater Manchester 113839 0.044  0.206  0 1 
Merseyside 113839 0.033  0.178  0 1 
Rest of North West 113839 0.018  0.132  0 1 
South Yorkshire 113839 0.040  0.195  0 1 
West Yorkshire 113839 0.022  0.146  0 1 
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Table 2.1. Summary statistics for the BHPS variables (cont.) 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Rest of Yorkshire  
& Humberside 
113839 0.026  0.160  0 1 
Tyne & Wear 113839 0.029  0.167  0 1 
Rest of North  113839 0.017  0.130  0 1 
Wales 113839 0.032  0.177  0 1 
Scotland 113839 0.133  0.340  0 1 
Year (2006 exc.) 
     
1991 113839 0.055  0.228  0 1 
1992 113839 0.053  0.224  0 1 
1993 113839 0.051  0.219  0 1 
1994 113839 0.051  0.221  0 1 
1995 113839 0.050  0.218  0 1 
1996 113839 0.052  0.222  0 1 
1997 113839 0.056  0.230  0 1 
1998 113839 0.055  0.227  0 1 
1999 113839 0.079  0.270  0 1 
2000 113839 0.080  0.271  0 1 
2001 113839 0.078  0.269  0 1 
2002 113839 0.070  0.256  0 1 
2003 113839 0.068  0.252  0 1 
2004 113839 0.066  0.249  0 1 
2005 113839 0.068  0.251  0 1 
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2.4.4.2. British Cohort Study 1970 
The second dataset is the British Cohort Study (BCS) which has been carried out 
since 1970. The study traces a group of about 17,200 individuals (cohort members) 
who were born in Great Britain in one particular week during 1970. It also has 
panel characteristics as the individuals are repeatedly surveyed over time but it is 
not as regular as the BHPS. Since the first survey, six major follow-up surveys 
have been carried out at the ages of 5, 10, 16, 26, 30, 34 and 38, with the most 
recent one done in 2008. Initially, the survey topics were mainly confined to 
medical conditions of new born babies. As the individual cohort members grew up, 
the topics have also been expanded to social, educational and occupational 
characteristics. A particular benefit from the BCS 1970 is that it allows for access 
to information on parental homeownership status when the cohort members were 
young. For the empirical analysis, the 2004 survey will be employed because a 
relatively permanent tenure type is likely to be determined by the age of 34.3 At 
earlier ages (26 or 30), most individuals may still be in transition to their preferred 
tenure type. 
 
The original cohort members are 17,196 but the number of members surveyed is 
reduced substantially to 9,665 by 2004. Of these, 7,828 are homeowners or private 
renters and public renters and other types of renters are excluded at this stage. 
Among the homeowners and private renters, the information on parents’ 
homeownership status when they were 5 years old is available only for 6,457. The 
final number of the regression sample is 6,118 after observations with missing 
values for regression variables are excluded. See Table 2.2 for summary statistics. 
                                           
3 At the time of empirical experiment, the 2004 survey was the most recent one.  
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Table 2.2. Summary statistics for the BCS 1970 variables 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Respondent is unemployed 6118 0.014  0.116  0 1 
Respondent is homeowner  
(private renter exc.) 
6118 0.918  0.274  0 1 
Age 6118 33.882  0.356  33 35 
Age squared 6118 1148.083  23.920  1089 1225 
Sex (Female exc.) 6118 0.477  0.500  0 1 
Qualification (Higher degree exc.) 
     
First degree 6118 0.142  0.349  0 1 
A level 6118 0.334  0.472  0 1 
GCSE 6118 0.098  0.297  0 1 
CSE 6118 0.291  0.454  0 1 
No qualification 6118 0.072  0.259  0 1 
Marital status (Married exc.) 
     
Cohabiting 6118 0.205  0.404  0 1 
Single (never married) 6118 0.144  0.351  0 1 
Separated, divorced, widowed 6118 0.049  0.216  0 1 
No. of children 6118 1.089  1.052  0 7 
No. of HH members 6118 2.062  1.239  0 8 
Father's occupational class  
when respondent was 5 year old.  
(Professional occupations exc.) 
     
Managerial and low professional 
occupations 
6118 0.229  0.420  0 1 
Non-manual skilled occupations 6118 0.100  0.299  0 1 
Manual skilled occupations 6118 0.442  0.497  0 1 
Semi-skilled occupations 6118 0.115  0.320  0 1 
Unskilled occupations 6118 0.032  0.177  0 1 
Father was homeowner  
when respondent was 5 year old. 
6118 0.659  0.474  0 1 
Region (Scotland exc.) 
     
North East 6118 0.048  0.213  0 1 
North West 6118 0.117  0.321  0 1 
Yorkshire & Humberside 6118 0.099  0.298  0 1 
East Midlands 6118 0.073  0.261  0 1 
West Midlands 6118 0.097  0.296  0 1 
East of England 6118 0.110  0.313  0 1 
London 6118 0.088  0.283  0 1 
South East 6118 0.146  0.353  0 1 
South West 6118 0.088  0.283  0 1 
Wales 6118 0.056  0.229  0 1 
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2.5. Empirical results 
2.5.1. Pooled logit regressions with BHPS 
The results of logit regression with a pooled sample from the BHPS are discussed 
first. Though a logit model specification is hardly capable of dealing with the 
omitted variable bias and the endogeneity of the homeownership status, it allows 
us to ascertain the biases caused by it when comparing the findings to those of 
panel fixed effects estimates or IV estimation. Table 2.3 shows the results of 
binary logit regressions of an individual’s unemployment on homeownership 
status and other control variables. The control variables are gradually added from 
left to right columns. In column (1), only the dummy for homeownership status is 
controlled for along with regional and year dummies. The main finding is that the 
estimated coefficient of homeownership status is negative implying that 
homeowners are less likely to be unemployed than private renters. However, it is 
likely biased due to incomplete control of explanatory variables. In columns (2) 
and (3), major individual demographic characteristics and household 
characteristics are added respectively. The inclusion of more control variables 
makes the estimated coefficients of the homeownership variable smaller, which 
implies that the omitted variable bias is reduced. However, even after a number of 
variables arguably correlated with both unemployment and homeownership 
statuses are controlled for, the differences in the probability of unemployment 
remains significant. Some unobservable heterogeneity may be responsible for the 
difference. This problem is addressed by employing a panel fixed effects model, 
discussed in the next section. 
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Table 2.3. Logit estimation of unemployment 
(Dependent variable: unemployment status (1 if unemployed, otherwise 0)) 
 (1) 
HO status only 
(2) Personal 
characteristics 
(3) HH 
characteristics 
    
Homeowner  
(Private renter exc.) 
-0.836*** -0.741*** -0.590*** 
 (0.042) (0.045) (0.045) 
Age  -0.085*** -0.013 
  (0.008) (0.010) 
Age squared  0.001*** 0.000* 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Male (Female exc.)  0.727*** 0.633*** 
  (0.044) (0.040) 
Head of HH (Non-head exc.)  -0.385*** -0.326*** 
  (0.045) (0.044) 
Qualification  
(First or higher degree exc.) 
   
Other higher qual.  -0.128** -0.089 
  (0.058) (0.059) 
A level  -0.319*** -0.293*** 
  (0.065) (0.066) 
GCE O level  0.005 0.051 
  (0.060) (0.061) 
Other qualification  0.360*** 0.412*** 
  (0.074) (0.075) 
No qualification  0.658*** 0.705*** 
  (0.062) (0.063) 
Marital status (Married exc.)    
Separated   1.212*** 
   (0.100) 
Divorced   0.875*** 
   (0.064) 
Widowed   0.560*** 
   (0.164) 
Never married   1.018*** 
   (0.059) 
No. of dependent children in HH   -0.073** 
   (0.029) 
No. of HH members   0.078*** 
   (0.016) 
Region Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -2.953*** -1.429*** -3.961*** 
 (0.087) (0.172) (0.231) 
Pseudo. R-squared 0.0224 0.0530 0.0685 
No. of obs. 113,839 113,839 113,839 
Note: ***, **,* refer to the significance levels at 1, 5 and 10% respectively. Robust standard errors 
are given in parenthesis. The estimated coefficients for the regional and year dummies are omitted 
from the table.
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2.5.2. Panel models 
Table 2.4 presents a few panel model regression results and the estimation of the 
Random Effects (RE) model is presented first in column (1). The RE estimate of 
the coefficient of the homeowner dummy is negative and significant at the 1% 
level, which is the same result as the pooled logit estimation in column (3) of 
Table 2.3. However, it is likely to be biased due to the presence of unobservable 
personal characteristics which affect both the unemployment and the 
homeownership statuses. The ρ-value associated with the RE model regression is 
0.49, which means that the unobserved individual characteristics account for 
about 49% of variation in the composite errors. A fixed effects model regression 
is needed to control for unobservable personal characteristics. 
 
In column (2) of Table 2.4, the logit FE model estimation result is given. The 
estimated coefficient of the homeownership variable turns positive but is not 
statistically significant. This suggests that there may be no difference in the 
probability of unemployment between homeowners and private renters. Though 
not as efficient as the RE model, the virtue of the FE estimator is that it is 
consistent even when unobserved time-constant characteristics are present. Hence, 
the estimates from the RE model are considered consistent only when they are not 
significantly different from the corresponding FE estimates. The estimated 
coefficients of the homeownership variable look different at a glance between the 
FE and RE models. The difference is also confirmed by a Hausman specification 
test. Hence, the RE estimate of the homeownership variable in column (1) is 
formally demonstrated to be biased. 
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Table 2.4. Fixed and Random effects logit estimation of unemployment  
(Dependent variable: unemployment status (1 if unemployed, otherwise 0)) 
 (1) 
RE logit 
(2) 
FE logit 
(3) 
FE LPM 
    
Homeowner  
(Private renter exc.) 
-0.508*** -0.107 -0.000 
 (0.063) (0.098) (0.003) 
Age -0.010 -0.170** -0.006*** 
 (0.014) (0.080) (0.002) 
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male (Female exc.) 0.730***   
 (0.061)   
Head of HH (Non-head exc.) -0.381*** -0.160* -0.006** 
 (0.062) (0.092) (0.002) 
Qualification  
(First or higher degree exc.) 
   
Other higher qual. -0.304*** -2.543*** -0.062*** 
 (0.087) (0.221) (0.005) 
A level -0.549*** -2.239*** -0.063*** 
 (0.091) (0.203) (0.005) 
GCE O level -0.257*** -3.072*** -0.081*** 
 (0.089) (0.231) (0.005) 
Other qualification 0.238** -2.679*** -0.062*** 
 (0.119) (0.317) (0.008) 
No qualification 0.561*** -3.106*** -0.075*** 
 (0.098) (0.284) (0.007) 
Marital status (Married exc.)    
Separated 1.315*** 0.624*** 0.021*** 
 (0.131) (0.172) (0.005) 
Divorced 0.860*** 0.227 0.005 
 (0.095) (0.154) (0.004) 
Widowed 0.726*** 0.313 0.013 
 (0.233) (0.429) (0.009) 
Never married 1.010*** 0.447*** 0.009*** 
 (0.083) (0.141) (0.003) 
No. of children in HH -0.144*** -0.325*** -0.008*** 
 (0.037) (0.055) (0.001) 
No. of workers in HH 0.082*** 0.114*** 0.005*** 
 (0.022) (0.033) (0.001) 
Region Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -5.043***  0.260*** 
 (0.329)  (0.088) 
Adj. R-squared  0.0524 0.0026 
No. of obs. 113,839 19,517 113,839 
Note: ***, **,* refer to the significance levels at 1, 5 and 10% respectively. Robust standard errors 
are given in parenthesis. The estimated coefficients for the regional and year dummies are omitted 
from the table. The sample size for the result shown in column (2) is less than those in the other 
two columns due to the transformation process required for the logit FE model. The R-squared for 
LPM FE model in column (3) is the overall R-squared. 
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Though the FE logit model produces consistent estimates immune from 
unobservable heterogeneity across individuals, its expenses are not small in terms 
of efficiency loss due to the requirement for the transformation as discussed 
earlier. Any respondents who have not experienced any changes in their 
unemployment status over the entire period of the surveys (16 waves here) would 
be excluded from the sample to be used for the estimation. The loss is particularly 
large since employment or unemployment status tends to be persistent over time. 
Out of 113,839 observations for 18,153 individuals, only 19,517 observations of 
2,182 individuals are used for the logit FE estimation in column (2) of Table 2.4. 
The model does not make use of the data efficiently and hence standard errors are 
larger than they would be with a larger sample size. As a consequence, one might 
be concerned that the null hypothesis of no difference in the probability of 
unemployment between homeowners and private renters is less likely to be 
rejected. 
 
To check the robustness of the FE logit model result, an FE linear probability 
model (LPM) is used as a supplementary model in column (3) of Table 2.4. 
Unlike the FE logit model, it does not require the strict transformation condition 
and hence there is no loss of sample. It drops an assumption of non-linearly 
distributed error terms and is not the best model to deal with binary models but it 
is expected to reveal whether the reduction in sample size affects the sign and 
significance of the logit FE estimate. Though a direct comparison of the size of 
estimates between FE logit and LPM is not possible, they do indicate the same 
finding that there is no correlation between homeownership and unemployment. 
Therefore, the FE logit does not seem to be affected by the loss of sample. 
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Overall, it is clearly shown that unobserved characteristics are indeed relevant 
through the comparison among pooled logit, RE and FE models. When they are 
properly dealt with by FE models, the negative correlation between 
homeownership and unemployment disappears. Then, it could be cautiously 
suggested that the estimated coefficient of the homeownership status may even 
turn positive if the possibility of reverse causation from unemployment to 
homeownership is removed. The next section will attempt to discount the concern 
of reverse causation through 2SLS estimation. 
 
2.5.3. 2SLS estimation with homeownership rate as an instrument 
Table 2.5 shows the IV estimation results with the pooled sample of the BHPS. As 
discussed, the instrument is the aggregate homeownership rates. One of the key 
requirements for an instrument is that it should be correlated with the dependent 
variable only through the independent variable to be instrumented but not with the 
error term (i.e. through omitted variables). In this specific case, however, the 
homeownership rate of a certain district (the instrument) could be correlated with 
the unemployment statuses of the individual residents (the dependent variable) of 
that district through variables other than the homeownership status (the 
endogenous variable to be instrumented), particularly, through the local 
unemployment and employment rates for two reasons. Firstly, there are a 
relatively small number of sample for each district in the BHPS. Secondly, the 
BHPS picks up the households from a relatively limited number of postcode areas 
within a certain district. As a result, the BHPS surveyees from the same district 
tend to share more homogenous neighbourhood characteristics than the entire 
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households from that district do. Therefore, the local unemployment and 
employment rates which are calculated based on the small number of relatively 
homogeneous households are likely to be closely correlated with the employment 
status of the individual members of those households. If the local homeownership 
rate is correlated with unemployment and employment rates within a district - 
which is likely as both of them are computed from the relatively small number of 
households in each district of the BHPS - the local homeownership rate could also 
be correlated with the individual’s unemployment status through the local 
unemployment and employment rates. Then, the local homeownership rate would 
not be a valid instrument if unemployment rates and employment rates remain in 
the error terms. Therefore, those two rates should be controlled for in the 
regression specification. 
 
Before the IV results are discussed, the comparable OLS estimation result in 
column (1) of Table 2.5 is explained first to demonstrate the bias introduced by 
endogeneity of homeownership. As a binary dependent model combined with an 
IV approach is not easy to estimate with a logit model, it is estimated by OLS (i.e. 
linear probability model), which should still be able to show the sign and 
significance level of the estimated coefficient of interest correctly. The linear 
probability model with the pooled sample over 16 waves shows again that 
homeowners are associated with a lower probability of unemployment. The 
estimated coefficient of the homeownership status has a negative sign and is 
significant at the 1% level. It is consistent with the results from the pooled logit 
estimation in column (3) of Table 2.3. 
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Table 2.5. IV estimation of unemployment with BHPS 
(Dependent variable: unemployment status (1 if unemployed, otherwise 0)) 
 (1) OLS (2) IV with 
district HO rate 
(3) IV with 
county HO rate 
Homeowner (Private renter 
exc.) 
-0.026*** -0.020 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.028) (0.098) 
Age -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male (Female exc.) 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.025*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) 
Head of HH (Non-head exc.) -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.016 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.010) 
Qualification  
(First or higher degree exc.) 
   
Other higher qual. -0.003** -0.003** -0.004 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
A level -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
GCE O level 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) 
Other qualification 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
No qualification 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Marital status (Married exc.)    
Separated 0.043*** 0.044*** 0.047*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.014) 
Divorced 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.030*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) 
Widowed 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.020*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Never married 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.034*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.011) 
No. of children in HH -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
No. of HH members 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
District unemployment rate 0.143*** 0.144***  
 (0.022) (0.022)  
District employment rate -0.026*** -0.027***  
 (0.006) (0.008)  
County unemployment rate    -0.059** 
   (0.024) 
County employment rate   0.123*** 
   (0.041) 
Region Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.054*** 0.038** 0.046 
 (0.010) (0.016) (0.046) 
Adj. R-squared 0.023 0.023 0.020 
No. of obs. 113,839 113,839 113,839 
Note: ***, **,* refer to the significance levels at 1, 5 and 10% respectively. Robust standard errors 
are given in parenthesis. The estimated coefficients for the regional and year dummies are omitted 
from the table. See Table 2.6 for the related first-stage regressions. The endogenous variable is the 
homeownership status and the instrumental variables are the district homeownership rate for 
column (2) and county-level homeownership rate for column (3). 
57 
 
A comparable IV estimation result with the instrument being the district-level 
homeownership rate is presented in column (2) of Table 2.5. The corresponding 
first-stage regression result is shown in column (1) of Table 2.6. The first-stage 
regression result shows that the homeownership rate is a highly relevant 
instrument to the individual homeownership status. Firstly, the homeownership 
rate variable has a statistically significant effect on the individual homeownership 
status and it is positive as expected. Roughly speaking, a 1% increase in the local 
homeownership rate at the district level raises the probability of homeownership 
by 0.157%. Secondly, the F statistic from the first-stage regression is significant at 
the 1% level and its p-value is practically zero. Lastly, the Kleibergen-Paap Wald 
F statistic is 390.6, suggesting that weak identification does not appear to be a 
problem here. An over-identification test cannot be performed as the equation is 
exactly identified. 
 
The most noteworthy change is that the estimated coefficient of interest by the IV 
estimation becomes less negative and is no longer statistically significant 
implying that homeownership may not causally affect unemployment. Overall, 
there is no relationship found between one’s homeownership and unemployment 
status when reverse causality is dealt with by IV estimation. It is possible that 
there may exist other types of local characteristics than the unemployment and 
employment rates which connect the local homeownership rates and individuals’ 
unemployment statuses. However, it is not feasible to control for an infinite 
number of aggregate local characteristics and it is not justifiable to do so without 
concrete theoretical reasons. 
  
58 
 
Table 2.6. First stage regression of IV estimation with BHPS 
(Dependent variable: homeownership status (1 if homeowner, 0 private renter)) 
 (1) First stage regression 
for column (2) of Table 2.5 
(2) First stage regression 
for column (3) of Table 2.5 
Age 0.014*** 0.014*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Age squared -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Male (Female exc.) 0.059*** 0.060*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Head of HH (Non-head exc.) -0.100*** -0.101*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Qualification  
(First or higher degree exc.) 
  
Other higher qual. 0.026*** 0.027*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
A level -0.006* -0.006* 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
GCE O level 0.049*** 0.050*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Other qualification 0.033*** 0.033*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
No qualification -0.019*** -0.020*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Marital status (Married exc.)   
Separated -0.135*** -0.136*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
Divorced -0.056*** -0.058*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Widowed 0.047*** 0.046*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
Never married -0.103*** -0.106*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
No. of children in HH -0.010*** -0.009*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
No. of workers in HH 0.017*** 0.016*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
District unemployment rate  -0.022  
 (0.036)  
District employment rate 0.103***  
 (0.012)  
District homeownership rate 0.157***  
 (0.008)  
County unemployment rate   0.103 
  (0.065) 
County employment rate  0.183*** 
  (0.021) 
County homeownership rate  0.103*** 
  (0.017) 
Region Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes 
Constant 0.404*** 0.391*** 
 (0.016) (0.021) 
Adj. R-squared 0.122 0.117 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic 390.570 35.806 
No. of obs. 113,839 113,839 
Note: ***, **,* refer to the significance levels at 1, 5 and 10% respectively. Robust standard errors 
are given in parenthesis. The estimated coefficients for the regional and year dummies are omitted 
from the table.  
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An alternative way to check the robustness of the IV estimation result would be to 
analyse the homeownership rate from a larger geographical unit, which would 
mean the local homeownership rate may be less relevant to individual 
homeownership status but, at the same time, more exogenous. The 278 local 
districts are grouped into the corresponding 57 counties as of 1991 and the 
county-level homeownership rate is calculated. It is an empirical question whether 
the homeownership rate at the county level can still work as a relevant instrument 
while being exogenous enough. At least, the relevant first stage regression in 
column (2) of Table 2.6 confirms that it is also highly correlated with an 
individual’s homeownership status. Also, the diagnostic statistics support its 
relevance: the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic is 35.8. Now the estimated 
coefficient of the homeownership status increases further but is not statistically 
different from zero. Overall, these results are strongly suggestive that one’s 
homeownership status does not cause unemployment. 
  
Finally, there may be the possibility that unobservable time-constant 
characteristics of the individuals are correlated with the local homeownership rate 
because it is calculated based on a small-sized sample. To control for the 
unobservable heterogeneity, a FE IV model is estimated and its result is presented 
in Table 2.7. The deviation of homeownership status from its average over time is 
instrumented by the deviation of homeownership rates from their average. As the 
change in the homeownership rate is not great over time, there may be a concern 
that the deviation of homeownership rates would be fairly small and hence the 
homeownership rate may not be as highly relevant an instrument as in the case of 
pooled IV regressions. 
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Table 2.7. Fixed effects IV estimation of unemployment with BHPS 
(Dependent variable: unemployment status (1 if unemployed, otherwise 0)) 
 (1) IV with district 
homeownership rate 
(2) IV with county-level 
homeownership rate 
   
Homeowner (Private renter exc.) 0.090 0.102 
 (0.070) (0.134) 
Age -0.006*** -0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) 
Age squared 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Head of HH (Non-head exc.) 0.006 0.008 
 (0.010) (0.018) 
Qualification  
(First or higher degree exc.) 
  
Other higher qual. -0.061*** -0.060*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) 
A level -0.057*** -0.056*** 
 (0.007) (0.010) 
GCE O level -0.084*** -0.084*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) 
Other qualification -0.062*** -0.061*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
No qualification -0.076*** -0.075*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
Marital status (Married exc.)   
Separated 0.027*** 0.028*** 
 (0.007) (0.010) 
Divorced 0.006 0.006 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Widowed 0.007 0.006 
 (0.009) (0.012) 
Never married 0.018** 0.020 
 (0.008) (0.014) 
No. of children in HH -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
No. of HH members 0.002 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.005) 
District unemployment rate 0.122***  
 (0.023)  
District employment rate 0.002  
 (0.010)  
County unemployment rate  0.023 
  (0.046) 
County employment rate  -0.008 
  (0.019) 
Adj. R-squared ∙ ∙ 
No. of obs. 109,932 109,932 
Note: ***, **,* refer to the significance levels at 1, 5 and 10% respectively. Robust standard errors 
are given in parenthesis. The estimated coefficients for the regional and year dummies are omitted 
from the table. R2 are not reported as they are negative. See Table 2.8 for the related first-stage 
regressions. The endogenous variable is the homeownership status and the instrumental variables 
are the district homeownership rate for column (1) and county-level homeownership rate for 
column (2). The number of observations used is 3,907 less than the total sample size (113,839 
observations). The reduction in the sample size is due to the singleton groups where only one 
observation exists. 
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As can be seen in the related first-stage regression results presented in Table 2.8 
below, it turns out that the concern explained above is not serious. In column (1) 
of Table 2.8 where the instrument is the district-level homeownership rate, the 
size of the estimates for the homeownership rate is lower than the counterpart in 
the non-panel first-stage regressions in column (1) of Table 2.6 but it still has a 
predicted sign and is statistically significant at the 1%-level. In column (2) of 
Table 2.8 where the instrument is the county-level homeownership rate, the size 
and the significance are not different from those of the corresponding estimate in 
column (2) of Table 2.6 (i.e. pooled IV regressions). Again, the Kleibergen-Paap 
Wald F statistics in Table 2.8 become lower compared to those in Table 2.6 but 
they are still large enough to support the relevance of the homeownership rates as 
instruments. A main finding from the second-stage regressions in Table 2.7 is that 
the estimated coefficients of the homeownership status are now positive but they 
are still insignificant, independent of whether the district- or county-level 
homeownership rate is used as an instrument. 
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Table 2.8. First stage regression of FE IV estimation with BHPS 
(Dependent variable: homeownership status (1 if homeowner, 0 private renter)) 
 (1) First stage regression 
for column (1) of Table 2.7 
(2) First stage regression 
for column (2) of Table 2.7 
   
Age 0.007** 0.007** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Age squared -0.000* -0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Head of HH (Non-head exc.) -0.133*** -0.135*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
Qualification  
(First or higher degree exc.) 
  
Other higher qual. -0.024** -0.023* 
 (0.012) (0.012) 
A level -0.062*** -0.064*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) 
GCE O level 0.027** 0.027** 
 (0.013) (0.013) 
Other qualification -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.016) (0.017) 
No qualification -0.001 -0.003 
 (0.016) (0.016) 
Marital status (Married exc.)   
Separated -0.063*** -0.063*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) 
Divorced -0.007 -0.007 
 (0.010) (0.010) 
Widowed 0.073*** 0.073*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) 
Never married -0.101*** -0.103*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) 
No. of children in HH -0.013*** -0.013*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
No. of workers in HH 0.034*** 0.034*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
District unemployment rate  -0.091***  
 (0.034)  
District employment rate 0.064***  
 (0.021)  
District homeownership rate 0.092***  
 (0.016)  
County unemployment rate   -0.101 
  (0.065) 
County employment rate  0.014 
  (0.038) 
County homeownership rate  0.103*** 
  (0.029) 
Region Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes 
Constant 0.612*** 0.622*** 
 (0.133) (0.136) 
Adj. R-squared 0.087 0.085 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic 72.041 27.355 
No. of obs. 113,839 113,839 
Note: ***, **,* refer to the significance levels at 1, 5 and 10% respectively. Robust standard errors 
are given in parenthesis. The estimated coefficients for the regional and year dummies are omitted 
from the table.  
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2.5.4. 2SLS estimation with parental homeownership as an instrument 
Table 2.9 presents the 2SLS estimation results using parental homeownership 
status as an instrument for the homeownership status with the BCS 1970. Column 
(1) shows the OLS regression of unemployment status on homeownership status. 
The next column shows the corresponding IV estimation results. The types of 
control variables from the BCS 1970 are similar to those from the BHPS but the 
two datasets are slightly different in terms of types of marital status and housing 
and number of regions. Unlike the BHPS, there is no information on the number 
of employed individuals in the household in the BCS 1970. 
 
Parental social class is a new control variable which does not appear in the 
regression specifications with the BHPS. It needs to be included for the parental 
homeownership status (the instrument) not to be correlated with their children’s 
unemployment status (the dependent variable). There is the possibility that parents’ 
innate abilities, which would have contributed to their homeownership, are 
genetically correlated with the abilities of their children. In turn, the children’s 
innate abilities can surely affect their labour market outcomes. Therefore, the 
parents’ homeownership status and children’s unemployment status could be 
spuriously correlated through the parents’ innate ability. Hence, the omission of 
the parental innate abilities in the structural equation (second-stage equation) 
could correlate the parental homeownership status with their children’s 
unemployment status. As a proxy variable for parents’ innate abilities, a father’s 
social class in 1975 when the respondents were 5 years old is included in the 
regressions. Though there is also the information on a mother’s class, it is missing 
for too many respondents and hence it is better to use the father’s class only. 
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Table 2.9. IV estimation of unemployment with BCS 1970 
(Dependent variable: unemployment status (1 if unemployed, otherwise 0)) 
 (1) OLS (2) IV 
   
Homeowner (Private renter exc.) -0.024** -0.014 
 (0.010) (0.088) 
Age -0.142 0.008 
 (0.516) (0.040) 
Age squared 0.002 -0.000 
 (0.008) (0.001) 
Male (Female exc.) 0.004 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Qualification (Higher degree exc.)   
First degree -0.008 -0.009 
 (0.011) (0.011) 
A level -0.019* -0.019* 
 (0.010) (0.010) 
GCSE -0.020** -0.021* 
 (0.010) (0.011) 
CSE -0.019** -0.020** 
 (0.010) (0.010) 
No qualification -0.016 -0.017 
 (0.011) (0.011) 
Marital status (Married exc.)   
Cohabiting 0.005 0.006 
 (0.004) (0.008) 
Single (never married) 0.033*** 0.034** 
 (0.008) (0.016) 
Separated, divorced & widowed 0.024** 0.026 
 (0.010) (0.018) 
No. of children -0.009** -0.009** 
 (0.004) (0.005) 
No. of HH members 0.008** 0.008** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Father’s occupational class when 
respondent was 5 year old.  
(Professional occupation exc.) 
  
Managerial and low professional 
occupations 
0.000 0.001 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
Non-manual skilled occupations 0.007 0.007 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
Manual skilled occupations 0.007 0.007 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
Semi-skilled occupations 0.005 0.005 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
Unskilled occupations 0.016 0.016 
 (0.013) (0.013) 
Constant 2.535 0.000 
 (8.684) (0.698) 
Adj. R-squared 0.022 0.021 
No. of obs. 6,118 6,118 
Note: ***, **,* refer to the significance levels at 1, 5 and 10% respectively. Robust standard errors 
are given in parenthesis. The estimated coefficients for the regional dummies are omitted from the 
table. See Table 2.10 for the related first-stage regression. The endogenous variable is the 
homeownership status and the instrumental variable is the father’s homeownership status when the 
respondent was 5 year old.  
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Despite some differences between the two datasets, the OLS estimation produces 
a very similar result to the one from the BHPS. Homeowners have a lower 
probability of unemployment by about 2.4% whilst the comparable result from the 
BHPS regression is 2.6% (column (1) of Table 2.5). Age and age squared do not 
have any effect on unemployment in this data because there is no variation in age 
among the cohort members. Some other variables such as the number of 
dependent children, household size and housing type do not have a substantial 
effect on the unemployment status. It is likely because the cohort members are in 
a similar life-cycle stage so that there is not much variation in those variables 
across the regression sample. 
 
The first-stage regression for the IV estimation in column (2) of Table 2.9 is 
presented in column (1) of Table 2.10. As expected, the probability of children’s 
homeownership is higher if their parents were homeowners when they were 5 
years old and the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic is 18.9. Overall, there is little 
doubt that parental homeownership status is a good predictor of their children’s 
homeownership status. In column (2) of Table 2.9, the IV estimate of the 
coefficient of the homeownership status is less negative and statistically not 
different from zero. This is the same result as the one from the IV estimation with 
the BHPS. The two different attempts using two different datasets and two 
different instruments (with different theoretical rationales) still arrive at the same 
conclusion that there is no statistically significant relationship between one’s 
homeownership and unemployment status. 
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Table 2.10. First stage regression of IV estimation with BCS 1970 
(Dependent variable: homeownership status (1 if homeowner, 0 private renter)) 
 First stage regression for column (2) of 
Table 2.9 
  
Age 3.003* 
 (1.648) 
Age square -0.045* 
 (0.025) 
Male (female exc.) -0.007 
 (0.007) 
Qualification (Higher degree exc.)  
First degree 0.033* 
 (0.020) 
A level 0.045** 
 (0.018) 
GCSE 0.039* 
 (0.021) 
CSE 0.045** 
 (0.019) 
No qualification 0.038* 
 (0.022) 
Marital status (Married exc.)  
Cohabiting -0.082*** 
 (0.010) 
Single (never married) -0.149*** 
 (0.015) 
Separated, divorced & widowed -0.168*** 
 (0.024) 
No. of children 0.014 
 (0.009) 
No. of HH members -0.008 
 (0.008) 
Father’s occupational class  
when respondent was 5 y.o.  
(Professional occupation exc.) 
 
Managerial and low professional occupations -0.008 
 (0.014) 
Non-manual skilled occupations 0.012 
 (0.016) 
Manual skilled occupations 0.001 
 (0.014) 
Semi-skilled occupations 0.005 
 (0.016) 
Unskilled occupations 0.005 
 (0.024) 
Father was homeowner at 5 y.o. 0.036*** 
 (0.008) 
Constant -48.987* 
 (27.625) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.079 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic 18.890 
No. of obs. 6,118 
Note: ***, **,* refer to the significance levels at 1, 5 and 10% respectively. Robust standard errors 
are given in parenthesis. The estimated coefficients for the regional dummies are omitted from the 
table. 
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2.6. Conclusion 
This chapter attempts to test the causal relationship between homeownership and 
unemployment. The most well-known argument regarding the relationship is 
Oswald’s hypothesis that homeownership causes unemployment through a 
reduced mobility effect. This mechanism was initially suggested to explain the 
persistently high unemployment rate in Europe during the 1960s and onwards and 
is empirically supported by early macro-level work. However, more recent studies 
criticise the methodology of macro-studies, focus more on individual outcomes 
and often find no causal relationship. This chapter contributes to the literature by 
adding more evidence on the causal relationship using UK micro-data, the BHPS 
and the BCS 1970.  
 
A major empirical challenge is to remove bias caused by the endogeneity of 
homeownership which is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, becoming a 
homeowner is a complicated process in which numerous individual and household 
characteristics are involved. It is virtually impossible to control for all the relevant 
factors which affect both homeownership and unemployment status. Secondly, 
there exists a potential reverse causation from unemployment to homeownership 
through an income effect. Panel FE models are adopted to deal with a significant 
part of the omitted variable bias (i.e. the bias introduced by time-invariant 
unobservables). As a more fundamental solution to the bias caused by the 
endogenous explanatory variable, an instrumental approach is applied with the 
instrument being either the local homeownership rate or the parental 
homeownership status. 
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The OLS or logit estimations show that homeowners are associated with a lower 
probability of being unemployed contrary to Oswald’s suggestion. It is suspected 
that this could be because of the endogeneity of homeownership status. As 
expected, a comparison of a pooled model with a panel FE model indicates that 
unobserved individual heterogeneity does play a role in determining the 
homeownership and unemployment statuses simultaneously. When time-constant 
individual characteristics are controlled for, the difference in the unemployment 
probability between homeowners and renters disappears. The pooled and panel FE 
IV estimation also supports the view that homeownership status does not cause 
unemployment regardless of the instrument employed. 
  
69 
 
CHAPTER 3. DISTANCE MOVED AND HOUSING 
TENURE  DECISION 
 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter explores whether distance moved affects movers’ tenure decisions. 
The proposition tested, in a nutshell, is that households who move farther away 
from their original residence are less likely to own their next property since the 
collection of available information on the destination housing market is more 
difficult and more costly and hence the mover household may be more likely to 
make an ill-informed investment decision by either paying too high a price or 
buying into the ‘wrong’ neighbourhood. Renters may also misjudge the prevailing 
rent-level or choose the ‘wrong’ neighbourhood but this has less grave 
consequences. One reason for this is that renters who move, in contrast to owners, 
face much lower transaction costs. 
 
It is well reported in the literature that job-related movers move relatively longer 
distances than housing-related movers (Nivalainen, 2004). This is because people 
relocating for work typically move between geographically separate labour 
markets, which generally also means a new housing market. Therefore, in the new 
housing market, movers might not have sufficient information on neighbourhood 
quality, housing stock conditions and housing price level. One interesting question 
that can be raised regarding the housing market outcomes of inter-city movers is 
how the difficulty of obtaining information on destination housing markets might 
affect residential tenure decisions.  
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In the absence of sufficient information on the destination housing market, movers 
may prefer private renting over owner-occupation, due to the following distinctive 
characteristics of housing. Firstly, the collection of information on local housing 
markets is costly as straightforward comparisons across residential properties and 
neighbourhoods are not possible due to the heterogeneity of housing units and 
neighbourhoods in terms of location and characteristics. Secondly, if a house and 
its neighbourhood in the new housing market turn out to be not as good as the 
mover initially thought, the costs to bear would be greater for homeowners than 
for private renters. This is because homeowners invest large proportions of their 
wealth in housing and thus cannot diversify investment risk effectively (Hilber, 
2005). Moreover, their housing investment is heavily leveraged, which magnifies 
the risk further. Lastly, buying a home involves much higher transaction costs than 
renting it. If a household fails to purchase desirable housing due to lack of 
information, they would be either locked into that property, or forced to bear 
additional transaction costs to relocate. 
 
Given the importance of local housing market information for the home-buyer, the 
starting point of this chapter is that the amount of information on the destination 
housing market is likely to decrease with the distance moved. As the distance a 
mover plans to move increases, searching in the target housing market would 
become increasingly costly and therefore the amount and quality of information 
on the housing and neighbourhood is likely to fall.4 A reasonable strategy for the 
mover’s tenure decision would be to rent a property first and delay a home 
                                           
4 The emergence of the Internet may have substantially reduced such costs, but still a site 
inspection in person is essential for properties, unlike mass produced goods sold online and hence 
costs of travels for viewing are inevitable. 
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purchase until she or he gains sufficient knowledge and living experience in the 
new neighbourhood. If this hypothesis holds true, it should be observed that the 
longer distance a household moves, the more likely they are to choose private 
renting over owner-occupation.  
 
For the empirical analysis, this chapter employs the Survey of English Housing 
(SEH) which provides essential information such as the housing tenure status of 
households (the dependent variable), distance moved (the key explanatory 
variable) and various demographic and socio-economic characteristics of 
household heads (the control variables). One particular concern with the empirical 
analysis below is that of spurious correlation or omitted variable bias: distance 
moved may be correlated with propensity to own since omitted characteristics of 
households may be correlated with both, the dependent and the key explanatory 
variable. Controlling for as many demographic and socio-economic characteristics 
of mover households may therefore mitigate potential omitted-variable bias. The 
additional advantage of the SEH is that it provides some information on the pre-
move conditions of households. In particular, the tenure status at the previous 
accommodation helps to control for unobservable preferences and ability to own 
of households. 
 
The empirical analysis first looks at whether the awareness of neighbourhood 
problems decreases with the distance moved. The awareness of neighbourhood 
problems is assumed to represent how much information mover households had 
on the new neighbourhood. It turns out that the further the distance moved, the 
less likely the movers are to be aware of neighbourhood problems, such as crime, 
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vandalism, litter and graffiti. This result indicates that movers do have difficulty in 
collecting information on distant housing markets, which leads to the main 
hypothesis of this chapter regarding whether the probability of choosing owner-
occupation over private renting decreases with the distance moved. When a 
number of demographic and socio-economic factors are controlled for to reduce 
omitted variable bias, a negative effect of the distance moved on the probability of 
homeownership is unambiguously demonstrated. Lastly, an investigation is 
carried out regarding the household’s subsequent moving decision after the initial 
move. Once renting households become familiar with the local housing market 
over time, they may consider moving to more permanent owner-occupied 
accommodation. The tendency to move out shortly after the first move is expected 
to increase with the distance moved. This is because the longer-distance movers 
are more likely to find problems with the accommodation and neighbourhoods 
since they were less able to collect information on them prior to the moves. 
Therefore, the length of stay at the current accommodation is expected to have a 
negative relationship with the distance moved and this hypothesis is supported by 
the empirical analysis. 
 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 discusses previous related 
studies and the contribution of this chapter to the relevant literature. Section 3.3 
derives testable hypotheses using a simple model. Section 3.4 explains the 
empirical strategies and data. Section 3.5 presents empirical results. The last 
section concludes with a summary and discussion of policy implications. 
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3.2. Literature review 
A lack of knowledge on a destination housing market essentially refers to 
uncertainty about its various aspects, such as general housing conditions, 
neighbourhood quality, trend in housing price moves, etc. Therefore, a review of 
the literature on whether and how various types of uncertainty affect housing 
tenure decisions would give us the chance to assess indirectly the effects of 
informational shortage on tenure decisions. In the literature on determinants of 
housing tenure, many kinds of uncertainty have received academic attention and 
have been reported to discourage homeownership. One of the types of uncertainty 
that has drawn the greatest academic attention is income uncertainty. Since it 
usually accounts for the largest proportion of mortgage payments of households, 
uncertainty in the income stream could discourage homeownership. Haurin and 
Gill (1987) show a negative relationship between a likelihood of homeownership 
and labour income uncertainty which is measured by the proportion of military 
personnel household income accounted for by spouse’s earnings which are 
arguably more uncertain in their future prospects. Using the coefficient of 
variation of income as a measure of income uncertainty, Haurin (1991) shows that 
a 10% increase in income variability has as negative an effect on homeownership 
as a 5% decrease in income itself. Robst et al. (1999) obtain a more precise 
measure of income risk by excluding expected income rises and still reach the 
same conclusion as the studies above. A similar finding is also reported in the 
European context where institutional settings and property market characteristics 
are different from the US. For Germany and Spain, households with a high degree 
of income uncertainty tend to prefer renting when the uncertainty is represented 
by both variance and skewness (Diaz-Serrano, 2005).  
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The level and volatility of housing prices is also found to be important in 
homeownership decisions. Fu (1991) shows that the causal relationship between 
housing price uncertainty and probability of home ownership should be negative 
in the absence of borrowing constraints. However, if borrowing against expected 
future gains from housing investment is constrained, the relationship may be 
ambiguous due to the offsetting of income and substitution effects (Fu, 1995). 
Most empirical studies have reported the negative effect of housing price 
uncertainty on the probability of becoming a homeowner. Rosen et al. (1984) find 
that uncertainty involved in the relative prices of owning has significantly lowered 
the proportion of owner-occupiers in the U.S. Turner (2003) also finds that an 
increase in anticipated price volatility by one standard deviation lowers the 
probability of homeownership by 7 percent. Turner and Seo (2007) suggest that 
when the anticipated volatility in housing price increases from the 25th to the 50th 
percentile of the distribution of price variance, the probability of transitioning into 
ownership is reduced by 19 percent.  
 
There are several studies that explore how general knowledge on housing 
transactions (e.g. how to search housing markets and obtain mortgages from credit 
markets) affects tenure decisions. Dietz and Haurin (2003) suggest that a positive 
correlation in the homeownership status between parents and their child could be 
attributed to a transfer of knowledge on housing transactions. Haurin and 
Morrow-Jones (2006) argue that some studies (e.g. Henretta, 1984; Boehm and 
Schlottman, 1999; Mulder and Smits, 1999) have produced empirical outcomes 
consistent with the intergenerational transfer of housing market knowledge. 
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Haurin and Morrow-Jones (2006) explore how the market knowledge affects 
homeownership decision in a more direct manner. Through their own survey, they 
measure the level of market knowledge of home-buyers based on questions 
around the market situation at the time of the home-purchase.5 They find that the 
degree of real estate market knowledge increases the probability of 
homeownership and the difference in market knowledge can explain 8.5% of the 
gap in homeownership rates between black and white households. 
 
The related literature indicates that various types of uncertainty lower the 
likelihood of homeownership and it can be inferred that a lack of information or 
knowledge on local housing markets could also discourage homeownership. Since 
housing is a location-specific good, knowledge on local housing markets may 
have a greater impact on the homeownership decision than general knowledge of 
the process of buying a home. The focus of previous studies has been typically on 
the latter type of knowledge, whereas the focus of this chapter is on the former 
type of knowledge. The investigation of the relationship between distance moved 
and housing tenure can have important policy implications for both labour and 
housing markets. It is therefore surprising that, to the author’s knowledge, the 
topic of this chapter has not been explored rigorously so far. The most closely 
related study to this chapter is Clark and Huang (2004) who look at the 
relationship between the distance moved and the homeownership status using the 
UK BHPS. They suggest that homeowners do not show a particularly strong 
tendency to return to renting even after they make long-distance moves but their 
                                           
5 Haurin and Morrow-Jones (2006) collected the following information: (1) whether there was 
knowledge on mortgage interest rates; (2) the size of the down payment; (3) whether help was 
available from the government; (4) whether it was possible to find out own, and; (5) other’s credit 
scores, and; (6) whether the affordable housing price was known 
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conclusion is based solely on descriptive statistics. This chapter is the first study 
to test the hypothesis formally in a rigorous way through an econometric approach. 
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3.3. Testable hypotheses 
A theoretical model which predicts the main hypothesis of this chapter requires a 
couple of assumptions. The first assumption is that the amount of information 
obtained on new housing and neighbourhoods decreases with the distance moved. 
Though the case is different from this chapter, Yezer and Thurston (1976) and 
DaVanzo (1983) argue that the longer the distance of the move, the more costly it 
is to obtain information on employment opportunities in the new labour market. 
Their finding arguably also applies to the housing market. One may argue that 
unlike the 1970s and 1980s, the acquisition of information on distant housing 
markets may not be too difficult any more in an era of highly advanced 
information technology. However, the types of market information which are 
electronically available are typically limited to standardised factors, such as 
housing price, size and structure. There are still many types of crucial information 
which are difficult to obtain unless properties and neighbourhoods are actually 
experienced, such as detailed conditions of properties or the neighbourhood 
atmosphere. Final decisions on whether to buy a property are typically made only 
after several visits. Therefore, it is predicted that the distance a household wants to 
move would lower the likelihood of homeownership through its negative effect on 
efforts to collect information on local housing markets. This assumption is first 
tested prior to the main hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 1 
The amount of information held by a household on the new neighbourhood 
would decrease as the distance moved increases. 
 
78 
 
The second assumption is that the maximum utility receivable from desirable 
accommodation and neighbourhood would be greater for homeowners than for 
private renters. Homeowners are likely to have a higher level of satisfaction from 
good accommodation as they can stay as long as they want. However, if the 
accommodation turns out to be of poor quality, owner-occupiers would receive a 
lower level of utility from it than private renters as the former have to either stay 
and suffer from the poor housing quality or incur large costs to relocate. In any 
case, homeowners are likely to suffer more than renters when choosing a wrong 
property. Mathematically,  
 
𝑈𝐺
𝐻 > 𝑈𝐺
𝑅 and 𝑈𝐵
𝐻 < 𝑈𝐵
𝑅
      (1) 
 
Where 𝑈𝐺
𝐻 and 𝑈𝐺
𝑅 are the utilities that a homeowner and a renter receive 
from good accommodation respectively. 𝑈𝐵
𝐻 and 𝑈𝐵
𝑅 are the utilities that a 
homeowner and a renter receive from the bad accommodation respectively. 
 
A tenure decision is made by comparing the utilities which a homeowner and a 
renter are expected to receive from the new accommodation. For simplicity, the 
expected utility is given as the weighted average utility of the maximum and 
minimum achievable with weights respectively given by the probability of finding 
good accommodation (pd) and bad accommodation (1-pd). Then, the difference in 
the expected utility between owner-occupation and renting is given by  
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𝐸(𝑈𝐻𝑂) − 𝐸(𝑈𝑅𝑇) = 𝑝𝑑 ∙ (𝑈𝐺,𝐻𝑂 − 𝑈𝐺,𝑅𝑇) + (1 −  𝑝𝑑) ∙ (𝑈𝐵,𝐻𝑂 − 𝑈𝐵,𝑅𝑇)      (2) 
 
Where 𝐸(𝑈𝐻𝑂) and 𝐸(𝑈𝑅𝑇) are the expected utilities that a homeowner and 
a renter receive from the new accommodation respectively. 
 
If the two assumptions hold true, the difference in the expected utility given in eq. 
(2) is positive when the distance moved is zero, but turns negative eventually as 
the distance moved increases. For a relatively short distance, the probability (pd) 
would be close to 1 since sufficient searching can be done. Hence, the first term 
on the right-hand side of eq. (2) which is positive by assumption is given more 
weight so that the difference in the expected utility between homeowners and 
private renters remains positive, implying that owner-occupation is preferred over 
renting. As the probability (pd) decreases with the distance moved, a greater 
weight is given to the second term on the right-hand side of eq. (2), which is 
assumed to be negative, causing the difference (𝐸(𝑈𝐻𝑂) −  𝐸(𝑈𝑅𝑇)) to be 
negative and renting is preferred. Therefore, beyond a certain distance from the 
previous accommodation, where the difference in the expected utility turns 
negative, movers can be expected to increasingly choose renting over owning.  
 
The argument made above is depicted in Figure 3.1, which contains the 
assumptions made previously. Since the probability of finding good 
accommodation (pd) decreases with the distance moved, both schedules of 
expected utility for homeowner and renter decrease but only at different rates as 
the difference in the utility received from good and poor accommodation is 
greater for homeowners than renters. Therefore, the two schedules should 
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intersect each other somewhere in the middle between the origin and destination 
of the move and the intersecting point is referred to by d*. Between the point of 
origin and the point d*, the expected utility is greater for homeowners than it is for 
renters and hence movers are likely to own, whilst beyond d*, they are likely to 
rent. 
 
Figure. 3.1. Expected utility and the intended moving distance. 
 
So, the main hypothesis is derived as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2 
The longer the distance moved, the more likely the households are to choose 
private renting over owner-occupation. 
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After settling down in the new accommodation, the level of the mover’s 
knowledge of the local area can be expected to increase over time and then, she or 
he may want to make a so-called corrective or adjustment move to more 
permanent accommodation. The tendency to adjust housing quality and location 
within the same housing market is likely to be stronger for longer-distance movers 
as they are less likely to be satisfied with their first accommodation in the new 
market due to informational shortage. The third hypothesis can be expressed as 
follows: 
 
Hypothesis 3 
The longer the distance moved, the more likely movers are to move again 
shortly after the initial move. 
  
Through these hypotheses, this chapter aims to show that facing uncertainty 
regarding the quality and conditions of new housing and neighbourhood, a 
mover’s rational behaviour may be to first move into temporary accommodation, 
such as a privately rented house, and then later settle in a more permanent place. 
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3.4. Data and empirical strategy  
3.4.1. Survey of English Housing 
The data for the empirical analysis is the Survey of English Housing (SEH) 
provided by the Office of National Statistics, the UK governmental body in charge 
of national statistics. As its title implies, the geographical span of the survey 
covers England and Wales. The SEH provides all the essential information for the 
analysis, such as distance moved, housing tenure status, problems in 
neighbourhoods, housing-related characteristics, demographic and socio-
economic characteristics of households. An additional advantage is that it 
provides some important information on the pre-move conditions of households. 
Of these, previous tenure status is particularly helpful in controlling for 
households’ preferences and ability to own. Furthermore, the lengthy period of the 
survey (15 years from 1993/4 to 2007/8) permits securing a large sample size and 
carrying out experiments for sub-sample groups.6 The unit of observation is a 
household and some types of personal information are available mainly for 
household heads. 
 
3.4.2. Common variables and sample selection 
There are some explanatory variables commonly included in Hypothesis 1 to 3. 
Before empirical strategies for individual hypotheses are considered, it seems 
worth discussing what those variables are and how they are constructed. More 
detailed discussion of how each variable is relevant to the hypotheses will be done 
in the empirical strategy section for each hypothesis. As this chapter seeks to 
                                           
6 The SEH ended in 2007/8 and was merged with the English House Condition Survey to form a 
single housing survey for the UK called the English Housing Survey. Due to the continuity and 
consistency of the variables, this chapter uses only SEH. 
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explain the relationship between distance moved and homeownership status, these 
two variables are discussed first before the other control variables are introduced. 
A housing tenure is the dependent variable for Hypothesis 2 and one of the 
explanatory variables for the other hypotheses. In the SEH, housing tenure is 
given in greater detail, but without sacrificing the efficiency of information they 
can be grouped into three categories: homeowners, private renters and public 
renters. The detailed tenure types and their matching groups are shown in Table 3. 
1. Of many characteristics of renting, this chapter focuses on its ability to offer 
easy and quick access to and exit from accommodation. In this regard, the 
inclusion of public renters in the regression sample appears inappropriate since it 
is more difficult and takes longer time to secure public housing in the UK due to a 
high demand for them and the complex administrative process. Rather, it is often 
chosen as permanent accommodation for low-income households, as an 
alternative to owner-occupied housing. Therefore, it seems appropriate to exclude 
public renters from regressions. 
 
Table 3.1. Types of housing tenure  
Housing tenure Detailed categories 
 Homeowner own outright, own with mortgage, partly own/partly rent 
 Public renter rent from local council or housing association 
 Private renter 
rent from private landlords, property companies, 
employers, organisation or relatives and friends 
 
The main explanatory variable for Hypothesis 1 to 3 is the distance between 
current and previous accommodation, as self-assessed by moving households. In 
the SEH, it is originally given as a categorical variable which has 9 options 
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ranging from ‘under 1 mile’, ‘1 miles but not 2 miles’, ‘2 miles but not 5 miles’, 
‘5 miles but not 10 miles’, ‘10 miles but not 20 miles’ , ‘20 miles but not 50 
miles’, ’50 miles or more’, ‘From Northern Ireland’ to ‘From abroad’. The 
households that moved from Northern Ireland or abroad are excluded from the 
regression sample as they are likely to choose private renting mainly because they 
are unfamiliar with the institutional settings of the property and mortgage markets 
of England and Wales, rather than because they do not have knowledge of the 
local areas where they have settled down. The inclusion of movers from outside 
England and Wales would lead to an overestimation of the influence of the 
distance moved on the tenure decision, unless there are any control variables 
indicating how knowledgeable these overseas migrants were about England and 
Wales and the property market in general prior to moving. Rather than using the 
distance moved as it is given as a categorical variable, it is converted to a 
continuous variable by taking a mid-value of each range, for example, 0.5 miles 
for the category of ‘under 1 mile’, 1.5 miles for ‘1 mile but not 2 miles’, 3.5 miles 
for ‘2 miles but not 5 miles’, etc. For a category of ‘over 50 miles’, ‘75 miles’ is 
assigned arbitrarily.7 This way of conversion makes it easy to interpret the 
empirical results and regressions with interaction terms between distance moved 
and other characteristics of households are possible. 
 
The rest of the control variables can be grouped into: (1) demographic and 
individual-specific characteristics of household heads; (2) household-level 
information; (3) housing characteristics, and; (4) time and regional dummies. The 
individual-specific characteristics include a household head’s age, sex and 
                                           
7 Though not shown in this chapter, other arbitrary numbers such as 50 and 100 miles are assigned 
for ‘over 50 miles’ category but the overall result does not change accordingly.  
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economic status. There are 5 types of economic status, as shown in the summary 
tables below, among which students are not included in the regression sample. As 
the SEH interviews household heads, the students in the survey are usually those 
who have left their family for college or university and live independently from 
their parents. Therefore, they become heads of their own households. In general, 
they move long distance to the places of study and rent a house. However, their 
tenure types are likely to be determined mainly by the expected length of stay 
rather than by the distance moved. Therefore, the inclusion of students in the 
regression sample would dilute the true relationship between tenure status and 
distance moved. 
 
The household-level characteristics include the household composition, the 
number of adults, the number of children and the real household income. The 
numbers of adults and children indicate the size of the household. The income to 
be used in the regression is the real annual household income. The nominal 
household income is first obtained by summing up the annual gross income 
earned by the household head and spouse. For single-person households, the 
spouse’s income is set to zero. The nominal income is deflated to the real income 
in 1993 prices, using the UK retail price index. Though the income is initially 
given as a continuous variable in pound sterling, it enters the regressions as a 
categorical variable and this allows for regressions using the interaction terms 
between the distance moved and the income. The categorical household income 
takes four options of £0-£9,999, £10,000-£19,999, £20,000-£49,999 and £50,000 
or over.  
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The information on housing characteristics covers the type of accommodation, the 
number of bedrooms, the council tax band and the main reasons for moving. 
There are five types of accommodation (see the summary tables below for details) 
and the number of bedrooms is used as a proxy for the size of the accommodation. 
The council tax band is adopted as a proxy measure for property value. There are 
9 categories of the property value ranging from ‘up to £40,000’ to ‘over £320,000’ 
(see the summary tables below for the detailed categories). Though it does not 
really show the exact value of each property, it reveals the relative position of the 
property in the spectrum of housing value. Another advantage of the band is that it 
shows the value of rented properties as well as that of owner-occupied ones.  
 
The main reasons for moving are found to be highly correlated with the distance 
moved and also with the homeownership status. In the SEH, there are more than 
20 different reasons for moving and the types and the number of the reasons vary 
from year to year. To make these consistent over time, each and every individual 
reason is classified into one of the categories from Table 3.2 below. Those who 
report ‘for homeownership’ as the main reason for moving are excluded from the 
regression sample. This chapter looks at the impact of distance moved on tenure 
status but since their moves were motivated by the intention to become 
homeowners, it is unlikely that the distance moved affects homeownership. 
 
The total number of households available for the entire duration of the survey is 
429,878. The information on the distance moved is available for those households 
which moved within 3 years of the time of the survey, meaning they were 
relatively recent movers, and the number of these cases is 67,648. Out of this 
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number, public renters, foreign migrants, students and those who moved for 
homeownership are excluded as discussed above, leaving a sample size of 44,489. 
When the cases which have a missing value in any of the variables are excluded, 
the sample size is reduced to 37,755. Starting from this number of observations, 
the exact sample size used to test each hypothesis varies somewhat due to the 
exclusion of some cases according to the characteristics of experimentation. This 
will be explained further when each hypothesis is discussed below. 
 
Table 3.2. Main reasons for moving 
Grouped reasons  
for moving 
Stated individual reasons for moving 
Year of 
appearance 
Neighbourhood-related 
reasons 
Wanted to move to better and more pleasant 
neighbourhood 
1993-2007 
Housing-related reasons Wanted larger or better housing 1993-2007 
Wanted smaller or cheaper housing 1993-2007 
Ownership Wanted to buy  1993-2007 
Involuntary move Had to leave tied accommodation 1993-1997 
 Could not afford mortgage payments  1993-1997 
 Could not afford rent payments 1993-1997 
 Could not afford mortgage payments or rent 
payments 
1998-2007 
 Accommodation was no longer available  1993-1996 
 Assured short-hold came to an end 1995-1997 
 Landlord required tenant to move out 1995-2007 
Personal/family-related 
reasons 
Divorced or separated 1993-2007 
Married or cohabited 1993-2007 
Moved for family reasons 1993 
Moved for personal reasons 1993 
Moved for other family or personal reasons 1994-2007 
Wanted independent accommodation 1994-2007 
Job-related reasons Wanted to move near to new jobs 1993-1997 
 Wanted to move near to current job 1993-1997 
 Moved for job related reasons 1998-2007 
Other reasons Went to or finished college/university 1993-1997 
 Moved for better schools for children 2005-2007 
 Other reasons 1993-2007 
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3.4.3. Empirical strategy  
3.4.3.1. Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1 is concerned with the relationship between the distance moved and 
the level of information held by the movers on the new neighbourhood. The SEH 
provides information on how serious household heads think their local area 
problems such as crime are. The seriousness of crime is likely to be felt only after 
people become familiar with their neighbourhood through a few years’ residency. 
Therefore, how aware they are of the local problems is considered closely related 
to the level of knowledge on their local areas. Therefore, using the degree of 
awareness of local problems as a proxy for local knowledge, the model 
specification is written as follows: 
 
Awareness of local problem = f(distance moved, other controls)      (3) 
 
The dependent variable takes one of the three options – a specific local problem, 
for example, crime is ‘serious’, ‘problematic but not serious’ or ‘not a problem at 
all’. The ordered logit model is appropriate for the estimation of eq. (3), as only an 
order among the options of the dependent variables is known. If this hypothesis is 
true, longer-distance movers are expected to be less aware of their neighbourhood 
problems. To check whether the hypothesis holds true for different types of 
problems, this chapter looks at four types of local problems, namely, crime, 
vandalism, litter and graffiti. 
 
The seriousness of the local problems felt by movers is affected not only by the 
distance moved, but also by the quality of neighbourhoods. If neighbourhood 
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quality is correlated with the distance moved but omitted from the regressions, the 
estimated coefficient of the distance moved would be biased. In reality, the 
correlation between the distance moved and neighbourhood quality can occur for 
two reasons. Firstly, households may want to move away from local problems 
through long distance moves. Secondly, good-quality neighbourhoods are 
relatively rare and hence one may have to move relatively long distances to find 
them. Unfortunately, neighbourhood quality is difficult to measure and there is no 
information on neighbourhood quality in the SEH. Therefore, the best strategy 
available is to control for individual household characteristics that capture the 
quality of neighbourhoods. Two obvious characteristics are real household income 
and housing value. Real household income is highly associated with 
neighbourhood quality due to the fact that the higher the income, the more likely 
the household is to live in the good neighbourhood. Housing value also has a 
close relationship with neighbourhood quality through the process of housing 
price capitalisation. Properties in high-quality neighbourhoods are more expensive 
than those in low-quality ones, reflecting the difference in the neighbourhood 
quality. Also, the size of housing may be related to the quality of neighbourhood. 
Large (and expensive) houses are found more often in high-quality 
neighbourhoods. The number of bedrooms will be controlled for as a proxy for the 
size of houses. 
 
Hypothesis 1 is concerned with the extent to which mover households were aware 
of neighbourhood problems at the time of moves. As the awareness of the 
problems tends to go up with the length of residency in the neighbourhood, the 
regression sample used to test Hypothesis 1 should be limited to mover 
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households that had lived for relatively a short period in their current 
accommodation when they were surveyed. However, if the sample is limited to 
households with too short length of residency, say, one month, it will be difficult 
to secure a sufficient sample size to obtain reliable empirical results. Therefore, it 
seems reasonable to choose only those households which had lived in their current 
houses for less than 1 year (henceforth, first-year residents). Out of 37,775 cases 
(see ‘sample selection’ section above for how this number was reached), 15,202 
had lived in their locations for less than 1 year. In addition, the sample size varies 
depending on the types of neighbourhood problems, as, for example, is the sample 
size is 10,543 for crime. The summary statistics for the variables included in the 
regressions for Hypothesis 1 are shown in Table 3.3 below. 
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Table 3.3. Summary statistics for Hypothesis 1 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Crime 10543 2.495 0.657 1 3 
Distance moved 10543 16.317 25.205 0.5 75 
Age 10543 36.671 12.928 16 91 
Age squared 10543 1511.908 1172.708 256 8281 
Sex 10543 1.294 0.455 1 2 
Economic status 
(Full-time employed exc.) 
          
Part-time employed 10543 0.070 0.255 0 1 
Unemployed 10543 0.032 0.176 0 1 
Retired 10543 0.061 0.239 0 1 
Inactive 10543 0.066 0.248 0 1 
Household composition 
(Single exc.) 
          
Couple 10543 0.601 0.490 0 1 
Lone parent 10543 0.088 0.283 0 1 
Multi-family HH 10543 0.057 0.231 0 1 
No. of children 10543 0.553 0.920 0 7 
No. of adults 10543 1.800 0.705 1 8 
Real HH income 
(£0-£9,999 exc.) 
          
£10,000-£19,999 10543 0.293 0.455 0 1 
£20,000-£49,000 10543 0.401 0.490 0 1 
£50,000 or more 10543 0.074 0.261 0 1 
Homeowner  
(private renter exc.) 
10543 0.597 0.491 0 1 
No. of bedrooms 10543 2.579 1.004 1 9 
Accommodation type 
(Detached/Bungalow exc.) 
          
Semi-detached 10543 0.260 0.439 0 1 
Terraced 10543 0.309 0.462 0 1 
Purpose-built flat 10543 0.125 0.331 0 1 
Converted flat 10543 0.113 0.317 0 1 
Council tax band 
(Up to 40k exc.) 
          
Up to £52k 10543 0.206 0.404 0 1 
Up to £68k 10543 0.220 0.414 0 1 
Up to £88k 10543 0.174 0.379 0 1 
Up to £120k 10543 0.094 0.292 0 1 
Up to £160k 10543 0.048 0.213 0 1 
Up to £320k 10543 0.036 0.185 0 1 
Over £320k  10543 0.007 0.081 0 1 
 
92 
 
Table 3.3. Summary statistics for Hypothesis 1 (cont.) 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Main reasons for moving 
(Neighbourhood-related exc.) 
          
Housing-related 10543 0.265 0.441 0 1 
Had to move 10543 0.135 0.342 0 1 
Personal/family-related 10543 0.349 0.477 0 1 
Job-related 10543 0.130 0.336 0 1 
Region 
(North East exc.) 
          
North West 10543 0.117 0.321 0 1 
Yorkshire & the Humber 10543 0.098 0.297 0 1 
East Midlands 10543 0.087 0.282 0 1 
West Midlands 10543 0.084 0.278 0 1 
Eastern 10543 0.117 0.322 0 1 
London 10543 0.137 0.343 0 1 
South East 10543 0.192 0.394 0 1 
South West 10543 0.120 0.325 0 1 
Year of survey 
(1994 exc.) 
          
1995 10543 0.042 0.202 0 1 
1997 10543 0.110 0.313 0 1 
1998 10543 0.121 0.326 0 1 
1999 10543 0.110 0.313 0 1 
2001 10543 0.111 0.314 0 1 
2002 10543 0.105 0.306 0 1 
2003 10543 0.098 0.297 0 1 
2004 10543 0.096 0.294 0 1 
2005 10543 0.083 0.276 0 1 
2006 10543 0.087 0.282 0 1 
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3.4.3.2. Hypothesis 2 
The main goal of this chapter is to test whether the distance moved affects the 
mover’s tenure decision. The regression model is specified such that the 
probability of homeownership is expressed as a function of the distance moved 
along with other control variables.  
 
Pr (homeownership=1) = f (distance moved, other controls)     (4) 
 
The dependent variable is a dummy which takes the value of 1 if a household is an 
owner-occupier or 0 if it rents from a private landlord. The model is estimated by 
maximum likelihood logit. If the hypothesis is true, the estimated coefficient of 
the distance moved should take a negative sign. The control variable which 
appears uniquely for Hypothesis 2 is tenure status in the previous accommodation, 
which takes one of the three options - homeowner, public renter and private renter. 
This past tenure status is likely correlated with both the current tenure status and 
the distance moved. Previous homeowners tend to become homeowners again and 
are reluctant to move short distances as substantial moving costs cannot be 
justified for short-distance moves.  
 
In order to test Hypothesis 2, only first-year residents are included in the 
regression sample. This chapter is interested in the relationship between the 
distance moved and the homeownership status at the time of the moves but it will 
be diluted over time as long-distance movers, who are more likely to be renters, 
are expected to move again at a faster rate than short-distance movers. Therefore, 
the regression sample needs to be confined to relatively recent mover households. 
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As counted previously, the first-year residents are 15,202. When the cases with 
missing values relating to previous tenure are excluded, the final sample size for 
the regressions is 13,185. See Table 3.4 for the relevant summary statistics. 
 
Table 3.4. Summary statistics for Hypothesis 2 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Homeownership status 13185 0.607 0.489 0 1 
Distance moved 13185 17.174 25.929 0.5 75 
Age 13185 38.515 13.123 17 92 
Age squared 13185 1655.622 1221.500 289 8464 
Sex 13185 1.271 0.445 1 2 
Economic status 
(Full-time employed exc.) 
          
Part-time employed 13185 0.068 0.252 0 1 
Unemployed 13185 0.038 0.190 0 1 
Retired 13185 0.073 0.260 0 1 
Inactive 13185 0.072 0.259 0 1 
Household composition 
(Single exc.) 
          
Couple 13185 0.619 0.486 0 1 
Lone parent 13185 0.092 0.289 0 1 
Multi-family HH 13185 0.053 0.223 0 1 
No. of children 13185 0.626 0.971 0 7 
No. of adults 13185 1.830 0.712 1 8 
Real HH income 
(£0-£9,999 exc.) 
          
£10,000-£19,999 13185 0.284 0.451 0 1 
£20,000-£49,000 13185 0.401 0.490 0 1 
£50,000 or more 13185 0.079 0.269 0 1 
Previous tenure type 
(Previous HO exc.) 
          
Previous public renter 13185 0.065 0.246 0 1 
Previous private renter 13185 0.406 0.491 0 1 
No. of bedrooms 13185 2.653 1.018 1 10 
Accommodation type 
(Detached/Bungalow exc.) 
          
Semi-detached 13185 0.266 0.442 0 1 
Terraced 13185 0.289 0.453 0 1 
Purpose-built flat 13185 0.115 0.318 0 1 
Converted flat 13185 0.112 0.315 0 1 
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Table 3.4. Summary statistics for Hypothesis 2 (cont.) 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Council tax band 
(Up to 40k exc.) 
          
Up to £52k 13185 0.195 0.396 0 1 
Up to £68k 13185 0.220 0.414 0 1 
Up to £88k 13185 0.186 0.389 0 1 
Up to £120k 13185 0.106 0.308 0 1 
Up to £160k 13185 0.053 0.225 0 1 
Up to £320k 13185 0.041 0.199 0 1 
Over £320k  13185 0.008 0.089 0 1 
Main reasons for moving 
(Neighbourhood-related exc.) 
          
Housing-related 13185 0.312 0.463 0 1 
Had to move 13185 0.136 0.343 0 1 
Personal/family-related 13185 0.280 0.449 0 1 
Job-related 13185 0.134 0.340 0 1 
Region 
(North East exc.) 
          
North West 13185 0.115 0.319 0 1 
Yorkshire & the Humber 13185 0.089 0.285 0 1 
East Midlands 13185 0.084 0.277 0 1 
West Midlands 13185 0.083 0.276 0 1 
Eastern 13185 0.120 0.325 0 1 
London 13185 0.141 0.348 0 1 
South East 13185 0.202 0.401 0 1 
South West 13185 0.123 0.328 0 1 
Year of survey 
(1993 exc.) 
          
1994 13185 0.062 0.242 0 1 
1995 13185 0.069 0.253 0 1 
1996 13185 0.068 0.252 0 1 
1997 13185 0.075 0.263 0 1 
1998 13185 0.083 0.276 0 1 
1999 13185 0.075 0.264 0 1 
2000 13185 0.075 0.264 0 1 
2001 13185 0.074 0.262 0 1 
2002 13185 0.071 0.256 0 1 
2003 13185 0.067 0.250 0 1 
2004 13185 0.065 0.246 0 1 
2005 13185 0.057 0.232 0 1 
2006 13185 0.059 0.236 0 1 
2007 13185 0.058 0.234 0 1 
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3.4.3.3. Hypothesis 3 
The third hypothesis states that the longer the distance moved, the more likely 
movers are to make an adjustment move shortly after the initial move. If it holds 
true, the proportion of the second- and third-year residents would be lower among 
the longer-distance movers than among the shorter-distance ones. Then, the model 
specification can be written as follows. 
 
Length of stay= f(distance moved, other controls)         (5)  
 
The dependent variable is the length of stay in the current accommodation. It is 
given as a categorical variable taking one of the three options: ‘less than 1 year’, 
‘1 year but not 2 years’ and ‘2 years but not 3 years’. The reason for why the 
length of stay (the dependent variable) does not go beyond 3 years is because the 
information on the distance moved (the key explanatory variable) is only available 
for those who have lived for less than 3 years in the current accommodation. The 
categorical dependent variable is converted into a continuous variable by taking 
the mid-value of the range (e.g. a half year for ‘less than 1 year’). Since it is now a 
continuous variable, the OLS estimation is applied to eq. (5) and the estimated 
coefficient of the distance moved is expected to have a negative sign if the 
hypothesis is correct. 
 
In general, the set of other control variables is similar to those used for the 
previous hypotheses. Of the explanatory variables, the tenure types are 
particularly important, as private renters are more likely to move again soon and 
also to have moved longer distances than homeowners. Therefore, unless the types 
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of housing tenure are controlled for, the estimate for the distance moved would be 
biased downwards. Also, the main reasons for moving would affect both the 
distance moved and the length of stay greatly. For example, housing- or 
neighbourhood-related movers are expected to move short distances and stay 
relatively long in the same place, while job-related movers would move longer 
distances and stay only short-term. 
 
Unlike the previous hypotheses, Hypothesis 3 does not require the regression 
sample to be limited to the first-year residents, as the length of stay is the main 
explanatory variable. The entire 37,755 cases (see ‘sample selection’ part above) 
are used and Table 3.5 below presents the relevant summary statistics. 
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Table 3.5. Summary statistics for Hypothesis 3 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Length of stay 37755 1.878 0.818 1 3 
Distance moved 37755 16.003 24.873 0.5 75 
Age 37755 38.829 13.206 16 95 
Age squared 37755 1682.124 1241.046 256 9025 
Sex 37755 1.259 0.438 1 2 
Economic status 
(Full-time employed exc.) 
          
Part-time employed 37755 0.062 0.242 0 1 
Unemployed 37755 0.029 0.168 0 1 
Retired 37755 0.075 0.263 0 1 
Inactive 37755 0.060 0.237 0 1 
Household composition 
(Single exc.) 
          
Couple 37755 0.653 0.476 0 1 
Lone parent 37755 0.081 0.273 0 1 
Multi-family HH 37755 0.040 0.195 0 1 
No. of children 37755 0.647 0.972 0 7 
No. of adults 37755 1.842 0.685 1 9 
Real HH income 
(£0-£9,999 exc.) 
          
£10,000-£19,999 37755 0.289 0.453 0 1 
£20,000-£49,000 37755 0.422 0.494 0 1 
£50,000 or more 37755 0.081 0.273 0 1 
Homeowner (private renter exc.) 37755 0.715 0.451 0 1 
No. of bedrooms 37755 2.702 0.989 1 10 
Accommodation type 
(Detached/Bungalow exc.) 
          
Semi-detached 37755 0.284 0.451 0 1 
Terraced 37755 0.291 0.454 0 1 
Purpose-built flat 37755 0.104 0.305 0 1 
Converted flat 37755 0.086 0.281 0 1 
Council tax band 
(Up to 40k exc.) 
          
Up to £52k 37755 0.196 0.397 0 1 
Up to £68k 37755 0.219 0.414 0 1 
Up to £88k 37755 0.195 0.396 0 1 
Up to £120k 37755 0.107 0.309 0 1 
Up to £160k 37755 0.054 0.226 0 1 
Up to £320k 37755 0.040 0.195 0 1 
Over £320k  37755 0.008 0.090 0 1 
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Table 3.5. Summary statistics for Hypothesis 3 (cont.) 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Main reasons for moving 
(Neighbourhood-related exc.) 
          
Housing-related 37755 0.295 0.456 0 1 
Had to move 37755 0.125 0.331 0 1 
Personal/family-related 37755 0.328 0.469 0 1 
Job-related 37755 0.120 0.325 0 1 
Region 
(North East exc.) 
          
North West 37755 0.123 0.328 0 1 
Yorkshire & the Humber 37755 0.095 0.294 0 1 
East Midlands 37755 0.084 0.277 0 1 
West Midlands 37755 0.088 0.283 0 1 
Eastern 37755 0.120 0.325 0 1 
London 37755 0.129 0.335 0 1 
South East 37755 0.193 0.395 0 1 
South West 37755 0.120 0.324 0 1 
Year of survey 
(1993 exc.) 
          
1994 37755 0.050 0.218 0 1 
1995 37755 0.059 0.235 0 1 
1996 37755 0.060 0.238 0 1 
1997 37755 0.072 0.259 0 1 
1998 37755 0.084 0.278 0 1 
1999 37755 0.078 0.268 0 1 
2000 37755 0.080 0.271 0 1 
2001 37755 0.078 0.268 0 1 
2002 37755 0.075 0.263 0 1 
2003 37755 0.073 0.261 0 1 
2004 37755 0.069 0.253 0 1 
2005 37755 0.066 0.248 0 1 
2006 37755 0.061 0.240 0 1 
2007 37755 0.057 0.232 0 1 
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3.5. Empirical results 
3.5.1. Local information and distance moved  
Table 3.6 presents the ordered logit regression results for Hypothesis 1 that local 
housing market information decreases with the distance moved (i.e., the 
underlying proposed mechanism that is driving long-distance movers to rent 
rather than own). The dependent variable is a measure of how serious household 
heads think crime is in their local area. Since the dependent variable takes a lower 
value out of 1, 2 and 3 if household heads think more strongly that crime is 
serious, the estimate of the distance coefficient would have a positive sign if 
Hypothesis 1 holds true. The explanatory variables are controlled for in a gradual 
manner from left to right. In the first column, when the distance moved and 
regional and time dummies are in the regression model, the estimate turns out to 
be positive and significant at the 1% level, which is consistent with the hypothesis. 
However, it is likely to be a biased estimate due to omitted variables.  
 
When household heads’ personal and household characteristics are controlled for 
in column (2), the estimate for the distance moved goes down (and arguably 
becomes less biased). This is not surprising since various demographic and socio-
economic characteristics are correlated with the distance moved to access better 
neighbourhood quality. For example, retired households move about 19 miles on 
average when they relocated to access better neighbourhood quality, whereas the 
average distance moved to access better neighbourhood quality is only 10 miles. 
Though not explicitly shown in Table 3.6, the addition of real household income 
contributes further to the decline of the estimated coefficient on ‘distance moved’, 
consistent with the prediction made previously.  
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Table 3.6. Ordered logit estimation of neighbourhood problem awareness 1 
(Dependent variable: Seriousness of crime in the area) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Distance  
moved only 
Personal/HH 
char. 
Tenure, 
housing 
char. 
Main reasons 
for moving 
     
Distance moved 0.00530*** 0.00449*** 0.00406*** 0.00343*** 
 (0.00083) (0.00084) (0.00085) (0.00102) 
Age  0.003 -0.007 -0.011 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Age squared  0.000 0.000 0.000* 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sex (Female exc.)  0.054 0.052 0.051 
  (0.053) (0.054) (0.054) 
Economic status of HH 
(Full-time employed exc.) 
 
    
Part-time employed  -0.116 -0.137 -0.138 
  (0.088) (0.089) (0.090) 
Unemployed  -0.319** -0.288** -0.285** 
  (0.127) (0.127) (0.127) 
Retired  0.070 -0.002 -0.012 
  (0.156) (0.157) (0.158) 
Inactive  -0.315*** -0.288*** -0.291*** 
  (0.099) (0.099) (0.100) 
Household composition 
(Single exc.) 
 
    
Couple  0.285*** 0.210*** 0.190** 
  (0.076) (0.078) (0.078) 
Lone parent  0.107 0.023 0.032 
  (0.095) (0.096) (0.097) 
Multi-family HH  0.348*** 0.271** 0.242* 
  (0.125) (0.126) (0.126) 
Number of children  -0.028 -0.051* -0.057** 
  (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) 
Number of adults  -0.173*** -0.188*** -0.189*** 
  (0.045) (0.047) (0.047) 
Household real income 
(£0-£9,999 exc.) 
 
    
£10,000-£19,999  0.078 0.013 0.017 
  (0.068) (0.069) (0.069) 
£20,000-£49,999  0.230*** 0.092 0.094 
  (0.073) (0.076) (0.076) 
£50,000 or more  0.149 0.005 0.011 
  (0.098) (0.108) (0.108) 
Homeowner  
(Private renter exc.) 
  -0.110** -0.109** 
   (0.050) (0.051) 
Number of bedrooms   -0.052* -0.052* 
   (0.031) (0.031) 
Accommodation type 
(Detached/bungalow exc.) 
 
    
Semi-detached   -0.066 -0.069 
   (0.067) (0.067) 
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Table 3.6. Ordered logit estimation of neighbourhood problem awareness 1 
(cont.) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Distance  
moved only 
Personal/HH 
char. 
Tenure, 
housing 
char. 
Main reasons 
for moving 
Terraced   -0.313*** -0.297*** 
   (0.072) (0.072) 
Purpose-built flat   -0.281*** -0.260*** 
   (0.096) (0.096) 
Converted flat   -0.650*** -0.639*** 
   (0.102) (0.103) 
Council tax band 
(Up to £40k exc.) 
 
    
Up to £52k   0.295*** 0.295*** 
   (0.066) (0.066) 
Up to £68k   0.392*** 0.387*** 
   (0.069) (0.069) 
Up to £88k   0.392*** 0.393*** 
   (0.081) (0.081) 
Up to £120k   0.352*** 0.346*** 
   (0.095) (0.096) 
Up to £160k   0.419*** 0.409*** 
   (0.121) (0.122) 
Up to £320k   0.450*** 0.437*** 
   (0.138) (0.138) 
Over £320k   -0.059 -0.061 
   (0.225) (0.225) 
Main reasons for moving 
(Neighbourhood-related exc.) 
 
    
Housing-related    -0.325*** 
    (0.071) 
Had to leave    -0.357*** 
    (0.081) 
Personal/family-related    -0.382*** 
    (0.070) 
Job-related    -0.244*** 
    (0.092) 
Constant 0.714*** 0.966*** 0.315 -0.084 
 (0.129) (0.258) (0.282) (0.292) 
Government office regions Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Years of survey Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0217 0.0302 0.0375 0.0392 
No. of obs. 10543 10543 10543 10543 
Note: ***, **,* significance level at 1, 5, 10% respectively. Age, sex and economic status are of 
household heads.  
 
Column (3) additionally controls for housing characteristics. Adding the various 
housing controls reduces the coefficient on ‘distance moved’ further. Though not 
shown explicitly in Table 3.6, a gradual control of housing characteristics reveals 
that most housing controls do not significantly alter the ‘distance moved’ 
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coefficient. The exception is the housing value control (derived from council tax 
bands), which reduces the coefficient on ‘distance moved’ substantially. Lastly, 
when the main reasons for moving are also controlled for, the estimate of interest 
decreases further, as shown in column (4). It implies that the reasons for moving 
are correlated with both the neighbourhood quality and the distance moved. For 
example, movers who relocate for neighbourhood-related reasons are likely to 
move relatively short distances while movers who relocate for job-related reasons 
usually move long distances and are likely to care less about neighbourhood 
quality. Importantly, however, even after carefully controlling for a large set of 
covariates in column (4), the estimated coefficient of the distance moved still 
remains positive and highly statistically significant at the 1% level.  
 
Table 3.7 shows the results for the same regression as that reported in column (4) 
of Table 3.6, but with alternative dependent variables: awareness of vandalism, 
graffiti and litter. Though the results vary somewhat depending on the outcome 
measure, the estimates of the distance moved variable are positive and statistically 
significant throughout. All the results are consistent with the hypothesis that the 
distance moved does have a negative effect on the level of information on 
destination housing markets held by the movers. 
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Table 3.7. Ordered logit estimation of neighbourhood problem awareness 2 
(Dependent variables: Seriousness of vandalism, graffiti and litter) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable Vandalism Graffiti Litter 
    
Distance moved 0.00382*** 0.00251* 0.00203** 
 (0.00106) (0.00135) (0.00100) 
Age 0.003 -0.007 -0.025** 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) 
Age squared -0.000 0.000 0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sex (Female exc.) 0.054 0.077 -0.054 
 (0.054) (0.066) (0.052) 
Economic status of HH 
(Full-time employed exc.) 
 
   
Part-time employed -0.172** -0.174 -0.246*** 
 (0.087) (0.107) (0.087) 
Unemployed -0.041 -0.148 -0.169 
 (0.122) (0.149) (0.122) 
Retired 0.268* -0.084 -0.316** 
 (0.160) (0.218) (0.155) 
Inactive -0.239** -0.059 -0.258*** 
 (0.097) (0.123) (0.099) 
Household composition 
(Single exc.) 
 
   
Couple -0.005 0.031 0.005 
 (0.080) (0.099) (0.078) 
Lone parent 0.088 0.134 0.015 
 (0.097) (0.123) (0.097) 
Multi-family HH -0.060 0.034 -0.130 
 (0.127) (0.155) (0.125) 
Number of children -0.064** -0.048 -0.025 
 (0.028) (0.034) (0.027) 
Number of adults -0.070 -0.012 -0.073 
 (0.048) (0.060) (0.047) 
Household real income 
(£0-£9,999 exc.) 
 
   
£10,000-£19,999 0.053 0.189** -0.062 
 (0.068) (0.085) (0.067) 
£20,000-£49,999 0.192** 0.185** -0.026 
 (0.076) (0.094) (0.075) 
£50,000 or more 0.293** 0.070 0.038 
 (0.116) (0.135) (0.114) 
Homeowner (Private renter exc.) -0.039 -0.190*** -0.057 
 (0.051) (0.065) (0.050) 
Number of bedrooms -0.039 -0.124*** -0.114*** 
 (0.032) (0.041) (0.032) 
Accommodation type 
(Detached/bungalow exc.) 
 
   
Semi-detached -0.171** -0.088 -0.111 
 (0.074) (0.098) (0.075) 
Terraced -0.458*** -0.404*** -0.650*** 
 (0.077) (0.101) (0.077) 
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Table 3.7. Ordered logit estimation of neighbourhood problem awareness 2 
(cont.) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable Vandalism Graffiti Litter 
Purpose-built flat -0.418*** -0.398*** -0.433*** 
 (0.102) (0.130) (0.101) 
Converted flat -0.671*** -0.630*** -0.846*** 
 (0.107) (0.133) (0.105) 
Council tax band 
(Up to £40k exc.) 
 
   
Up to £52k 0.326*** 0.335*** 0.401*** 
 (0.065) (0.080) (0.063) 
Up to £68k 0.523*** 0.503*** 0.610*** 
 (0.071) (0.088) (0.070) 
Up to £88k 0.496*** 0.524*** 0.679*** 
 (0.082) (0.104) (0.081) 
Up to £120k 0.630*** 0.691*** 0.791*** 
 (0.101) (0.128) (0.102) 
Up to £160k 0.597*** 0.731*** 1.099*** 
 (0.129) (0.164) (0.136) 
Up to £320k 0.741*** 0.966*** 1.310*** 
 (0.152) (0.187) (0.159) 
Over £320k 0.912*** 1.668*** 0.855*** 
 (0.295) (0.426) (0.286) 
Main reasons for moving 
(Neighbourhood-related exc.) 
 
   
Housing-related -0.267*** -0.338*** -0.357*** 
 (0.077) (0.099) (0.076) 
Had to leave -0.309*** -0.341*** -0.398*** 
 (0.086) (0.110) (0.084) 
Personal/family-related -0.330*** -0.355*** -0.358*** 
 (0.076) (0.097) (0.074) 
Job-related -0.326*** -0.298** -0.350*** 
 (0.098) (0.125) (0.095) 
Constant -0.935*** -1.712*** -1.955*** 
 (0.290) (0.360) (0.283) 
Government office regions Yes Yes Yes 
Years of survey Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0332 0.0440 0.0482 
No. of obs. 11594 10360 11689 
Note: ***, **,* significance level at 1, 5, 10% respectively. Age, sex and economic status are of 
household heads. 
 
3.5.2. Homeownership status and distance moved  
Table 3.8 shows the results of logit estimates for Hypothesis 2 (the main 
proposition), which states that the longer the distance moved, the lower the 
probability of being a homeowner. The explanatory variables that are thought to 
be correlated with both the distance moved and the probability of homeownership 
are grouped into three categories and controlled for gradually, from left to right. In 
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all columns, the distance moved has a negative relationship with the probability of 
homeownership, which is consistent with Hypothesis 2. However, the estimates 
for the distance moved vary substantially depending on the types of control 
variables included in the regressions. When personal, household and housing 
characteristics are controlled for, the negative relationship between distance 
moved and the probability of homeownership becomes stronger, as shown in 
columns (2) and (3). 
 
However, a dramatic fall in the estimate of distance moved occurs when the main 
reasons for moving are controlled for in column (4). This implies that those 
reasons are correlated with the distance moved and homeownership status. More 
specifically, they are correlated with the distance moved in a way that those who 
want to move for job-related reasons (often for better job opportunities in large 
labour markets such as London) need to move long distances whilst those moving 
for housing- or neighbourhood-related reasons move short distances. This is 
thought to be because new housing and neighbourhoods are likely to be available 
within a shorter distance from previous accommodation than large job markets are. 
This is confirmed by simple statistics as shown in Table 3.9. The average distance 
moved for housing-related movers is 5 to 6 miles, for neighbourhood-related 13 to 
17 miles and for job-related about 50 miles among the sample used for the 
regressions in Table 3.8. 
 
 
  
107 
 
Table 3.8. Logit estimation of homeownership status 
(Dependent variable: Homeownership status) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Distance 
moved only 
Personal/HH 
char. 
Housing 
char. 
Main 
reasons for 
moving 
     
Distance moved -0.00527*** -0.0108*** -0.0140*** -0.00538*** 
 (0.00069) (0.00084) (0.00095) (0.00118) 
Age  0.124*** 0.013 0.010 
  (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
Age squared  -0.001*** 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sex (Female exc.)  0.365*** 0.331*** 0.300*** 
  (0.060) (0.069) (0.069) 
Economic status of HH 
(Full-time employed exc.) 
 
    
Part-time employed  -0.274*** -0.388*** -0.448*** 
  (0.091) (0.101) (0.102) 
Unemployed  -1.116*** -0.851*** -1.033*** 
  (0.129) (0.134) (0.138) 
Retired  0.940*** 0.709*** 0.518*** 
  (0.177) (0.179) (0.184) 
Inactive  -1.195*** -1.046*** -1.135*** 
  (0.100) (0.105) (0.107) 
Household composition 
(Single exc.) 
 
    
Couple  0.832*** 0.728*** 0.687*** 
  (0.084) (0.095) (0.097) 
Lone parent  0.002 -0.392*** -0.369*** 
  (0.097) (0.106) (0.107) 
Multi-family HH  -0.536*** -0.685*** -0.712*** 
  (0.139) (0.160) (0.162) 
Number of children  0.156*** -0.148*** -0.147*** 
  (0.026) (0.030) (0.030) 
Number of adults  -0.139*** -0.355*** -0.365*** 
  (0.049) (0.053) (0.054) 
Household real income 
(£0-£9,999 exc.) 
 
    
£10,000-£19,999  0.861*** 0.669*** 0.703*** 
  (0.071) (0.079) (0.080) 
£20,000-£49,999  1.468*** 0.937*** 0.987*** 
  (0.076) (0.088) (0.090) 
£50,000 or more  1.748*** 0.832*** 0.832*** 
  (0.109) (0.136) (0.137) 
Previous tenure status 
(Previous HO exc.) 
 
    
Previous public renter   -1.184*** -1.285*** 
   (0.092) (0.093) 
Previous private renter   -1.815*** -2.019*** 
   (0.054) (0.061) 
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Table 3.8. Logit estimation of homeownership status(cont.) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Distance 
moved only 
Personal/HH 
char. 
Housing 
char. 
Main 
reasons for 
moving 
Number of bedrooms   0.374*** 0.370*** 
   (0.039) (0.039) 
Accommodation type 
(Detached/bungalow exc.) 
 
    
Semi-detached   0.010 -0.002 
   (0.082) (0.084) 
Terraced   -0.190** -0.210** 
   (0.087) (0.090) 
Purpose-built flat   -0.940*** -0.912*** 
   (0.113) (0.115) 
Converted flat   -1.418*** -1.410*** 
   (0.120) (0.123) 
Council tax band 
(Up to £40k exc.) 
 
    
Up to £52k   0.266*** 0.254*** 
   (0.078) (0.078) 
Up to £68k   0.467*** 0.456*** 
   (0.083) (0.084) 
Up to £88k   0.572*** 0.561*** 
   (0.095) (0.097) 
Up to £120k   0.359*** 0.422*** 
   (0.115) (0.117) 
Up to £160k   0.603*** 0.617*** 
   (0.149) (0.152) 
Up to £320k   0.329* 0.382** 
   (0.178) (0.184) 
Over 320k   0.171 0.302 
   (0.356) (0.357) 
Main reasons for moving 
(Neighbourhood-related exc.) 
 
    
Housing-related    -0.094 
    (0.077) 
Had to leave    0.632*** 
    (0.095) 
Personal/family-related    -0.300*** 
    (0.081) 
Job-related    -1.130*** 
    (0.105) 
Constant 0.881*** -3.646*** -0.040 0.330 
 (0.127) (0.294) (0.356) (0.368) 
Government office regions Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Years of survey Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0134 0.2131 0.3581 0.3771 
No. of obs. 13185 13185 13185 13185 
Note: ***, **,* significance level at 1, 5, 10% respectively. Age, sex and economic status are of 
household heads.  
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Table 3.9. Average distance moved by residential tenure status 
 Reasons for moving 
Average distance 
moved (miles)  
 
Proportion by tenure 
(%) 
Home-
owner 
Private 
renter 
 
Home-
owner 
Private 
renter 
Total sample 16.03 18.94  60.67 39.33 
Those who moved 
  
   
for neighbourhood 17.08 13.60  70.64 29.36 
for housing 6.73 5.10  71.51 28.49 
forced to move 8.40 7.34  53.59 46.41 
for personal/family affair 20.03 16.17  56.17 43.83 
for jobs 50.11 51.31  41.74 58.26 
Note: The sample used to compute the figures in this table are the same as those used in the 
regressions of which results are presented in Table 3.8. 
 
At the same time, the reasons for moving are also correlated with the 
homeownership status. The housing- and neighbourhood-related movers tend to 
owner-occupy their new homes but the job-related movers tend to rent, regardless 
of the distance moved. Compared to housing- and neighbourhood-related movers, 
job-related movers would be less certain about where exactly they would settle 
down in the long term within the new housing market as they might not have 
collected sufficient information prior to the move as their primary concerns were 
jobs and job locations. On the other hand, housing- and neighbourhood-related 
movers will have obtained sufficient information on the new housing and the 
neighbourhood, so that they can make better informed tenure decisions and are 
therefore more prone to homeownership, when other things, including the distance 
moved, are equal. In fact, this is another piece of evidence that the information 
available on the local housing market has an influence on movers’ housing tenure 
decisions. Overall, the reasons for moving are correlated with both distance 
moved and tenure decisions and controlling for the reasons substantially reduces 
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the strength of the negative correlation between them. However, the correlation is 
still negative and significant at the 1% level, consistent with Hypothesis 2. 
 
Another, potentially important, variable determining the housing tenure status is 
financial constraints or the ability to buy a home. Financially constrained 
households may not be able to owner-occupy regardless of the distance moved. In 
a setting where all households are financially constrained, nobody would own and 
the distance moved would be unrelated to homeownership. Therefore, the more 
financially constrained households are, the more biased towards zero the 
relationship between the distance moved and homeownership can be expected to 
be. Household income, one of the controls used in the analysis, partly captures the 
ability of households to afford homeownership, as it reflects the degree to which 
households are liquidity constrained. The SEH, like most other household datasets, 
does not include, however, household wealth, which is a measure for how down 
payment constrained households are. Whereas the SEH does not include a direct 
measure of how wealthy households are, the dataset does include information on 
the previous housing tenure status, that is, whether households have collateral (i.e., 
a home), to proceeds of which they can use to purchase a home in a subsequent 
move. Previous homeowners are also better placed to obtain a new mortgage. In 
other words, previous homeowners are less likely to be financially constrained 
when moving and considering whether to buy or rent at the new place. The 
interaction effects between different types of previous tenure (homeowner, private 
renter and public renter), reported in column (1) of Table 3.10, reveal that distance 
moved indeed only affects the tenure choice at the destination location of previous 
homeowners but not of previous private renters or social renters, arguably because 
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the latter two categories are financially more constrained. Another implication 
from this result is that informational constraints matter even for those who are rich 
enough to buy housing. Even if households want to and are able to owner-occupy, 
homeownership is likely to be deterred if they are uncertain about the quality of 
potential housing and the surrounding environment. They may choose to first rent 
and then buy at the new destination location. The results are indicative that lack of 
housing and neighbourhood information are very important for housing tenure 
decisions. 
 
Table 3.10. Logit estimation of homeownership status with interaction terms  
(Dependent variable: Homeownership status)  
 (1) (2) (3) 
  
Distance × Prev. 
tenure 
Distance × HH 
income 
Distance × 
 Reasons for  
moving 
Interaction term: 
Distance moved × Previous tenure 
   
Distance×prev. HO -0.00957***   
 (0.00141)   
Distance×prev. public renter -0.00377   
 (0.00341)   
Distance ×prev. private renter 0.00014   
 (0.00164)   
Interaction term: 
Distance moved × HH income 
   
Distance×£0-9,999  0.00045  
  (0.00201)  
Distance×£10,000-19,999  -0.00289  
  (0.00191)  
Distance×£20,000-49,999  -0.00996***  
  (0.00168)  
Distance×£50,000 or more  -0.0129***  
  (0.00328)  
Interaction term: 
Distance moved × Reasons for moving 
   
Distance×neighbourhood   0.00123 
   (0.00306) 
Distance×housing   0.00192 
   (0.00371) 
Distance×had to move   -0.01080*** 
   (0.00386) 
Distance×personal/family reasons   -0.00368** 
   (0.00187) 
Distance×job-related reasons   -0.01147*** 
   (0.00223) 
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Table 3.10. Logit estimation of homeownership status with interaction terms 
(cont.) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  
Distance × Prev. 
tenure 
Distance × HH 
income 
Distance × 
 Reasons for  
moving 
Age 0.009 0.010 0.008 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sex (Female exc.) 0.295*** 0.297*** 0.295*** 
 (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) 
Economic status of HH 
(Full-time employed exc.) 
 
   
Part-time employed -0.440*** -0.440*** -0.455*** 
 (0.103) (0.103) (0.102) 
Unemployed -1.018*** -1.044*** -1.052*** 
 (0.139) (0.139) (0.138) 
Retired 0.544*** 0.489*** 0.477** 
 (0.184) (0.183) (0.185) 
Inactive -1.117*** -1.144*** -1.145*** 
 (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) 
Household composition 
(Single exc.) 
   
Couple 0.697*** 0.676*** 0.671*** 
 (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) 
Lone parent -0.378*** -0.348*** -0.370*** 
 (0.108) (0.107) (0.107) 
Multi-family HH -0.683*** -0.717*** -0.736*** 
 (0.162) (0.162) (0.162) 
Number of children -0.148*** -0.145*** -0.143*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Number of adults -0.369*** -0.359*** -0.360*** 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) 
Household real income 
(£0-£9,999 exc.) 
 
   
£10,000-£19,999 0.700*** 0.741*** 0.708*** 
 (0.080) (0.089) (0.080) 
£20,000-£49,999 0.994*** 1.154*** 1.000*** 
 (0.090) (0.098) (0.090) 
£50,000 or more 0.844*** 1.101*** 0.851*** 
 (0.136) (0.165) (0.137) 
Previous tenure status 
(Previous HO exc.) 
 
   
Previous public renter -1.411*** -1.294*** -1.283*** 
 (0.109) (0.093) (0.093) 
Previous private renter -2.216*** -2.032*** -2.031*** 
 (0.073) (0.061) (0.061) 
Number of bedrooms 0.371*** 0.368*** 0.371*** 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) 
Accommodation type 
(Detached/bungalow exc.) 
 
   
Semi-detached -0.007 -0.005 0.010 
 (0.084) (0.085) (0.085) 
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Table 3.10. Logit estimation of homeownership status with interaction terms  
(cont.) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  
Distance × Prev. 
tenure 
Distance × HH 
income 
Distance × 
 Reasons for  
moving 
Terraced -0.206** -0.211** -0.202** 
 (0.089) (0.090) (0.090) 
Purpose-built flat -0.903*** -0.905*** -0.902*** 
 (0.115) (0.115) (0.115) 
Converted flat -1.398*** -1.409*** -1.406*** 
 (0.124) (0.124) (0.124) 
Council tax band 
(Up to £40k exc.) 
 
   
Up to £52k 0.250*** 0.248*** 0.257*** 
 (0.079) (0.078) (0.079) 
Up to £68k 0.451*** 0.441*** 0.454*** 
 (0.084) (0.084) (0.084) 
Up to £88k 0.554*** 0.554*** 0.557*** 
 (0.097) (0.097) (0.098) 
Up to £120k 0.414*** 0.415*** 0.423*** 
 (0.117) (0.117) (0.117) 
Up to £160k 0.622*** 0.610*** 0.612*** 
 (0.151) (0.152) (0.152) 
Up to £320k 0.383** 0.373** 0.380** 
 (0.182) (0.184) (0.184) 
Over 320k 0.322 0.265 0.271 
 (0.359) (0.355) (0.353) 
Main reasons for moving 
(Neighbourhood-related exc.) 
 
   
Housing-related -0.105 -0.092 -0.036 
 (0.078) (0.078) (0.087) 
Had to leave 0.677*** 0.640*** 0.786*** 
 (0.096) (0.096) (0.107) 
Personal/family-related -0.306*** -0.306*** -0.223** 
 (0.081) (0.081) (0.095) 
Job-related -1.141*** -1.030*** -0.718*** 
 (0.103) (0.106) (0.150) 
Constant 0.447 0.278 0.284 
 (0.368) (0.369) (0.370) 
Government office regions Yes Yes Yes 
Years of survey Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-squared 0.3785 0.3785 0.3782 
No. of obs. 13185 13185 13185 
Note: ***, **,* significance level at 1, 5, 10% respectively. Age, sex and economic status are of 
household heads.  
 
Next, it is examined whether the relationship of interest varies among different 
income groups. It is predicted that the higher the household income, the less likely 
they are to be financially constrained and therefore the higher the household 
income, the more negative the estimated coefficient on distance moved. There are 
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four levels of household income: ‘£0 to £9,999’; ‘£10,000 to £19,999’; ‘£20,000 
to £49,999’, and; ‘£50,000 and over’. Using the interaction terms between the 
income and the distance moved, the coefficient of the distance moved for each 
income group is estimated. The empirical results are consistent with the prediction, 
as the lowest income group has the smallest estimate (with a positive sign), which 
is not statistically different from zero, while the highest group has the largest and 
the most statistically significant negative estimate (see column (2) of Table 3.10). 
The result confirms that only when there is little financial constraint, households 
can express their preference over residential tenure according to the distance 
moved.  
 
As discussed previously, the main reasons for moving are correlated with the 
intensity of the search for housing markets. Those who want to move for better 
housing or neighbourhood can be expected to search more intensively than those 
moving for job-related reasons, regardless of the distances they plan to move. 
Therefore, the relationship between the probability of homeownership and the 
distance moved can be expected to be weaker and less significant for housing- and 
neighbourhood-related movers. This hypothesis is tested using the interaction 
terms between the distance moved and the reasons for moving (column (3) of 
Table 3.10). The estimates for ‘distance×neighbourhod’ and ‘distance×housing’ 
are positive but not different from zero statistically, while the rest are negative and 
significant. Of these, the estimate for the job-related movers is the most negative, 
and compared to the rest of the movers, job-related movers’ tenure decisions are 
more strongly affected by the distance moved. 
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Table 3.11 reports quantitative effects of the relationship of interest based on the 
various regression results from Table 3.8 and Table 3.10. The first row shows the 
relationship for the entire sample, indicating the predicted probability of 
homeownership (67.27%), when the hypothetical distance moved is 0 miles. It 
goes down with the distance moved and those who moved 75 miles have a 9.41% 
point lower chance of being a homeowner (see the last column). This suggests that 
the impact of distance moved on homeownership is quantitatively meaningful. 
When this is examined by distinguishing between previous tenure categories 
(Panel A), previous homeowners show the sharpest fall in the probability of 
becoming a homeowner when their distances moved increase from 0 miles to 75 
miles and the difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. The difference 
in propensity to own as a consequence of moving 75 miles further away is 11.63% 
point, again quantitatively quite meaningful. When the effect is investigated by 
real household income (Panel B), the change in the probability of homeownership 
along the distance moved is the largest for the households with earnings of 
‘£50,000 or more’ (-17.33% point). Finally, in Panel C, job-related movers are the 
group showing the most substantial fall in the likelihood of homeownership (-
20.58% point). 
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Table 3.11. Predicted probability of homeownership by distance moved (%) 
 
Distance moved Δ%  
between 0 
and 75 miles  
0 mile 25 miles 50 mils 75 miles 
Total sample 67.27 64.25 61.10 57.86 9.41 
Panel A:  
By previous tenure      
Previous homeowner 84.87 81.54 77.66 73.24 11.63 
Previous public renter 33.76 31.69 29.69 27.76 6.00 
Previous private renter 33.71 33.78 33.86 33.94 -0.23 
Panel B:  
By household income      
£0-£9,999 46.85 47.12 47.40 47.68 -0.83 
£10,000-£19,999 76.49 75.16 73.79 72.37 4.12 
£20,000-£49,999 80.16 75.91 71.07 65.69 14.47 
£50,000 or more 84.17 79.37 73.58 66.84 17.33 
Panel C:  
By reason for moving      
Neighbourhood-related 66.56 67.24 67.91 68.58 -2.02 
Housing-related 64.56 65.65 66.73 67.79 -3.23 
Had to leave 78.90 74.06 68.55 62.46 16.44 
Personal/family-related 61.95 59.75 57.52 55.26 6.69 
Job-related 52.11 44.96 38.02 31.53 20.58 
 
3.5.3. Corrective move and distance moved 
Table 3.12 shows the OLS regression results from the test of Hypothesis 3, which 
states that the longer distance a household has moved, the more likely it is to 
move again soon to find more permanent accommodation within the same 
housing market. As discussed previously, the empirical strategy is to run OLS 
regressions with the dependent variable being length of stay in the current location 
and the main explanatory variable being distance moved. The estimates of the 
distance moved would take a negative sign. 
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Table 3.12. OLS estimation of length of stay 
(Dependent variable: length of stay)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Distance 
moved only 
Personal/HH 
char. 
Housing 
char. 
Distance × 
Tenure 
     
Distance moved -0.00093*** -0.00129*** -0.00114***  
 (0.00017) (0.00017) (0.00020)  
Interaction terms: 
Distance moved  
×Tenure type 
    
Distance×Homeowner    -0.00086*** 
    (0.00024) 
Distance×Private renter    -0.00172*** 
    (0.00029) 
Age  0.030*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age squared  -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sex (Female exc.)  0.014 -0.003 -0.003 
  (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
Economic status of HH 
(Full-time employed exc.) 
 
    
Part-time employed  -0.030 -0.008 -0.009 
  (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) 
Unemployed  -0.067** 0.018 0.015 
  (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Retired  0.030 -0.006 -0.008 
  (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Inactive  -0.078*** 0.009 0.007 
  (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) 
Household composition 
(Single exc.) 
 
    
Couple  0.059*** 0.019 0.018 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Lone parent  0.002 0.013 0.012 
  (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Multi-family HH  -0.069*** -0.018 -0.020 
  (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Number of children  0.048*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Number of adults  -0.015* -0.006 -0.005 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Household real income 
(£0-£9,999 exc.) 
 
    
£10,000-£19,999  0.059*** -0.003 -0.002 
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
£20,000-£49,999  0.113*** 0.017 0.019 
  (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) 
£50,000 or more  0.126*** 0.043* 0.044* 
  (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) 
Homeowner (Private renter exc.)   0.343*** 0.328*** 
   (0.011) (0.012) 
Number of bedrooms   -0.001 -0.001 
   (0.006) (0.006) 
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Table 3.12. OLS regressions for Length of stay (cont.)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Distance 
moved only 
Personal/HH 
char. 
Housing 
char. 
Distance × 
Tenure 
Accommodation type 
(Detached/bungalow exc.) 
 
    
Semi-detached   -0.015 -0.014 
   (0.013) (0.013) 
Terraced   -0.023 -0.022 
   (0.015) (0.015) 
Purpose-built flat   -0.041** -0.040** 
   (0.020) (0.020) 
Converted flat   -0.056*** -0.056*** 
   (0.021) (0.021) 
Council tax band 
(Up to £40k exc.) 
 
    
Up to £52k   0.016 0.017 
   (0.014) (0.014) 
Up to £68k   0.000 0.001 
   (0.015) (0.015) 
Up to £88k   0.016 0.016 
   (0.017) (0.017) 
Up to £120k   -0.016 -0.015 
   (0.020) (0.020) 
Up to £160k   -0.057** -0.057** 
   (0.025) (0.025) 
Up to £320k   -0.085*** -0.085*** 
   (0.029) (0.029) 
Over 320k   -0.089* -0.088* 
   (0.051) (0.051) 
Main reasons for moving 
(Neighbourhood-related exc.) 
 
    
Housing-related   -0.015 -0.014 
   (0.014) (0.014) 
Had to leave   0.006 0.006 
   (0.017) (0.017) 
Personal/family-related   0.012 0.012 
   (0.014) (0.014) 
Job-related   0.054*** 0.057*** 
   (0.018) (0.018) 
Government office regions Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Years of survey Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 1.991*** 1.093*** 1.090*** 1.100*** 
 (0.029) (0.054) (0.060) (0.060) 
Adj. R-squared 0.0041 0.0383 0.0675 0.0677 
No. of obs. 37755 37755 37755 37755 
Note: ***, **,* significance level at 1, 5, 10% respectively. Age, sex and economic status are of 
household heads.  
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Indeed, when only the distance moved is controlled for besides the time and 
regional dummies, its estimate is negative and statistically different from zero at 
the 1% level. This means that longer-distance movers move again at a faster rate 
than their shorter-distance counterparts. This result is persistent regardless of the 
type of control variable included in the regressions. Moreover, the effect of 
interest is likely to be stronger among the private renters because those who 
planned to move to more permanent accommodation have become a tenant first. 
Therefore, the estimate of the distance should be more negative for tenants. This 
hypothesis is supported by the empirical analysis which examines the effect by 
type of tenure using the interaction terms between the distance moved and the 
tenure types, as shown in column (4) of Table 3.12. Though the effect is smaller, 
even homeowners tend to stay for a shorter period, the longer distances they have 
moved. This latter finding is indicative of long distance movers generally being 
more mobile. However, the fact that the effect is about twice as strong for private 
renters, provides support for the main proposition put forward in this chapter that 
long distance moves deter homeownership for information related reasons; 
subsequent to the relocation, long distance movers appear to gather information 
about the local housing market, which enables them subsequently, to attain 
homeownership. 
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3.6. Conclusion 
This chapter investigates the relationship between the probability of 
homeownership and the distance moved. As the distance moved increases, the 
search for new accommodation becomes increasingly costly in terms of time and 
money. Without sufficient information on properties in the destination housing 
market, a household is likely to avoid homeownership due to high housing 
investment risks and transactions costs. As a result, the probability of 
homeownership is expected to decrease with the distance moved. It is only after 
movers become more familiar with the local property markets that they consider 
making ‘corrective’ moves to more permanent owner-occupied accommodation. 
Therefore, it is predicted that the longer the distance moved, the higher the 
likelihood of moving soon. 
 
Empirically, this chapter tests a series of hypotheses consistent with the prediction 
above. Firstly, it tests whether a negative relationship exists between the 
seriousness of the neighbourhood problems felt by households and the distance 
moved. The degree of the seriousness is seen as how aware household heads are 
of neighbourhood problems and hence is likely related to the level of local 
housing market knowledge held by them. The findings in this chapter suggest that, 
after controlling for factors capturing ‘objective’ neighbourhood quality, the 
household-reported seriousness of area problems decreases with the distance 
moved. This implies that collection of information on the new neighbourhood 
becomes more difficult and costly as the distance movers plan to move increases. 
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The main hypothesis of this chapter is that the longer the distance moved, the 
lower the probability of becoming a homeowner. Those who need to make a long-
distance move are likely to avoid homeownership in the new neighbourhood. This 
is thought to be because long-distance movers cannot collect enough information 
on the new housing market, based on which they would make tenure decisions. 
This main proposition finds strong support in the data. The strongest adverse 
effect of distance moved on homeownership can be found among the least 
constrained households financially, consistent with theory.  When the effect of 
interest is examined by previous tenure status and by household income, it is the 
most statistically significant for previous homeowners and the highest income 
group respectively. An investigation of the effect of interest by reasons for moving 
reveals that it is not significantly different from zero for housing- and 
neighbourhood-related movers, as they are likely to pay good attention to housing 
and neighbourhood regardless of the distance they move, so perhaps incur higher 
information costs prior to moving. Finally, the hypothesis of ‘corrective’ moves is 
tested, which states that the longer the distance moved, the sooner households 
move again to more permanent accommodation within the same housing market. 
Empirically, the relationship between the length of stay and the distance moved 
turns out to be negative and is stronger for private renters, consistent with theory.  
 
Through testing a series of hypotheses, this chapter reveals the importance and 
relevance to individuals’ homeownership decisions of local housing market 
information as represented by the distance moved. The difficulty of collecting 
information on destination housing markets deters homeownership. Typically, 
long-distance moves are found to be associated with job opportunities. When they 
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move for jobs, they would not normally pay much attention to the nature of 
accommodation. Even though they were given job opportunities, they may have to 
let them go if they cannot quickly find places to stay in the new labour markets. 
Some may use a strategy of ‘moving first and searching chances’ and they still 
require temporary accommodation, until it is clear where they will work and live. 
Therefore, the availability of temporary and flexible accommodation such as 
private renting lessens the worry and effort to find places to stay for job-related 
movers. 
  
123 
 
CHAPTER 4. COMMUTING TIME AND WORKER’S 
EFFORT 
 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter explores whether the length of commuting time can affect a worker’s 
effort in the workplace. For most workers, commuting is an unavoidable daily 
activity to connect housing and labour markets and accounts for a relatively large 
proportion of working hours. The RAC foundation (2007) reports that the average 
commuting time per day is 54 minutes in the UK which would be equivalent to 
one-eighth of the working hours of full-time workers. It is much higher in large 
cities such as London where workers spend 84 minutes every working day. 
Unfortunately, workers’ feelings about this important daily activity are generally 
negative. Rouwendal and Meijer (2001) argue that workers dislike commuting as 
the value they put on commuting time is even higher than their wage rates. 
Transportation studies as well as psychological literature also demonstrate the 
negative effect of commuting on both the physical and mental health of 
commuters (Koslowskyet et al., 1995; Evans and Wener, 2006; Hoehner et al., 
2012). Considering the negative effects of commuting on workers, it is natural to 
link commuting time with worker effort. Commuting may not only cause 
commuters to feel exhausted but also impose mental stress from aggravating 
events such as traffic jams, road accidents, etc. Indeed, it has been reported that 
the degree of commuting stress negatively impacts on the level of job strain 
(Wener et al., 2006). 
 
The topic of this chapter, however, has been largely overlooked until recently by 
economists. Zenou (2002) assumes that workers’ effort levels decrease with 
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commuting distance in order to propose the ‘red-lining’ hypothesis to explain the 
supposed spatial mismatch problem first raised by Kain (1968) but does not show 
whether the assumption is valid empirically. Ha (2005) investigates the same issue 
using UK micro-data but does not find a statistically significant relationship 
between effort and commuting time. Van Ommeren and Gutiérrez-i-Puigarnau 
(2011) study the relationship between commuting distance and worker 
productivity. Considering that worker productivity is an outcome of underlying 
effort, the nature of their study very much reflects the current chapter. Using 
German data, they confirm that commuting distance does increase worker 
absenteeism rates, as average absenteeism would be lower by 15 to 20% if 
commuting distances were negligible. This chapter explores the relationship using 
UK data employing a strategy of careful control with explanatory variables. While 
Van Ommeren and Gutiérrez-i-Puigarnau (2011) use one proxy measure of 
productivity (absenteeism), this chapter adopts unpaid overtime work as an 
additional measure of effort to make sure the empirical results are robust.  
 
Though it is rather an abstract concept, effort is regarded as effective labour 
supply and closely related with labour productivity in the literature. In essence, 
the two concepts are more or less the same and interchangeable as workers are 
truly productive only during their effective working hours. As worker effort can 
be seen as labour supply, this chapter uses a neoclassical labour supply model to 
make predictions regarding the effect of commuting on the supply of effort by 
workers. The model has an advantage in that it can accommodate effort in the 
form of effective working hours. The neoclassical model predicts that commuting 
time negatively affects worker effort: when contracted hours of working are fixed 
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and a higher wage cannot be paid to longer-distance commuters, the workers 
would have an incentive to shirk. 
 
Through the review of previous studies in the labour-supply literature, 
absenteeism and unpaid overtime working hours are chosen as proxy measures for 
work effort. Absenteeism is assumed to be a negative proxy measure for 
underlying effort and hence is expected to have a positive relationship with 
commuting time. However, in practice, absenteeism may have a couple of 
shortcomings as a proxy variable for effort. Firstly, absenteeism is likely 
unwelcomed and suppressed by employers and hence it may underestimate the 
true effort level. Secondly, absenteeism is often caused by random and unexpected 
illness and injury which are largely unrelated to a worker’s effort. Therefore, an 
additional measure of effort needs to be adopted in the hope that the use of two 
different measures can strengthen the reliability of the empirical evidence if they 
lead to the same result. Unpaid overtime hours are another popular measure of 
effort found in the literature and expected to be negatively correlated with 
commuting time. Both of these are thought to be valid measures as they bear a 
core characteristic of effort that it is costly to employees but beneficial to 
employers. 
 
The data to be used for the empirical analysis is the UK Quarterly Labour Force 
Survey (QLFS) which provides information on both absenteeism and unpaid 
overtime work and other relevant variables. The model specifications express 
absenteeism and unpaid overtime as a function of commuting time and other 
control variables respectively and are estimated by OLS. The overall empirical 
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evidence is supportive of the hypothesis. The absenteeism rate turns out to have a 
positive correlation with commuting time. Unpaid overtime work also has the 
expected correlation with commuting time: it decreases as commuting time 
increases. 
 
For the robustness of these results, the sizes of the estimated coefficient of 
commuting time are compared between sub-groups of the regression sample. 
Firstly, it is predicted that the relationship between commuting time and effort 
level would be stronger for part-time than full-time workers. For a given increase 
in commuting time, the effective wage rate would fall more strongly for part-time 
workers as their hours of work are shorter. Hence, the decrease in their effort 
levels would be expected to be more pronounced. Consistent with the prediction, 
part-time workers lower their effort levels at a faster rate for a given increase in 
commuting time. Secondly, working women are predicted to reduce effort to a 
greater extent than working men as commuting time increases. They usually do 
more household work and hence they are more time-constrained than men. This 
tendency would be expected to increase were they to have dependent children. As 
a result, they would respond more sensitively to a given increase in commuting 
time so that they would reduce their work effort to a greater extent. Indeed, this 
hypothesis turns out to be supported by the empirical analysis. 
 
Thus, effort level and commuting time are shown to have a negative relationship, 
as predicted by the theoretical model. However, it is still problematic to assert that 
the relationship is causal. This chapter suggests that commuting time decreases 
worker effort but the reverse causation is theoretically possible, as less work-
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oriented workers may choose long commutes to live in suburban areas. Therefore, 
the identification of causality of interest cannot be claimed until more reliable 
methods to deal with reverse causality, such as an instrumental variable approach, 
are applied. However, it still seems feasible to propose which direction of 
causality contributes more to the correlation found in this chapter. Theoretically, 
less work-oriented workers may want to avoid places of high job density, such as 
the central business districts, but in reality, they are likely to try to find jobs near 
their homes since they are less work-motivated. Therefore, the influence of 
causality from work effort to commuting time is likely limited. So, even if there 
might be a gap between the true causality of interest and correlation found in this 
chapter, it would arguably not be too large to invalidate the conclusions of this 
chapter. 
 
The structure of this chapter hereafter is as follows. Section 4.2 presents a 
neoclassical labour supply model to predict the effect of commuting time on effort. 
Section 4.3 reviews selected papers in the literature to identify good proxy 
measures for effort and its determinants identified empirically. Then, it describes 
the data and key dependent variables and discusses the empirical strategy. Section 
4.4 reports the empirical results and discusses their implications. Section 4.5 
concludes with a summary and policy implications. 
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4.2. Theoretical framework and predictions 
Though the term ‘effort’ is widely used in labour economics, it is difficult to 
define and measure due to its abstract and intangible nature. Instead, a popular 
view on effort is that it would be more or less the same as labour productivity. 
The well-known efficiency wage or shirking model states that the efficiency wage 
is paid by firms “to motivate workers and boost their productivity” (Rocheteau, 
2000, p. 76). Zenou (2002) also regards effort as labour productivity since his 
model is grounded in the efficiency wage model. Strictly speaking, however, 
effort is unlikely to be identical to labour productivity, but rather one of the most 
influential determinants of labour productivity. Even capital as a production factor 
helps to increase labour productivity, but they are not the same.  
 
A more conceptually correct view is that effort is an effective labour supply as 
defined by Filer et al. (1996). In reality, the presence of workers in the workplace 
does not automatically mean that labour has been truly supplied, as what actually 
contributes to production is the effort which the workers make towards their jobs. 
For example, it is well-known that the trade union practice of ‘working to rule’ 
tends to greatly reduce labour productivity. The extent to which workers engage in 
shirking behaviour would drive a wedge between contracted labour supply and 
actual effort exuded. The recognition of effort as true labour supply has an 
advantage in that it can easily fit in to the existing analytical framework: the 
neoclassical labour supply model. 
 
Though it is simplistic, the neoclassical labour supply model is useful in capturing 
the main features of individuals’ labour supply decisions and its predictions are 
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matched by stylised facts in the labour market. The presentation of the 
neoclassical model follows the one in Borjas (2005) and it would be modified to 
accommodate commuting time. As depicted in Figure 4.1, the neoclassical model 
consists of a worker’s utility function and budget constraint and shows how the 
worker determines his preferred working hours by maximising the utility subject 
to the budget constraint. 
 
Figure 4.1. Labour supply decision of non-commuter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The model assumptions are as follows. A representative worker derives his utility 
from income (Y) and leisure time (L) which is the remainder of total hours (T) 
after work. The worker’s preference follows the neoclassical axioms of 
completeness, transitivity, continuity and convexity. As a result, the utility 
function can be represented by a family of indifference curves which are 
I0 
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continuous, downward-sloping and convex to the origin, which is shown by the 
indifference curve (I0) in Figure 4.1. The budget constraint is given by the 
worker’s total income, which can be divided vertically between non-labour 
income (YNL) and labour income (i.e. hourly wage rate times hours of work). The 
negative slope of the budget constraint reflects a trade-off between leisure hours 
and income and represents a market-determined efficiency wage (wE), for which a 
worker is expected to put in maximum effort, as suggested by Shapiro and Stiglitz 
(1984). Optimal working hours can be determined at the tangential point between 
the indifference curve and budget constraint. At the point of tangency, the hours of 
leisure are L*, corresponding income is Y*, and hours of work are h*. As the 
worker is paid the efficiency wage, he is working for h* with full effort. 
 
Unlike the original neoclassical model where commuting activity is not 
considered, the modified version explicitly recognises commuting time in Figure 
4.2. Commuting is a grey area in the sense that it is neither leisure time nor 
working time. Although leisure refers to any activities other than the supply of 
labour, it should be confined to those which generate positive utility to the worker. 
In this sense, commuting cannot be a part of leisure as it is generally believed to 
cause ‘bads’ to workers and hence reduce utility. Commuting is rather an action 
closely tied to work and thus workers may consider the time spent on commuting 
as a part of implicit working hours. 
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Figure 4.2. Labour supply decision of commuter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If commuting time is included in working hours, the effective working time 
becomes the hours of work plus commuting time and the recalculated leisure time 
is now represented by LC in Figure 4.2. From the point of view of employers, 
however, commuting is the worker’s own responsibility and hence they have no 
reason to pay for it. As a result, there is no change in the worker’s labour income 
and it stays the same at Y*. Therefore, with positive commuting time (L*− LC), the 
worker has to be at point b and the new budget constraint should pass through this 
point. The slope of the new budget constraint, which is associated with the wage 
rate (wC), is obviously less steep than the original one (wE) because the same 
income (Y*) needs to be spread over extended working hours (T − LC), which are 
longer than the original working hours (T – L*) determined in Figure 4.1. 
 
 
I0 
I2 
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At point b, the utility level is represented by the indifference curve, I1 and lower 
than the level represented by I0 at point a. This implies that positive commuting 
time results in a contraction in the opportunity set and decline in the utility level 
as expected. Given that the wage rate is now wC, point b is not a place where the 
worker’s utility is maximised. The worker’s optimal behaviour would be to 
decrease the working time by (LS – LC) and stay at point c, the tangential point 
between the new budget constraint and the indifference curve I2 which represents 
a higher utility level than the one at I1. However, if the worker is bound by 
contract to work for h*, which was determined in Figure 4.1, he is unable to 
reduce work hours explicitly. An alternative way to work less would be to shirk 
for as much as LC – LS as in Figure 4.2. Following the theoretical discussion above, 
it is predicted that an increase in commuting time would induce workers to work 
less. Therefore, the testable hypothesis derived is that workers who face longer 
commuting time provide less effort than otherwise comparable workers. 
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4.3. Data and methodology 
4.3.1. Effort measures  
As Engellandt and Riphahn (2005) suggest, it is a widely accepted convention to 
use absenteeism and unpaid overtime hours as a proxy measure for effort in the 
related literature. In the studies of determinants for effort, Barmby (2002), 
Barmby et al. (1991, 1995, 2002), and Johannson and Palme (1996, 2002) 
measure effort by absenteeism, whilst Booth et al. (2002) and Lazear and Rosen 
(1990) adopt unpaid overtime hours as a proxy for effort and Engellandt and 
Riphahn (2005) use both measures. Indeed, absenteeism and unpaid overtime 
work can be seen as the realisation of unobservable effort at work. Both measures 
bear one important characteristic of effort: it is beneficial to employers but costly 
to employees. Furthermore, they are closely related to labour productivity. Van 
Ommeren and Gutiérrez-i-Puigarnau (2011) use absenteeism as a proxy variable 
for labour productivity. It is needless to say that workers with lower absenteeism 
and greater propensity to undertake unpaid overtime work would be more 
productive than otherwise indistinguishable workers from the employers’ point of 
view. 
 
While both measures appear to be equally well representative of effort in theory 
and have been treated as such in the empirical literature, there is a practical 
difference between absenteeism and unpaid overtime work. Absenteeism is 
discouraged by employers and hence its occurrence is suppressed whilst unpaid 
overtime work is beneficial to them and thus demanded and encouraged. Workers 
can do unpaid work only as much as they wish to but they cannot take as many 
sick-days as they may desire due to the risk of penalisation such as a pay-cut or 
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dismissal. Another distinctive feature of absenteeism, which differentiates it from 
unpaid overtime, is its randomness in terms of timing, frequency and duration. In 
addition to being caused by a lack of underlying work effort, additional causes can 
be uncertain such as by unpredicted illness or injury and this characteristic of 
absenteeism further weakens its relationship with underlying effort. In conclusion, 
absenteeism may not be free from weaknesses as a proxy but this chapter adopts it 
alongside overtime hours and would interpret the empirical results taking its 
characteristics into consideration rather than rejecting any of them in advance.  
 
4.3.2. Model specifications 
The purpose of the empirical analysis is to test the hypothesis discussed in Section 
4.2. Two base-line regression models are specified for this purpose in eq. (1) and 
(2). The absenteeism rate and unpaid overtime hours are expressed as a function 
of commuting time and other control variables respectively. The model 
specifications will be estimated by OLS.  
 
iinii XCA   10                      (1) 
iinii XCU   10                      (2) 
Where iA  and iU  are the absenteeism rate and unpaid overtime hours, iC  
is commuting time, 𝑋𝑖 is other controls and i  and i
  are error terms for 
worker i. 
 
As the absenteeism rate is a negative presentation of effort whilst unpaid overtime 
is a positive one, the former increases (i.e. α1> 0) and the latter decreases (i.e. β1< 
0) with commuting time. 
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4.3.3. Dataset and variables 
The UK Labour Force Survey (LFS) provides measures of both absenteeism and 
unpaid overtime for individual workers along with other information relevant to 
the topic of this chapter. It is a quarterly rotating panel survey and has been 
carried out since 1973 to provide information on socio-demographic 
characteristics, economic activities and educational characteristics of the UK 
population, which can be integrated to capture the various trends in the UK labour 
market. Since 1993, with an increase in surveying frequency from yearly to 
quarterly, the sample size has been significantly extended. About 120,000 
individual respondents come from 15,000 randomly selected households in Great 
Britain for each quarter, except for the second quarter when the number of 
households surveyed increases to 40,000 from Great Britain and an additional 
4,000 from Northern Ireland.  
 
Unpaid overtime hours are given as the number of hours per week. There are two 
types of unpaid overtime hours in the QLFS: usual and actual hours. The actual 
hours are measured in the reference week (the week previous to when the survey 
was taken), whilst the usual hours refer to the average of weekly unpaid overtime 
hours during the quarter of the survey. Although the results are unlikely to change 
much according to which are selected, usual unpaid overtime hours are chosen to 
remove the possibility that random events in the reference week create a 
substantial difference between the actual and usual hours for individual workers. 
 
The QLFS provides several sources for the measurement of absenteeism. It first 
details whether or not a survey respondent was absent from work in the reference 
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week. This dichotomous indicator can be used as a dummy dependent variable in 
the logit or probit models. However, this measure is inferior to continuous 
measures of absenteeism such as the absenteeism rate. The QLFS reports the 
numbers of days on which workers were scheduled to work and actual days 
worked in the reference week. Then, a ratio of the latter to the former can be 
accepted as an absenteeism rate. However, a ‘day’ may not be a fine exposure of 
amount of work especially when there are chances that workers have only part of 
a full day off. Barmby (2002) suggests a ratio of the number of hours taken off to 
contracted hours as a more sophisticated measure of the absenteeism rate and only 
acknowledges hours of absenteeism when they are caused by illness, arguing 
sickness absenteeism may not be caused only by a medical condition. Indeed, the 
decision to be absent allegedly due to illness is ultimately up to individual 
workers, although sickness or injury absenteeism does not necessarily result from 
nefarious motives. 
 
This chapter follows Barmby’s (2002) practice regarding the calculation of the 
absenteeism rate but additional reasons for absenteeism beyond ‘sickness and 
injury’ will be considered. In the QLFS, workers who worked fewer hours than 
usual are asked to state the reasons behind the absences. In most cases, the 
absences were inevitable, legitimate or pre-acknowledged by employers (e.g. 
maternity leave, variant work hours, holiday, etc.) but some workers state the 
reasons they could use to easily excuse themselves for their absences such as bad 
weather, personal or family-related reasons, and other. In this chapter, all of these 
cases would be classed under worker’s discretionary absenteeism. Then, the 
absenteeism rate would be expressed as: 
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A                       (3) 
 
Where iA  is the absenteeism rate, iD is the number of hours taken off 
and iC is the contracted hours of work for worker i. 
 
Then, each component of the absenteeism rate is given as follows: 
 
i
a
i
u
ii shhD )(                   (4) 
i
u
ii
a
ii shshC  )1(                 (5) 
 
Where uih  is usual hours,
a
ih is actual hours and is  is an absenteeism 
indicator.  
 
In eq.(4), absenteeism is regarded as the difference between usual and actual 
hours of work. is  is an indicator for absenteeism and set equal to 1 if the reasons 
for absence were illness, bad weather, personal/family-related or other, otherwise 
zero value is assigned. If a worker was not absent at all in the reference week, is
takes 0 and subsequently iD  and iA  are equal to zero. If the worker took any 
hours off from work for the reasons listed above, is  
takes the value of 1 and iD
is now equal to the difference between the contracted hours and the actual hours 
of work (i.e. hours taken off) and iC is the usual work hours. Then, the 
absenteeism rate iA  is given as the ratio of iD  and iC and a positive number. 
In the QLFS, the usual hours and the actual hours of work are given respectively 
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by ‘basic usual hours’ and ‘basic actual hours’, both of which are exclusive of any 
overtime hours. 
 
The daily commuting time is the main explanatory variable and initially given, in 
the QLFS, as minutes taken to go to work from home but is represented in hours 
in this chapter for easier interpretation of the estimated coefficients since unpaid 
overtime work, one of the dependent variables, is also given in hours. Its 
maximum value is set equal to 3 hours (180 minutes) and any commuting time 
over 3 hours will be treated as 3 hours. Other explanatory variables are largely 
categorised into worker’s demographic and other personal characteristics, 
employment characteristics and regional and year dummies, some of which are 
discussed in detail below.  
 
A combination of age and age squared is thought to be correlated with both 
commuting time and effort level as they are highly related to workers’ physical 
strength which, in turn, can determine how far they can travel to work and how 
hard they can work. Age can also be an indicator of a worker’s ambition for future 
career development and so, young workers may exert more effort and commute 
longer for future promotion opportunities. Gender is also a strong determinant of 
both commuting time and effort. Female workers usually travel shorter distances 
to work, work less overtime and take more time off work. This is thought to be 
related to child and family care demands. Education level is included in addition 
to basic socio-demographic factors as it is shown in Barmby et al. (2002) to affect 
absenteeism. 
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Of the employment conditions, wage is worthy of particular attention as it is 
positively correlated with both effort and commuting distance empirically. High-
income workers are certainly motivated by their wages and hence provide a high 
level of effort. Barmby et al. (1991) and Barmby (2002) examine the effect of 
financial incentives on effort and show the potential importance of financial 
aspects in explaining workers’ absenteeism behaviour. At the same time, they are 
likely to travel a long distance to work partly because high-income workers tend 
to reside in suburban areas in pursuit of a good residential environment, whereas 
their workplaces are often located in central business districts. This may also 
partly be because long-distance commuters are presumed to be compensated by 
high wage levels (Van Ommeren et al., 1997; Manning, 2003). Overall, high-
income workers are characterised by relatively high effort and long commuting 
time. Therefore, if wage is omitted from the relationships between wage, effort 
and commuting time, effort would appear positively correlated with commuting 
time, when they actually have a negative relationship. Of the various types of 
wages in the QLFS, net weekly wage - the amount of labour income earned 
weekly after tax - is adopted. The nominal wages from multiple years (2004 to 
2010) are deflated by the UK retail price index to the real wage at 2004 prices. 
The real wage enters the regression model in the form of a dummy to see if it has 
any non-linear relationship with the dependent variables. See the summary tables 
below for the detailed categories. 
 
Additionally, a few variables related to workers’ job status and characteristics will 
be included. Engellandt and Riphahn (2005) argue that work motivation levels 
vary between temporary and permanent workers. Moreover, temporary workers 
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are likely to have a shorter commuting time than those with permanent positions. 
Therefore, an indicator of whether a worker is temporary or permanent should be 
controlled for to reduce potential omitted variable biases. Likewise, it is also 
expected that part-time and full-time workers differ in terms of hours of work, 
commuting time and the incentive to put forth effort. Other important variables 
include type of occupation, as these are considered closely related to not only the 
nature of work (e.g. usual amount of overtime required, types of duty, etc.) but 
also commuting patterns and time. There are 9 types of occupation which are 
listed in the summary statistics tables below. 
 
As the sample is collected between 2004 and 2010, year dummies are used to 
capture unobservable differences among the years (e.g. unemployment rate and 
other macro-economic conditions). Lastly, dummies for regions of work are added 
to capture the regional differences, including the transportation modes and 
infrastructure. There are two types of regions in the QLFS – regions of work and 
regions of usual residence. The inclusion of both types of regions would capture 
the effect of commuting time on the dependent variables to some extent and hence 
only one of them should be included. Of the two types of regions, the regions of 
work are selected as they turn out to be more highly correlated with the dependent 
variables and commuting time. However, the two types of regions coincide in 
most cases of the regression sample and hence the choice of types of region does 
not affect the empirical results to any great extent. The QLFS initially recognises 
23 different regions across the UK. For simplicity, they are reduced to 12 
Government Office Regions. It turns out that the simplification of work regions 
does not affect the empirical results. 
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4.3.4. Sample selection 
The survey respondents of the QLFS are asked to report their commuting time 
only in the July-to-September quarter survey. In order to obtain the empirical 
results from the relatively recent years for policy-relevance, and to maintain 
consistency for important variables over time, as well as to obtain a reasonable 
sample size, this chapter collects the data from each July-to-September quarter in 
the seven years from 2004 to 2010. A pool of total observations from the July-to-
September quarters for the seven years amounts to 945,527 cases. However, the 
information on commuting time is available only for those who worked or did not 
work in the reference week temporarily but had a job and whose workplaces are 
separated from home, meaning the size of the potential sample is reduced to 
297,793. The number of cases is substantially reduced again to 90,479 as the wage 
information is available only for those at Wave 1 and 5. Even at the cost of a large 
sample loss, wage has to be kept in the regression models as it has a correlation 
with both commuting time and worker effort and therefore its omission could 
cause bias. When the cases with missing values for the variables appearing in the 
regression specifications are excluded, the final sample size used for the 
regressions for absenteeism rate is 78,029. The summary statistics are presented in 
Table 4.1. For the unpaid overtime regressions, 78,302 cases finally remain after 
observations with missing values for any variables entering the model are 
excluded. See Table 4.2 for the summary statistics. 
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Table 4.1. Summary statistics for absenteeism rate regression  
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Absenteeism rate 78029 0.033 0.164 0 1 
Travel time (in min.) 78029 25.633 22.703 1 180 
Age  78029 40.841 12.634 16 84 
Age squared 78029 1827.588 1051.837 256 7056 
Male (Female exc.) 78029 0.466 0.499 0 1 
Qualification  
(1st or higher degree exc.)      
Higher education 78029 0.108 0.311 0 1 
A level or equivalent 78029 0.229 0.420 0 1 
GCSE or equivalent 78029 0.233 0.423 0 1 
Other qualifications 78029 0.112 0.316 0 1 
No qualification 78029 0.082 0.275 0 1 
Marital status  
(Single exc.)      
Married 78029 0.553 0.497 0 1 
Separated 78029 0.030 0.170 0 1 
Divorced 78029 0.086 0.280 0 1 
Widowed 78029 0.014 0.116 0 1 
Dep. children in family  78029 0.376 0.484 0 1 
Sex & dependent children  
(Male & no dep. child exc.)      
Male & dep. child 78029 0.170 0.375 0 1 
Female & no dep. child  78029 0.328 0.469 0 1 
Female & dep. child 78029 0.206 0.404 0 1 
Real wage band  
(Less than £100 exc.)      
£100~£199 78029 0.246 0.431 0 1 
£200~£299 78029 0.268 0.443 0 1 
£300~£399 78029 0.166 0.372 0 1 
£400~£499 78029 0.092 0.289 0 1 
£500 or over 78029 0.093 0.291 0 1 
Full-time worker (Part-time exc.) 78029 0.724 0.447 0 1 
Permanent worker (Temp exc.) 78029 0.950 0.218 0 1 
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Table 4.1. Summary statistics for absenteeism rate regression (cont.) 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Job tenure  
(Less than 1 yr exc.)      
1 but less than 5 years 78029 0.334 0.472 0 1 
5 but less than 10 years 78029 0.208 0.406 0 1 
10 less than 20 years 78029 0.184 0.387 0 1 
20 years or more 78029 0.115 0.318 0 1 
Occupational class  
(Managers & senior official exc.)      
Professional occ. 78029 0.136 0.343 0 1 
Assoc. profession &technical 78029 0.147 0.354 0 1 
Administrative and secretarial 78029 0.137 0.344 0 1 
Skilled trades occupations 78029 0.072 0.259 0 1 
Personal service occupations 78029 0.090 0.287 0 1 
Sales and customer service  78029 0.083 0.277 0 1 
Process, plant and machine  78029 0.070 0.256 0 1 
Elementary occupations 78029 0.126 0.332 0 1 
Usual weekly work hours  
(0~14 hours exc.)      
15~24 hours 78029 0.149 0.356 0 1 
25~34 hours 78029 0.108 0.311 0 1 
35 hours or over 78029 0.670 0.470 0 1 
Regional dummies  
(North East exc.)      
North West 78029 0.104 0.305 0 1 
Yorkshire & the Humber 78029 0.098 0.298 0 1 
East Midlands 78029 0.078 0.268 0 1 
West Midlands 78029 0.084 0.278 0 1 
Eastern 78029 0.039 0.193 0 1 
London 78029 0.105 0.307 0 1 
South East 78029 0.186 0.389 0 1 
South West 78029 0.086 0.281 0 1 
Wales 78029 0.045 0.208 0 1 
Scotland 78029 0.095 0.293 0 1 
Northern Ireland 78029 0.023 0.149 0 1 
Year (2004 exc.) 
     
2005 78029 0.114 0.317 0 1 
2006 78029 0.164 0.370 0 1 
2007 78029 0.164 0.370 0 1 
2008 78029 0.159 0.366 0 1 
2009 78029 0.144 0.351 0 1 
2010 78029 0.137 0.343 0 1 
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Table 4.2. Summary statistics for unpaid overtime work regression  
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Unpaid overtime hours 78302 1.520 4.002 0 79 
Travel time (in min.) 78302 25.664 22.792 1 180 
Age  78302 40.850 12.650 16 84 
Age squared 78302 1828.719 1053.443 256 7056 
Male (Female exc.) 78302 0.467 0.499 0 1 
Qualification  
(1st or higher degree exc.)      
Higher education 78302 0.108 0.311 0 1 
A level or equivalent 78302 0.229 0.420 0 1 
GCSE or equivalent 78302 0.233 0.423 0 1 
Other qualifications 78302 0.112 0.316 0 1 
No qualification 78302 0.082 0.275 0 1 
Marital status  
(Single exc.)      
Married 78302 0.553 0.497 0 1 
Separated 78302 0.030 0.170 0 1 
Divorced 78302 0.086 0.280 0 1 
Widowed 78302 0.014 0.117 0 1 
Dep. children in family  78302 0.376 0.484 0 1 
Sex & dependent children  
(Male & no dep. child exc.)      
Male & dep. child 78302 0.170 0.376 0 1 
Female & no dep. child  78302 0.328 0.469 0 1 
Female & dep. child 78302 0.205 0.404 0 1 
Real wage band  
(Less than £100 exc.)      
£100~£199 78302 0.246 0.430 0 1 
£200~£299 78302 0.268 0.443 0 1 
£300~£399 78302 0.166 0.372 0 1 
£400~£499 78302 0.092 0.289 0 1 
£500 or over 78302 0.093 0.291 0 1 
Full-time worker (Part-time exc.) 78302 0.723 0.447 0 1 
Permanent worker (Temp exc.) 78302 0.949 0.219 0 1 
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Table 4.2. Summary statistics for unpaid overtime work regression (cont.) 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Job tenure  
(Less than 1 yr exc.)      
1 but less than 5 years 78302 0.334 0.472 0 1 
5 but less than 10 years 78302 0.208 0.406 0 1 
10 less than 20 years 78302 0.184 0.387 0 1 
20 years or more 78302 0.114 0.318 0 1 
Occupational class  
(Managers & senior official exc.)      
Professional occ. 78302 0.136 0.343 0 1 
Assoc. profession &technical 78302 0.147 0.354 0 1 
Administrative and secretarial 78302 0.137 0.343 0 1 
Skilled trades occupations 78302 0.072 0.259 0 1 
Personal service occupations 78302 0.090 0.287 0 1 
Sales and customer service  78302 0.083 0.276 0 1 
Process, plant and machine  78302 0.070 0.256 0 1 
Elementary occupations 78302 0.126 0.332 0 1 
Paid overtime work hours  78302 1.249 3.503 0 60 
Usual weekly work hours  
(0~14 hours exc.)      
15~24 hours 78302 0.148 0.355 0 1 
25~34 hours 78302 0.108 0.310 0 1 
35 hours or over 78302 0.671 0.470 0 1 
Regional dummies  
(North East exc.)      
North West 78302 0.104 0.305 0 1 
Yorkshire & the Humber 78302 0.098 0.298 0 1 
East Midlands 78302 0.078 0.268 0 1 
West Midlands 78302 0.084 0.278 0 1 
Eastern 78302 0.039 0.193 0 1 
London 78302 0.105 0.307 0 1 
South East 78302 0.186 0.389 0 1 
South West 78302 0.087 0.281 0 1 
Wales 78302 0.045 0.208 0 1 
Scotland 78302 0.095 0.293 0 1 
Northern Ireland 78302 0.023 0.148 0 1 
Year (2004 exc.) 
     
2005 78302 0.114 0.317 0 1 
2006 78302 0.164 0.370 0 1 
2007 78302 0.164 0.370 0 1 
2008 78302 0.159 0.366 0 1 
2009 78302 0.143 0.351 0 1 
2010 78302 0.137 0.343 0 1 
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4.4. Empirical results and discussion 
4.4.1. Absenteeism rate  
Table 4.3 reports the OLS regression results for the absenteeism rates. The 
explanatory variables are gradually added from column (1) to column (6). This is 
done so it would be possible to see how explanatory variables are correlated with 
commuting time and absenteeism rates and if they reduce bias. In column (1), 
only commuting time is controlled for and it turns out to have a negative 
correlation with the absenteeism rate implying that workers who commute longer 
tend to exhibit lower degree of absenteeism, which is contrary to the prediction 
made in Section 4.2. However, the correlation is not significant at any 
conventional levels. In column (2), the addition of regions of work and year 
dummies increases the size of the estimate of commuting time slightly and the p-
value also decreases towards zero (i.e. the estimate becomes more significant).  
 
The job characteristics are controlled for first as they are believed to be more 
highly correlated with commuting time and the absenteeism rate than personal and 
demographic attributes. Among the job characteristics, wage deserves prior 
attention as it is expected to be the most relevant in explaining the spurious 
relationship between the dependent and the main explanatory variables. When the 
dummy variables for the real wage bands are controlled for in column (3), the 
estimated coefficient of commuting time increases dramatically and is now 
statistically significant at 1% level. As predicted previously, the labour income 
turns out to be correlated positively with both commuting time and work effort. 
Furthermore, judging from the estimates of the real wage dummies, the 
absenteeism rate goes down as the wage increases. This result is consistent with 
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the findings in the related literature, which suggests that the financial rewards 
exert a positive influence over work effort levels (Barmby, 2002). In column (4), 
the two variables which describe personal job status within the workers’ firms are 
added. They indicate respectively whether workers are full-time or part-time and 
whether temporary or permanent. Contrary to the predictions made previously, the 
estimated coefficient of interest changes little. This result implies that such a 
status does not have an independent impact on the estimate, separate from the 
wage level. 
 
When the remaining job characteristics are added in column (5), the estimated 
coefficient of commuting time increases and becomes more statistically 
significant according to the attached p-value. The job tenure (the length of time in 
the current job) turns out to be important in uncovering the spurious relationship 
between commuting time and the absenteeism rate. The job tenure is found to be 
positively correlated with the absenteeism rate. Those who have worked for their 
current employers for less than 1 year have an absenteeism rate of about 2.52%, 
whereas those there for over 20 years have a 3.76% absenteeism rate. Furthermore, 
the estimated coefficients of the job tenure dummies suggest that workers tend to 
take more time off due to sickness and injury and personal- or family-related 
reasons as the time with their employer increases. This could partly be for reasons 
of age and health but it rather seems because workers become more comfortable 
with revealing their desire for absenteeism as the time spent in the same 
workplace increases. Indeed, the addition of age and age squared does not change 
the magnitude of the estimates of job tenure a great deal, as in column (6), which 
is supportive of this interpretation. Job tenure is correlated negatively with 
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commuting time. This is likely because workers have gradually moved closer to 
their workplaces over time (Gordon, Richardson and Jun, 1991). Therefore, the 
addition of job tenure corrects the negative bias and increases the estimate of main 
interest. 
 
The occupational type or class also increases the estimate slightly. Of the 
occupations, workers in high-status careers are found to be absent from work less 
often and commute for a longer time. While the basic average absenteeism rate for 
the entire sample is 3.30%, those for high-status jobs such as the ‘managers and 
senior officials’ and ‘professional occupation’ are 1.93% and 2.71% respectively. 
The average commuting times for these two groups are 33.27 and 30.91 minutes 
respectively but the average for all workers is only 25.63 minutes. In contrast, 
‘personal service occupation’, which is a relatively low-status job, has the highest 
absenteeism rate (4.85%) and the second shortest commuting time (18.98 
minutes). Those in ‘process, plant and machine operative’ and ‘elementary 
occupations’ are also characterised by high absenteeism rates and short 
commuting times. Overall, absenteeism rates and commuting times are negatively 
correlated across the occupational types and hence their omission could cause 
downward bias. It is worth noting that its effect on the relationship between the 
commuting time and the absenteeism rate is independent of the wage. This result 
implies that high-status jobs may provide other rewards, in addition to wages and 
therefore a worker’s occupational type seems to indicate a level of non-wage 
compensation to some extent. 
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Table 4.3. OLS estimation of absenteeism rate  
(Dependent variable: Absenteeism rate) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Commuting time (in hour) -0.000250 0.000651 0.00621*** 0.00622*** 0.00820*** 0.00854*** 
 (0.00163) (0.00173) (0.00181) (0.00181) (0.00183) (0.00183) 
Real wage band  
(Less than £100 exc.) 
      
£100~£199   -0.005** -0.006** -0.010*** -0.011*** 
   (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
£200~£299   -0.010*** -0.013*** -0.017*** -0.018*** 
   (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
£300~£399   -0.014*** -0.017*** -0.022*** -0.022*** 
   (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
£400~£499   -0.022*** -0.025*** -0.029*** -0.029*** 
   (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
£500 or over   -0.026*** -0.028*** -0.031*** -0.031*** 
   (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Full-time worker (Part-time exc.)    0.003 0.005*** 0.008*** 
    (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Permanent worker (Temp exc.)    0.003 -0.003 -0.004 
    (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Job tenure 
(Less than 1 yr exc.) 
      
1 but less than 5 years     0.010*** 0.008*** 
     (0.002) (0.002) 
5 but less than 10 years     0.016*** 0.012*** 
     (0.002) (0.002) 
10 less than 20 years     0.018*** 0.012*** 
     (0.002) (0.002) 
20 years or more     0.021*** 0.015*** 
     (0.002) (0.003) 
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Table 4.3. OLS estimation of absenteeism rate (cont.) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Occupational class  
(Managers & senior official exc.) 
      
Professional occ.     0.009*** 0.008*** 
     (0.002) (0.002) 
Assoc. profession & technical     0.014*** 0.014*** 
     (0.002) (0.002) 
Administrative and secretarial     0.011*** 0.010*** 
     (0.002) (0.002) 
Skilled trades occupations     0.007*** 0.010*** 
     (0.002) (0.003) 
Personal service occupations     0.023*** 0.022*** 
     (0.003) (0.003) 
Sales and customer service     0.007*** 0.009*** 
     (0.003) (0.003) 
Process, plant and machine     0.014*** 0.014*** 
     (0.003) (0.003) 
Elementary occupations     0.011*** 0.012*** 
     (0.002) (0.003) 
Age      0.001** 
      (0.000) 
Age squared      -0.000 
      (0.000) 
Male (Female exc.)      -0.005*** 
      (0.001) 
Qualification  
(1st or higher degree exc.) 
      
Higher education      -0.004* 
      (0.002) 
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Table 4.3. OLS estimation of absenteeism rate (cont.) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
A level or equivalent      -0.003 
      (0.002) 
GCSE or equivalent      -0.001 
      (0.002) 
Other qualifications      -0.002 
      (0.002) 
No qualification      0.001 
      (0.003) 
Marital status (Single exc.)       
Married      0.001 
      (0.002) 
Separated      0.000 
      (0.004) 
Divorced      0.007** 
      (0.003) 
Widowed      0.012* 
      (0.007) 
Dep. children in family      -0.000 
      (0.001) 
Region No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.041*** 0.039*** 0.022*** 0.007 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) 
Adj. R-squared -0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.005 
No. of obs. 78029 78029 78029 78029 78029 78029 
Note: ***, **,* refer to the significance levels at 1, 5 and 10% respectively. Robust standard errors are given in parenthesis. The explanatory variables are added to the 
specification gradually. The types of variables controlled for additionally for each column are as follows: (1) commuting time (2) regional and year dummies (3) real wage (4) 
personal job statuses (5) other job characteristics (6) personal characteristics. The estimated coefficients for the regional and year dummies are missed from the table.  
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The inclusion of personal and demographic characteristics does not change the 
estimate to a great degree, as shown in column (6). Of the personal characteristics, 
gender is the most relevant in explaining the spurious relationship and in fact, it is 
almost entirely responsible for the increase in the estimate. The reason for the 
increased estimate of commuting time is that gender is correlated with both 
commuting time and absenteeism. As shown with the negative sign for male 
workers in column (4), female workers have higher absenteeism rates than male 
workers on average. In the literature, women have been also reported to have a 
higher rate of absenteeism than men (Johns, 1978; Garcia, 1987; Barmby et al., 
2002). A perception that women are physically more vulnerable could be a reason 
for which absenteeism is allowed more generously for women. Mastekaasa and 
Olsen (1998) argue that a gender difference in absenteeism reflects a difference in 
general health conditions and personality between the two genders. At the same 
time, commuting time is longer for men on average (28.88 vs. 22.80 minutes). 
Without including gender in the specifications, then, shorter-distance commuters 
would appear to be more often absent from work and the estimate of commuting 
time would be biased downward. 
 
The regression result in column (6), with all the relevant independent variables 
being controlled for, suggests that there exists a positive correlation between 
commuting time and the absenteeism rate, which is consistent with the prediction. 
As sensed from the low R squared, only a little of the variation in the absenteeism 
can be explained by control variables, probably because, by nature, absenteeism is 
often caused by random events and is suppressed by employers. Considering this, 
one of the contributions made by this chapter is that commuting time is identified 
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as one of the few strong determinants of absenteeism. An hour increase in 
commuting time leads to a 0.85% increase in the absenteeism rate. Considering 
that the average absenteeism rate is 3.3%, as shown in Table 4.1, this increase 
does not seem trivial.  
 
4.4.2. Unpaid overtime hours 
Table 4.4 reports the OLS estimation results for usual unpaid overtime hours. 
Similar to the case of absenteeism, the model specifications vary from (1) to (6) 
by adding more control variables gradually. In column (1), where only the daily 
commuting time is included, the estimate of commuting time is highly positive 
and statistically very significant, which is contrary to the prediction made in 
Section 4.2. However, the estimate is likely to be biased due to many omitted 
variables. Even when, in addition, the regional and year dummies are controlled 
for, the bias slightly decreases (column (2)). In column (3), the real wage 
dummies are included first among the various job characteristics. The estimate is 
substantially reduced and turns negative, which is consistent with the prediction 
made previously but it is barely significant yet. Unpaid overtime work increases 
with the wage non-linearly, in particular, at an increasing rate. Those who earn 
over £500 per week do 4.8 hours more of unpaid work per week than those who 
earn less than £100. Reflecting the case of absenteeism, personal job status within 
companies has little independent effect on the estimate from the real wage, when 
those three variables are controlled for in column (4).  
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Table 4.4. OLS estimation of unpaid overtime work 
(Dependent variable: Unpaid overtime work hours) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Commuting time (in hour) 1.154*** 0.994*** -0.0503 -0.0526 -0.170*** -0.176*** 
 (0.0470) (0.0489) (0.0479) (0.0480) (0.0469) (0.0465) 
Real wage band  
(Less than £100 exc.) 
      
£100~£199   0.154*** 0.049* -0.144*** -0.222*** 
   (0.019) (0.025) (0.026) (0.028) 
£200~£299   0.778*** 0.589*** 0.088** -0.046 
   (0.027) (0.037) (0.040) (0.042) 
£300~£399   1.827*** 1.625*** 0.635*** 0.444*** 
   (0.042) (0.050) (0.055) (0.058) 
£400~£499   3.249*** 3.041*** 1.539*** 1.296*** 
   (0.070) (0.075) (0.079) (0.083) 
£500 or over   4.808*** 4.598*** 2.772*** 2.470*** 
   (0.083) (0.087) (0.094) (0.097) 
Full-time worker    0.223*** 0.489*** 0.620*** 
    (0.026) (0.027) (0.030) 
Permanent worker    0.102** 0.290*** 0.346*** 
    (0.049) (0.049) (0.050) 
Job tenure  
(Less than 1 yr exc.) 
      
1 but less than 5 years     0.170*** 0.163*** 
     (0.035) (0.036) 
5 but less than 10 years     0.131*** 0.142*** 
     (0.041) (0.043) 
10 less than 20 years     0.036 0.086* 
     (0.044) (0.047) 
20 years or more     -0.023 0.098* 
     (0.053) (0.057) 
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Table 4.4. OLS estimation of unpaid overtime work (cont.) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Occupational class  
(Managers & senior official exc.) 
      
Professional occ.     0.432*** 0.042 
     (0.081) (0.081) 
Assoc. profession & technical     -1.731*** -1.831*** 
     (0.062) (0.062) 
Administrative and secretarial     -1.985*** -1.931*** 
     (0.059) (0.059) 
Skilled trades occupations     -2.477*** -2.089*** 
     (0.061) (0.063) 
Personal service occupations     -1.880*** -1.810*** 
     (0.061) (0.061) 
Sales and customer service     -2.103*** -1.901*** 
     (0.060) (0.061) 
Process, plant and machine     -2.495*** -2.076*** 
     (0.061) (0.063) 
Elementary occupations     -2.285*** -1.942*** 
     (0.057) (0.058) 
Paid overtime work hours     -0.076*** -0.068*** 
     (0.003) (0.003) 
Age      0.023*** 
      (0.006) 
Age squared      -0.000*** 
      (0.000) 
Male (Female exc.)      -0.332*** 
      (0.035) 
Qualification  
(1st or higher degree exc.) 
      
Higher education      -0.630*** 
      (0.060) 
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Table 4.4. OLS estimation of unpaid overtime work (cont.) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
A level or equivalent      -0.960*** 
      (0.048) 
GCSE or equivalent      -0.997*** 
      (0.047) 
Other qualifications      -1.113*** 
      (0.052) 
No qualification      -1.213*** 
      (0.050) 
Marital status (Single exc.)       
Married      0.037 
      (0.038) 
Separated      -0.041 
      (0.072) 
Divorced      0.098* 
      (0.056) 
Widowed      -0.017 
      (0.095) 
Dep. children in family      -0.116*** 
      (0.031) 
Region No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 1.026*** 0.837*** 0.116* 0.002 1.911*** 2.299*** 
 (0.022) (0.070) (0.065) (0.079) (0.096) (0.135) 
Adj. R-squared 0.012 0.016 0.136 0.136 0.197 0.206 
No. of obs. 78302 78302 78302 78302 78302 78302 
Note: ***, **,* refer to the significance levels at 1, 5 and 10% respectively. Robust standard errors are given in parenthesis. The explanatory variables are added to the 
specification gradually. The types of variables controlled for additionally for each column are as follows: (1) commuting time (2) regional and year dummies (3) real wage (4) 
personal job statuses (5) other job characteristics (6) personal characteristics. The estimated coefficients for the regional and year dummies are missed from the table.  
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When the remaining job characteristics are controlled for, the estimate deceases 
substantially and becomes statistically significant at 1% level (column (5)). 
Among the newly added variables in column (5), the types of occupation are 
particularly effective in correcting the bias of the estimated coefficient of 
commuting time. Those with the two highest-status jobs (manager and senior 
official and professional occupations) do more unpaid work per week by 3 to 4 
hours compared to the rest. Also, their commuting time is well over 30 minutes 
while the average is only 26 minutes. On the other hand, those with relatively low 
skilled jobs are likely to be characterised by low unpaid overtime work (usually 
less than an hour) and short commuting time (about 20 minutes). As was the case 
with absenteeism, the occupational types seem to be deeply associated with the 
non-wage compensations and therefore their inclusion removes the bias further.  
 
Paid overtime hours appear only in the regression specification for the unpaid 
overtime. When being controlled for in column (5), it decreases the estimate of 
interest, implying that commuting time and unpaid overtime hours were 
spuriously correlated through the paid overtime hours. Firstly, the paid overtime 
work has a strong negative relationship with the amount of unpaid overtime work, 
likely because there is a time constraint on how much more workers can work on 
top of their basic hours. For the regression sample, the total overtime work (a sum 
of unpaid and paid overtime work) averages at just over 6 hours and 75% of the 
workers work overtime less than 10 hours and 90% less than 15 hours per week. 
That is, a majority of workers can work only up to certain limited hours per week. 
Therefore, there has to be a trade-off between paid and unpaid overtime hours 
from the workers’ points of view. Indeed, among the regression sample, those who 
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did less than an hour-long paid overtime did over 5 hours of unpaid overtime 
work, whereas those who did more than 5 hours paid overtime only did less than 
an hour of unpaid work. As an indicator for the degree of the trade-off, the 
correlation between them is -0.327. At the same time, workers with shorter 
commuting time tend to work more paid overtime than those with longer 
commuting time. This seems because those with short commuting time are less 
time-constrained and hence they are able to do more work to earn more. As a 
result, if the paid overtime hours were not included in the model, the estimated 
coefficient of commuting time would be biased upward.  
 
In column (6), the respondents’ personal and demographic characteristics are 
added and the estimate becomes more negative. Unlike in the case of absenteeism, 
regarding personal characteristics, educational qualification level plays the biggest 
role in correcting the downward bias. This is because the level of education is 
positively correlated with both commuting time and unpaid overtime hours. It is 
relatively well reported that educational attainment is closely associated with 
commuting time (e.g. Schwanen and Dijst, 2002; Lee and McDonald, 2003). 
However, it is unclear why the education level is found to be correlated with 
unpaid overtime work in a way that highly educated workers tend to do more 
unpaid hours. The best guess is that those with a higher level of education are 
more ambitious for their future career path so that by doing more unpaid work 
they show their loyalty to the employers and acquire work skills and experience. 
The indirect evidence found in the literature suggests that long-term unpaid work 
increases real labour earnings and the probability of promotion, or job retention 
(Anger, 2006; Pannenberg, 2002). Furthermore, it may be partly because jobs 
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wanted by highly educated workers are relatively rare and pay a wage high 
enough to attract workers from long distances. 
 
Despite the absenteeism rate and unpaid overtime work hours being fairly 
distinguishable in terms of their characteristics, except that they are both proxies 
for effort level, the two sets of empirical results which adopt each of them as a 
dependent variable respectively indicate the same findings. These findings, 
moreover, are consistent with the predictions made in Section 4.3. As most major 
variables are controlled for, the likelihood of the bias caused by omitted variables 
should be fairly low. Furthermore, on the whole, the addition of explanatory 
variables tends to reduce bias. 
 
4.4.3. Regressions with interaction terms 
When various personal, demographic and job characteristics are controlled for, the 
relationship between work effort and commuting time turns out to be statistically 
significant. One way to check the robustness of the results is to see if the 
empirical results are consistent with predictions for sub-sample groups using 
interaction terms. Firstly, the estimated coefficient of commuting time is 
examined by the full-time/part-time status of workers. In essence, the neoclassical 
model predicts that commuting time is considered as a part of work hours but not 
paid for so that the effective hourly wage (income divided by a sum of working 
and commuting hours) goes down as commuting time increases. As a result, the 
work effort level is also expected to become lower as the effective wage declines. 
An increase in commuting time would lower the effective wage for part-timers to 
a greater extent than for full-timers and therefore the effort level would fall more 
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sharply with commuting time for part-timers. The estimated coefficient of 
commuting time in the absenteeism regression should be greater and the one in 
the unpaid overtime work regression should be lower (more negative) for part-
time workers than for full-time workers.  
 
The regression results with the interaction terms between the full-time/part-time 
indicators and commuting time are presented in Table 4.5 and column (1) shows 
the results for the absenteeism regression. For both part-time and full-time 
workers, the estimated coefficients of commuting time are positive and 
statistically significant. This shows that the relationship is not confined just to a 
certain sub-sample group. More importantly, the estimated coefficient is much 
greater for part-time workers than full-time workers as expected. Column (2) 
presents the results for the unpaid overtime regression. Similarly, the estimated 
coefficients are negative in both cases with that for part-time workers being more 
pronounced. Again, the empirical results are consistent with the prediction 
regardless of the type of dependent variables.  
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Table 4.5. OLS regression with interaction terms 1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable Absenteeism 
rate 
Unpaid 
overtime 
Absenteeism 
rate 
Unpaid 
overtime 
Interaction terms:     
Full-time × commuting time 0.00644*** -0.111**   
 (0.00194) (0.0539)   
Part-time × commuting time 0.0193*** -0.503***   
 (0.00472) (0.0507)   
Interaction terms:     
0~14 hrs × commuting time   0.0262** -0.506*** 
   (0.0108) (0.0752) 
15~24 hrs × commuting time   0.0150*** -0.504*** 
   (0.00568) (0.0795) 
25~34 hrs × commuting time   0.0147** -0.377*** 
   (0.00604) (0.129) 
35 hrs and over 
×commuting time 
  0.00637*** -0.0913* 
   (0.00200) (0.0551) 
Real wage band  
(Less than £100 exc.) 
    
£100~£199 -0.012*** -0.196*** -0.015*** -0.157*** 
 (0.003) (0.028) (0.003) (0.036) 
£200~£299 -0.019*** -0.016 -0.022*** 0.193*** 
 (0.003) (0.042) (0.004) (0.050) 
£300~£399 -0.023*** 0.467*** -0.026*** 0.707*** 
 (0.004) (0.058) (0.004) (0.065) 
£400~£499 -0.030*** 1.312*** -0.033*** 1.575*** 
 (0.004) (0.082) (0.004) (0.088) 
£500 or over -0.031*** 2.475*** -0.034*** 2.745*** 
 (0.004) (0.097) (0.004) (0.101) 
Full-time worker (Part-time exc.) 0.013*** 0.474***   
 (0.003) (0.040)   
Permanent worker  
(Temp exc.) 
-0.003 0.339*** -0.004 0.375*** 
 (0.003) (0.050) (0.003) (0.050) 
Job tenure  
(Less than 1 yr exc.) 
    
1 but less than 5 years 0.008*** 0.163*** 0.008*** 0.154*** 
 (0.002) (0.036) (0.002) (0.036) 
5 but less than 10 years 0.012*** 0.144*** 0.012*** 0.120*** 
 (0.002) (0.043) (0.002) (0.043) 
10 less than 20 years 0.012*** 0.089* 0.012*** 0.066 
 (0.002) (0.047) (0.002) (0.047) 
20 years or more 0.015*** 0.105* 0.015*** 0.082 
 (0.003) (0.057) (0.003) (0.057) 
Occupational class  
(Managers & senior official exc.) 
    
Professional occ. 0.008*** 0.044 0.009*** 0.013 
 (0.002) (0.081) (0.002) (0.081) 
Assoc. profession & technical 0.015*** -1.833*** 0.015*** -1.862*** 
 (0.002) (0.062) (0.002) (0.062) 
Administrative and secretarial 0.010*** -1.934*** 0.010*** -1.953*** 
 (0.002) (0.059) (0.002) (0.059) 
Skilled trades occupations 0.010*** -2.090*** 0.010*** -2.083*** 
 (0.003) (0.063) (0.003) (0.064) 
Personal service occupations 0.022*** -1.817*** 0.022*** -1.859*** 
 (0.003) (0.061) (0.003) (0.061) 
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Table 4.5. OLS regression with interaction terms 1 (cont.) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable Absenteeism 
rate 
Unpaid 
overtime 
Absenteeism 
rate 
Unpaid 
overtime 
Sales and customer service 0.009*** -1.906*** 0.009*** -1.943*** 
 (0.003) (0.061) (0.003) (0.061) 
Process, plant and machine 0.014*** -2.075*** 0.014*** -2.059*** 
 (0.003) (0.063) (0.003) (0.064) 
Elementary occupations 0.012*** -1.950*** 0.012*** -1.975*** 
 (0.003) (0.058) (0.003) (0.058) 
Age 0.001** 0.023*** 0.001* 0.023*** 
 (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.006) 
Age squared -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male (Female exc.) -0.005*** -0.332*** -0.005*** -0.251*** 
 (0.001) (0.035) (0.001) (0.035) 
Qualification  
(1st or higher degree exc.) 
    
Higher education -0.004* -0.632*** -0.004* -0.633*** 
 (0.002) (0.060) (0.002) (0.060) 
A level or equivalent -0.002 -0.964*** -0.003 -0.949*** 
 (0.002) (0.048) (0.002) (0.048) 
GCSE or equivalent -0.001 -1.003*** -0.001 -0.981*** 
 (0.002) (0.047) (0.002) (0.047) 
Other qualifications -0.002 -1.116*** -0.002 -1.081*** 
 (0.002) (0.052) (0.002) (0.052) 
No qualification 0.001 -1.217*** 0.001 -1.174*** 
 (0.003) (0.050) (0.003) (0.050) 
Marital status (Single exc.)     
Married 0.001 0.035 0.001 0.014 
 (0.002) (0.038) (0.002) (0.038) 
Separated -0.000 -0.038 -0.000 -0.046 
 (0.004) (0.072) (0.004) (0.072) 
Divorced 0.007** 0.097* 0.007** 0.097* 
 (0.003) (0.056) (0.003) (0.056) 
Widowed 0.013* -0.021 0.013* -0.022 
 (0.007) (0.095) (0.007) (0.096) 
Dep. children in family -0.000 -0.115*** -0.000 -0.170*** 
 (0.001) (0.031) (0.001) (0.031) 
Paid overtime work hours  -0.068***  -0.067*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Usual weekly work hours  
(0~14 hours exc.) 
    
15~24 hours   0.008* 0.074* 
   (0.005) (0.040) 
25~34 hours   0.015*** 0.561*** 
   (0.005) (0.069) 
35 hours or over   0.020*** 0.179*** 
   (0.005) (0.057) 
Constant 0.003 2.411*** 0.000 2.435*** 
 (0.008) (0.135) (0.008) (0.136) 
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.005 0.206 0.005 0.205 
No. of obs. 78029 78302 78029 78302 
Note: ***, **,* refer to the significance levels at 1, 5 and 10% respectively. Robust standard errors 
are given in parenthesis. The estimated coefficients for the regional and year dummies are missed 
from the table.
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There could be a concern that part-time/full-time status may represent something 
other than the length of work hours. The differences between part-time and full-
time workers may come from the difference in the degree of commitment to their 
employers or desire and expectation for future career development within their 
companies. Depending on the assumption taken regarding what part-time/full-
time status really represents, the empirical results above may be interpreted in 
different ways. To avoid ambiguity in the interpretation of the results, a direct 
measure of work hours is introduced to replace the full-time/part-time status. 
Basic work hours in the form of dummy variables are now included in the 
regression model instead of the full-time/part-time status. The basic work hours 
are categorised into 0~14, 15~24, 25~34, and 35 hour or over. Then, the estimated 
coefficients are examined for the four groups of working hours using the 
interaction terms. Column (3) and (4) of Table 4.5 show respectively the empirical 
results with the interaction terms between commuting time and the bands of basic 
work hours. In both columns, it is clearly shown that the relationship between 
commuting and the dependent variables becomes stronger and statistically more 
significant as the basic work hours decrease. Therefore, it is confirmed that the 
length of work hours has an effect on the extent to which commuting time affects 
work effort, which is consistent with the prediction based on the theoretical model.  
 
It is also the case that the behaviour of men and women regarding commuting and 
absenteeism or unpaid overtime is very different. In the cases of both unpaid 
overtime and absenteeism, female workers are found to be associated with a lower 
level of work effort according to the estimated coefficient of ‘Male’ in Table 4.3 
and Table 4.4. This is plausible since women usually do more household work and 
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hence are more time-constrained than men, especially when they have dependent 
children. The time-constrained workers with less leisure time would respond more 
sensitively to a given increase in commuting time so that they would reduce their 
work effort to a greater extent. Therefore, it is expected that working women are 
absent more often from work and do less unpaid overtime work than working men 
as commuting time increases. The estimated coefficient of commuting time would 
be greater for women in the absenteeism regression and smaller in the unpaid 
overtime work regression. This prediction is tested using the interaction term 
between commuting time and gender of the workers. The estimated coefficient for 
women is greater than that for men in the absenteeism regression (column (1) of 
Table 4.6) and more negative in the unpaid overtime work regression (column (2) 
of Table 4.6). 
 
Tests are made to determine whether the presence of dependent children is the 
main reason why female workers reduce their effort levels to a greater extent than 
male counterparts as commuting time increases. For this experiment, a new 
variable is created by combining the sex and the existence of dependent children 
in the family. The new variable takes four options: ‘male & no dependent 
children’, ‘male & some dependent children’, ‘female & no dependent children’ or 
‘female & some dependent children’. Then, the estimate of commuting time for 
each of those sub-groups is examined through the interaction terms between the 
‘sex & dependent children’ variable and commuting time. Among those four sub-
groups, ‘female & some dependent children’ is expected to exhibit the strongest 
relationship between commuting time and the dependent variables. 
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Table 4.6. OLS regressions with interaction terms 2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable Absence 
rate 
Unpaid 
overtime 
Absence 
rate 
Unpaid 
overtime 
Interaction terms: 
Sex × Commuting time 
    
Male × commuting time 0.00652*** -0.116*   
 (0.00222) (0.0621)   
Female × commuting time 0.0117*** -0.270***   
 (0.00285) (0.0631)   
Interaction terms: 
Sex & Dep. child status 
×Commuting time 
    
Male & no dep. Child 
×commuting time 
  0.00868*** -0.165** 
   (0.00291) (0.0763) 
Male &dep. child 
×commuting time 
  0.00318 -0.0442 
   (0.00318) (0.101) 
Female &no dep. Child 
×commuting time 
  0.0107*** -0.193** 
   (0.00355) (0.0802) 
Female & dep. Child 
×commuting time 
  0.0134*** -0.417*** 
   (0.00443) (0.0937) 
Real wage band (below £100 exc.)     
£100~£199 -0.011*** -0.217*** -0.011*** -0.210*** 
 (0.003) (0.028) (0.003) (0.028) 
£200~£299 -0.018*** -0.036 -0.018*** -0.033 
 (0.003) (0.043) (0.003) (0.043) 
£300~£399 -0.022*** 0.453*** -0.022*** 0.453*** 
 (0.004) (0.058) (0.004) (0.058) 
£400~£499 -0.029*** 1.302*** -0.030*** 1.298*** 
 (0.004) (0.083) (0.004) (0.083) 
£500 or over -0.031*** 2.470*** -0.031*** 2.459*** 
 (0.004) (0.097) (0.004) (0.097) 
Full-time worker (Part-time exc.) 0.008*** 0.621*** 0.008*** 0.599*** 
 (0.002) (0.030) (0.002) (0.030) 
Permanent worker (Temp exc.) -0.004 0.344*** -0.003 0.346*** 
 (0.003) (0.050) (0.003) (0.050) 
Job tenure (Less than 1 yr exc.)     
1 but less than 5 years 0.008*** 0.162*** 0.008*** 0.163*** 
 (0.002) (0.036) (0.002) (0.036) 
5 but less than 10 years 0.012*** 0.142*** 0.012*** 0.145*** 
 (0.002) (0.043) (0.002) (0.043) 
10 less than 20 years 0.012*** 0.086* 0.012*** 0.087* 
 (0.002) (0.047) (0.002) (0.047) 
20 years or more 0.015*** 0.099* 0.015*** 0.105* 
 (0.003) (0.057) (0.003) (0.057) 
Occupational class  
(Managers & senior official exc.) 
    
Professional occ. 0.008*** 0.041 0.008*** 0.045 
 (0.002) (0.081) (0.002) (0.081) 
Assoc. profession & technical 0.015*** -1.832*** 0.015*** -1.830*** 
 (0.002) (0.062) (0.002) (0.062) 
Administrative and secretarial 0.010*** -1.932*** 0.010*** -1.935*** 
 (0.002) (0.059) (0.002) (0.059) 
Skilled trades occupations 0.010*** -2.087*** 0.010*** -2.088*** 
 (0.003) (0.063) (0.003) (0.063) 
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Table 4.6. OLS regressions with interaction terms 2 (cont.) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable Absence 
rate 
Unpaid 
overtime 
Absence 
rate 
Unpaid 
overtime 
Personal service occupations 0.022*** -1.815*** 0.022*** -1.815*** 
 (0.003) (0.061) (0.003) (0.061) 
Sales and customer service 0.009*** -1.903*** 0.009*** -1.907*** 
 (0.003) (0.061) (0.003) (0.061) 
Process, plant and machine 0.014*** -2.071*** 0.014*** -2.072*** 
 (0.003) (0.063) (0.003) (0.063) 
Elementary occupations 0.012*** -1.941*** 0.012*** -1.945*** 
 (0.003) (0.058) (0.003) (0.058) 
Age 0.001** 0.023*** 0.001** 0.024*** 
 (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.006) 
Age squared -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male (Female exc.) -0.003 -0.401***   
 (0.002) (0.047)   
Qualification (degrees exc.)     
Higher education -0.004* -0.633*** -0.004* -0.633*** 
 (0.002) (0.060) (0.002) (0.060) 
A level or equivalent -0.003 -0.963*** -0.003 -0.961*** 
 (0.002) (0.048) (0.002) (0.048) 
GCSE or equivalent -0.001 -1.001*** -0.001 -1.003*** 
 (0.002) (0.047) (0.002) (0.047) 
Other qualifications -0.002 -1.116*** -0.002 -1.120*** 
 (0.002) (0.052) (0.002) (0.052) 
No qualification 0.001 -1.217*** 0.001 -1.223*** 
 (0.003) (0.050) (0.003) (0.050) 
Marital status (Single exc.)     
Married 0.001 0.035 0.001 0.028 
 (0.002) (0.038) (0.002) (0.038) 
Separated 0.000 -0.042 0.000 -0.029 
 (0.004) (0.072) (0.004) (0.072) 
Divorced 0.007** 0.098* 0.007** 0.098* 
 (0.003) (0.056) (0.003) (0.056) 
Widowed 0.013* -0.020 0.012* -0.035 
 (0.007) (0.095) (0.007) (0.096) 
Dep. children in family -0.000 -0.117***   
 (0.001) (0.031)   
Paid overtime work hours  -0.068***  -0.068*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Sex & dependent children  
(Male & no dep. child exc.) 
    
Male & dep. child   0.003 -0.075 
   (0.003) (0.068) 
Female & no dep. child    0.004* 0.410*** 
   (0.003) (0.055) 
Female & dep. child   0.002 0.285*** 
   (0.003) (0.062) 
Constant 0.005 2.348*** 0.001 1.944*** 
 (0.008) (0.137) (0.008) (0.136) 
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.005 0.206 0.005 0.206 
No. of obs. 78029 78302 78029 78302 
Note: ***, **,* refer to the significance levels at 1, 5 and 10% respectively. Robust standard errors 
are given in parenthesis. The estimated coefficients for the regional and year dummies are missed 
from the table. 
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In column (3) of Table 4.6, the regression results for the absenteeism rate with the 
interaction terms between commuting time and ‘sex – dependent children’ 
dummies is presented. The estimated coefficient is the biggest for women with 
dependent children among the four groups while in the case of unpaid overtime 
work, the estimated coefficient is the lowest for women. Both of the results imply 
that childcare certainly imposes time-constraints on female workers so that they 
decrease their effort to a greater degree than any other group for a given increase 
in commuting time. Another interesting finding is that the presence of dependent 
children works in the opposite direction for male workers. Those with some 
dependent children have negative but insignificant estimates with both of the 
dependent variables, meaning that their effort levels do not really respond to the 
length of commuting time. It seems possible that male workers with dependent 
children are likely to be the main bread winners within their families and therefore 
they do not really adjust their effort levels according to how far they have to travel 
to work. 
 
4.4.4. Reverse causality 
Though it turns out that there is significant correlation between worker effort and 
commuting time and the impact of commuting time on measures of work effort 
are as predicted by the neoclassical model, one cannot be certain that the 
correlation is definitely causal and that the direction of causation runs only from 
commuting time to work effort. Theoretically, worker effort can affect commuting 
time. Less work-oriented workers might choose longer commutes, for example, 
because they want to live in suburban areas as they care more about family, child 
care and quality of life than work. Therefore, it is possible that the observed 
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correlation between them is causal in both directions. 
 
However, at least, it seems plausible to argue which of the two directions of 
causation contribute more to generating the observed correlation. Arguably, 
although less work-oriented individuals may want to live a long way from central 
business districts, they might also be expected to prioritise finding jobs near their 
homes since they are less work-motivated. In contrast, it is much more plausible 
that long commuting time causes workers to feel tired and hence negatively affect 
their willingness to exert effort at work. In the end, however, to infer the causation 
of interest, more sophisticated econometric approaches, such as IV estimation, 
should be tried. In this instance, a valid instrument should be correlated with 
commuting time but not with omitted variables which affect work effort. In theory, 
natural topology, such as rivers and mountains in the local areas, can be valid 
instruments as they can affect commuting time but they may not be correlated 
with unobservable characteristics that affect worker effort. Unfortunately, this 
identification strategy is not feasible with the data at hand as it does not provide 
information on detailed commuting routes of workers and therefore more suitable 
datasets need to be found for this strategy. A completely different but more 
feasible approach to identification of the causation may be to exploit a quasi-
natural experiment which brings an exogenous change in commuting time of 
workers, such as new road construction, the London Underground upgrade, etc. 
Then, one can judge whether the exogenous change in commuting time causes a 
change in work effort. This strategy should be tried in the future with appropriate 
data. 
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4.5. Conclusion  
This chapter explores the relationship between commuting time and workers’ 
effort. Absenteeism and unpaid overtime work hours are identified as proxy 
measures of workers’ effort through the literature review. The adoption of two 
measures reinforces the reliability of the empirical results. The dataset used for the 
empirical analysis is the QLFS which provides all the variables needed. When the 
relevant personal and demographical characteristics and job characteristics are 
controlled for, commuting time shows a positive correlation with absenteeism and 
a negative correlation with unpaid overtime hours as predicted through the 
neoclassical labour supply model.  
 
The robustness of the results is checked through the regression for sub-sample 
groups using the interaction terms. The model predicts that a reduction in part-
time worker effort levels is more pronounced for a given increase in commuting 
time as the increase lowers their effective wage to a greater extent than full-time 
workers. The empirical results turn out to be consistent with this prediction. 
Furthermore, the relationship for male and female workers is examined separately. 
It is reasonable to assume that female workers are more time-constrained as a 
result of family and childcare responsibilities and therefore their effort levels are 
expected to respond to the increase in commuting time more sensitively and this is 
empirically demonstrated to be true. Working women are more likely to be absent 
from work and do less unpaid overtime work than otherwise comparable men as 
their commuting time increases. This tendency is particularly stronger for women 
with dependent children than those without any. 
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The findings in this chapter have important implications for policy-makers, 
employers and workers. Firstly, when policy-makers weigh up the costs and 
benefits of building public transportation infrastructure (road, rail, etc.), they need 
to consider the benefits from the perspective of increased effort and productivity 
of workers. Secondly, employers could find it worth taking action to shorten 
employees’ commuting time or to improve commuting conditions. This could be 
done, for example, by providing free shuttle buses or by subsidising public 
transportation costs or fuel for car-users as the company can benefit from 
increased worker effort. Thirdly, for workers themselves, as commuting time 
affects their work incentive and performance negatively, it can also harm 
promotional opportunities and prospects of pay rises and raise the likelihood of 
dismissal. Therefore, it would be worth considering moving closer to the 
workplace if gains from the reduced commuting time are greater than the costs of 
relocation. 
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis presented three empirical essays on the interaction of labour and 
housing markets. These two markets are geographically overlapping with each 
other and indeed they are likely to be coincident for most households as people 
want work and their other daily activities to occur within a relatively limited area 
for the efficiency of time and resources. This, indeed, is the very basis of the 
monocentric model of urban land use which is the foundation of modern urban 
economics. As the spatial extent of the two markets is similar, many joint social 
and economic outcomes arise between them. Therefore, it is difficult to fully 
understand housing market phenomena without taking the labour market into 
consideration and vice versa. This thesis focuses on and confirms a few of the 
important ways these two markets interact.  
  
5.1. Discussion of the findings 
Chapter 2 examines the causal relationship between one’s tenure choice and 
unemployment status: specifically the proposition that homeownership causally 
and positively increases the probability of a person being unemployed. It has been 
argued that homeowners are less likely to move to other regions in response to 
negative demand shocks to their local labour markets due to large transaction 
costs in housing markets and therefore they are more likely to be unemployed at 
any given point in time. This is an important question for policy-makers as 
homeownership subsidies might have to be reconsidered if it were to turn out that 
there was this kind of causal relationship between homeownership and 
unemployment. The empirical challenge for the study comes from the possible 
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endogeneity of homeownership, which, if present, would cause OLS or logit 
estimators to be biased. To deal with any endogeneity, this research employs two 
plausible instruments, namely the local homeownership rate and parental 
homeownership status.  
 
The local homeownership rate is considered a comprehensive measure of how 
accessible homeownership is in the local area and available from UK panel data 
(BHPS). Using the panel structure of the dataset, a FE IV model is estimated and 
no causal relationship between homeownership and unemployment is found. In 
the related literature, parental homeownership status is found to affect children’s 
homeownership status positively through the inter-generational transfer of wealth 
and knowledge of the home-buying process. The British Cohort Study 1970 
provides information on parental homeownership status when the cohort members 
were very young. When the cohort member’s homeownership status is 
instrumented by parents’ homeownership status, no causal effect of 
homeownership on unemployment is found. 
 
Chapter 3 is the first empirical study to shed some light on the relationship 
between movers’ tenure decisions and the information available on their 
destination housing markets. If it is allowed that the longer the distance moved, 
the more difficult it becomes for households to collect information on their 
destination housing markets, distance moved is a useful proxy for information on 
those markets. So, this leads to the testable proposition that mover households will 
be more likely to rent the further they have moved. This chapter tests and 
confirms three hypotheses each of which is related to the notion that local housing 
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market information is important for movers’ tenure decisions. Firstly, the amount 
of information on destination housing markets held by movers decreases with the 
distance moved when it is proxied for by movers’ awareness of problems (e.g. 
crime, vandalism) in the new neighbourhoods. Secondly, movers tend to rent as 
the amount of information on the destination housing market decreases and that 
this is represented by the distance moved. Lastly, the longer the distance moved, 
the more quickly the households move again. This finding is consistent with the 
notion that the speed of the locational adjustment within the current housing 
market is expected to increase with the distance moved as longer-distance movers 
are less likely to be satisfied with the initial accommodation and neighbourhoods 
due to the lack of information on them prior to moves. Persuasive evidence is 
found in support of all three of these hypotheses. 
 
Chapter 4 demonstrates the negative impact of commuting time on worker effort. 
This issue has important implications for the various parties affected by worker 
effort. Despite the potentially important implications, the topic has been largely 
unexplored until a recent study with German data which confirmed the effect of 
commuting time on labour productivity. Though absenteeism rates and unpaid 
overtime hours have little in common except that they are closely related with 
worker effort, when they are adopted as a proxy measure for worker effort, they 
lead to the same conclusion that commuting time affects worker effort negatively. 
Even when the effect of commuting time on work effort is compared between sub-
groups of the regression sample (part-time and full-time, male and female 
workers), the results are consistent with the predictions made based on the 
neoclassical labour supply theory. 
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5.2. Contributions, limitations and future studies 
The most notable contribution made by this thesis is that it investigates relatively 
unexplored topics on the interaction between housing and labour markets – the 
two most spatial markets. Chapter 3 is the first empirical test of whether the 
distance moved affects movers’ tenure decisions. Though this topic can have 
significant implications for the rental market and labour mobility, there has been 
little attempt to evaluate the influence of local information on tenure decisions. 
This is probably because of the difficulty of framing the question in a way that 
would allow it to be addressed with available data. A significant contribution of 
this thesis is that it overcomes the difficulty of measuring the amount of local 
housing market information held by households prior to their moves by looking at 
the distance they moved. Chapter 4 is the first UK study of the impact of 
commuting time on worker effort. There have been many studies which measure 
the negative impact of commuting on worker health or well-being but none on 
worker effort or productivity directly. Considering the significant implications of 
this issue to the various parties concerned with worker effort in the workplace, it 
is surprising that it has not previously been the subject of research. 
 
Unlike the other two chapters, Chapter 2 focuses on a relatively well-explored 
topic and its contribution to the literature is mainly methodological. To identify 
the causal effect of an individual’s homeownership on unemployment status, it 
employs an IV approach with the two different types of instruments (local 
homeownership rate and parental homeownership status) which have not been 
applied in previous British studies. Especially, it complements existing studies in 
the sense that it is the first in the UK to combine the FE model and IV approach in 
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order to more rigorously assess the causal effect of homeownership on 
unemployment. 
 
Compared to Chapter 2 which adopts an IV approach to deal with the endogeneity 
of the dependent variable, Chapter 4 pays relatively less attention to the 
possibility of reverse causality and how to deal with it. It is concluded that 
commuting time has a negative impact on worker effort but theoretically the latter 
could also determine the former. For instance, less work-oriented workers may 
choose to live far away from their jobs to enjoy what they judge to be a better 
living environment. Though the reverse causality is not expected to be strong 
enough to invalidate the conclusion of Chapter 4, related further work might try to 
take a more sophisticated econometric approach to identify the direction of 
causality more precisely. One way to identify causation might be to exploit quasi-
natural experiments such as the new construction of roads or rail links or upgrades 
such as to London Underground, which cause an exogenous change in commuting 
time for workers in the affected areas. 
 
The obvious limitation of Chapter 2 is that it alone cannot tell why there is no 
relationship between unemployment and homeownership. However, the result of 
‘no causal relationship’ does not necessarily mean that nothing goes on between 
homeownership and unemployment. Homeowners may behave differently from 
renters to lower their chance of becoming unemployed or adopt different search 
strategies. For example, Munch et al. (2006) suggest that homeowners are more 
likely than renters to accept local jobs with low wage rates rather than stay 
unemployed. As there now seems to be a general consensus that homeownership 
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status does not cause unemployment, it is more important to understand why 
homeowners are not necessarily more likely to be unemployed than renters 
despite their obviously lower residential mobility. To date, it is this more general 
issue which has been relatively overlooked. In particular, it should be carefully 
examined whether homeowners are disadvantaged in terms of wage, commuting 
time, unpaid overtime work, job-skill mismatch and so on to retain their jobs. If 
homeowners maintain their employment only at the cost of decent working 
conditions, the subsidy schemes for homeownership may still need to be 
reconsidered even though it does not have a negative impact on employment 
status. 
 
The findings from a recent study raises a more fundamental question regarding 
Chapter 2: Are homeowners really less mobile than renters even when they want 
to move for employment opportunities? Hilber and Lyytikäinen (2012) show that 
stamp duty in the UK tends to hamper homeowner mobility in general but job-
related movers are an exception. This may be because the gains from job-related 
moves (e.g. higher wages and better chances of employment) exceed the moving 
costs. In contrast, Munch et al. (2006) show that homeownership lowers the 
likelihood of moving for job reasons. Therefore, it is necessary to examine 
carefully whether homeowners are less mobile than renters when they need to 
move for jobs and whether the degree of the homeowner’s job-related mobility 
varies by country or characteristics.  
 
One more issue worth further consideration in relation to Chapter 2 is why there is 
a gap between macro-level and micro-level studies of the relationship between 
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unemployment and homeownership. The results from the micro-studies exclude 
the possibility that the relationship between individuals’ homeownership and 
unemployment status is an underlying mechanism for the positive correlation 
between homeownership and unemployment rates at the macro-level. Therefore, it 
seems necessary to investigate what causes a positive correlation between those 
two rates and whether it has any important implications for housing and labour 
market policies. 
 
The implication of Chapter 3 for the labour market is that the availability of easily 
accessible accommodation in the housing/labour markets to which job-related 
movers want to move would be one of the most important factors to consider for 
the moving and location decisions for them. Based on this implication, a 
suggestion for further study related to Chapter 3 is to look at whether the 
existence of a larger private rental sector in a housing market would increase 
interregional mobility and attract more people to the local labour market and 
hence promote labour mobility at the national level. If it is supported empirically, 
some policy measures to encourage the growth of a more flexible and affordable 
private rental sector to improve the efficiency of national labour markets might be 
worth considering. 
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